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IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
Introduction
Decision making has attracted a considerable amount 
of research in a wide variety of scholarly and applied 
fields since the end of World War II. The decisional pro­
cess has been the center of research in disciplines as 
diverse as operations research and human relations. Because 
of this diversity, decision-making research has been sub­
sumed under a wide variety of models, many of which have 
little relation to each other.
The decisional framework has not been ignored in 
political science. Research using decision making in its 
title has been widely treated in most political science sub­
fields. Numerous bibliographical works in political science 
have made extensive use of the concept of "decision" 
(Wasserman and Silander, 1958; Gore and Silander, 1959;
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Wasserman and Silander, 1964; Robinson and Majak, 1967; 
Robinson, 1968). Such reviews, although valid efforts, 
analyze decision making primarily from a prescriptive or 
normative focus. Making such normative judgments on the 
"correct" way of deciding often results in nothing more ade­
quate than ideological arguments. In fact, it is question­
able whether prescriptive statements should be made when 
there is insufficient empirical understanding of the decision­
making process. One of the prime goals of this investigation 
is to contribute to an empirical theory of decision making, 
and not simply to prescribe the future decisional mechanisms.
Although traced in greater detail elsewhere (Kirk­
patrick, 1975b; 40-44), the definitional history of decision 
making in political science has reflected a variety of theo­
retical emphases. From a philosophical position, decisions 
have been conceived as "judgments(s) regarding what one ought 
to do in a certain situation after having deliberated on 
some alternate course of action" (Ofstad, 1961: 16). Histori­
cal and case studies have noted that decisions are "a cut 
between past and future, an introduction of an essentially 
new strand into the emerging pattern of history" (Shackle, 
1961: 3). Institutionalists link political decisions to pre­
serving and/or improving decision structures (Diesing, 1962), 
and to strengthening power relationships (Leoni, 1957).
All of the previous attempts at definition treat 
decisions as outcomes; each ignores the processual nature of
decision making. That is, most political science research 
on decision making has centered on the product of various 
decisions. Although outcomes are obviously important, the 
necessity of understanding how decisions are made (process) 
is paramount.
At the base of all decisions is the individual's 
choice, and thus the process the individual goes through in 
arriving at a final decision is the fundamental unit of all 
decisional process research. The prime interest of this 
study, however, is more broadly focused. The chief inter­
est is in decision making at the small group level.
Small groups prevade all elements of the political 
process. Small group decision-making units play a substan­
tial role in public policy as a considerable quantity of 
such decisions are created, legislated, implemented, and 
even adjudicated through small groups of elected and/or 
appointive officials. Small groups are both formal (e.g. 
Supreme Court, Constitutional sub-committees) and ad hoc 
(Presidential "kitchencabinets"); yet the small group deci­
sional process has gained little attention in political 
science research. Although research on particular small 
groups has been a prime focus of scholarly investigation, 
analysis of the commonalities of such political groups has 
been ignored. In fact, most political science research on 
decision making in small groups has emphasized the final 
political outcome of the decision process in question. For
instance, congressional studies often depend on the key vote 
on a specific measure and then infer the prior decisional 
process that might have occurred (Clausen, 1973; Kingdon, 
1973; Ripley, 1969). When the actual small group process is 
then analyzed, it often becomes heavily dependent on ideo- 
syncratic behavior described in detail after the decisions 
are finalized (Robinson, 1963; Manley, 1970; Wildavsky, 1974; 
Fenno, 1973)• The crucial question remains whether studies 
depending on final choice or vote behavior can actually in­
crease our knowledge of the process utilized in arriving at 
that final choice-
Thus, as political science moved from its theoreti­
cal discussion of decision making into behavioral research,
the complexity of decision making was essentially ignored.
As Heinz Eulau (1968: 208) noted:
With few exceptions, decision-making models in all 
their complexity have not been applied in political 
behavior research. Nevertheless, the possibility 
of breaking down the decision-making process into 
component parts that can be examined without neces­
sary reference to the total process promises 
empirically testable research propositions.
Yet, eight years later, Eulau still finds it necessary to
question the use of the decision-making concept by those
who are essentially studying roll calls (outcomes) in the
House of Representatives (Eulau, 1976).
This study attempts to examine decision making from
a more analytical perspective than traditionally utilized.
Central to this perspective are the three relatively
unexamined themes previously mentioned. First, analysis 
must center on the empirical, not the normative, referents 
of decisions. Second, the processual nature of decisions 
must be examined. Third, examination of decisions made in a 
small group context are needed because of the growing depen­
dence on such environments for major policy decisions. This 
analysis, then, will center on the empirical study of small 
group decisions via a processual analysis of those decisions.
This investigation will first examine the general 
class of alternative models available for examining political 
decision making. The remainder of Chapter I examines five 
general decision-making models: rational economic, psycho­
logical utilitarian, cybernetic, cognitive processual, and 
group dynamic approaches.
Chapter II outlines the specific framework used in 
this study emphasizing the applicability of the social psycho­
logical paradigm through individual cognitive emd group dy­
namic approaches. The model derived in Chapter II relies 
heavily on information and alternative search processes that 
explain individual shifts in a group decisional environment. 
The two principal elements of the decision model, search 
behavior and choice shift, are examined in the wake of the 
types of explanatory and intervening variables that have 
been theoretically linked to these processes in both the 
social psychology and communication literatures. Finally, 
a framework is constructed that joins the two processes of
search and choice shift into an operational design that is 
subject to empirical testing.
In Chapter III the research design for analysis of 
the decision-making process will be specified with an addi­
tional discussion of the particular design approach utilized 
— experimentation. Both the logic and fallacies of experi­
mental design are delineated with a particular emphasis on 
the needs of processual analysis. In addition, the relevant 
theoretical literature is examined and the specific hypothe­
ses derived from the model for experimental test in the 
analysis are listed.
The remaining chapters examine the actual experi­
mental results. Chapter IV outlines the research findings 
that explain the amount and complexity of information used 
in the search process by the experimental groups in making 
choices and recommendations. Chapter V examines the shifts 
that occur from individual predispositions to a final group 
choice and the particular models that explain those shifts. 
Finally, in Chapter VI the interaction of search procedures 
and choice shifts is examined in order to link the two di­
vergent processes theoretically and empirically. The last 
section of the chapter outlines the needs of future study 
for decision making in "real world" political groups and the 
interface of experimental and applied political decisional 
analysis.
Alternative Models 
Given the above constraints, studies of decision 
making have been examined under a wide array of theoretical 
models. These frameworks differ in their scope, analysis, 
and especially their assumptions about the nature of deci­
sion making. In order to facilitate understanding of the 
specific model to be utilized in this study, a brief over­
view of the various theoretical constructs applied to deci­
sional analysis is first outlined. Although referred to by 
a wide variety of terms reflecting the various disciplinary 
traditions, these constructs can be subsumed under the gen­
eral categories of rational economic models, psychological 
utilitarian models, cybernetic approaches, cognitive proces­
sual models, and group dynamic approaches. Each construct 
will be briefly critiqued both for the advantages and con­
straints inherent in each. It should be noted, however, that 
no single model can be construed as the "correct" method for 
analyzing decisions— only that certain models more adeo ately 
address the specifics of this investigation.
Rational Economic Models
Economic and rational choice models have rapidly 
become among the most attractive frameworks for examining 
decision making. Such models are carefully constructed 
mathematically, and are theoretically sophisticated (deduc­
tive) models of the process of decision making. Excellent 
reviews of the applicability of this class of models (Riker
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and Ordeshook, 1973; Curry and Wade, 1975; Downs, 1957;
Thorson, 1976), as well as the weaknesses of such models, 
(Kirkpatrick, 1975b; Conrad, 1970; Steinbruner, 1974) can 
be found in political science.
The rubrics addressing this general class of models 
are varied, e.g., mathematical and statistical decision 
theory, collective decision theory, axiomatic theory, game 
theory, positive theory, exchange theory; yet all are based 
on common assumptions. The values of a decision maker are 
aggregated in some manner such that a set of preferences are 
established regarding alternative states on those values.
The crux of the model is based on taking specific values and 
assigning units to each alternative outcome in the decision. 
Specifically, the utility concept is introduced to imply a 
measure of ultimate value (Steinbruner, 1974: 28; Luce and 
Raiffa, 1957). The major postulate of rational models empha­
sizes that the final decision will maximize the ultimate 
values (utility). However, since ultimate values can seldom 
be quantified, or even defined, the model usually takes a 
step backward to subjective utility such that relative values 
are established. Further, after a complete search for alter­
natives and their related utilities, the decision maker then 
estcd̂ lishes a preference ordering based on the subject's par­
ticular relative values on each alternative.
Yet, in order to do the formal, deductive calculus 
that is the elegance of the model, several critical, and
potentially crippling, assumptions must often be met. First, 
it must be assumed that all available alternatives are out­
lined. Second, all possible outcomes of each alternative 
are established, including unintended effects. Third, some 
probability is established for each alternative's success 
or failure (Conrad, 1970). Each of these emphasizes the 
need for the model to meet the assumption of "sensitivity to 
pertinent information" (Steinbruner, 1974; 35). Rational 
choice models require at least some assumption based on per­
fect, or near-perfect, information or knowledge. (Kirk­
patrick, 1975b: 46). In fact, a common categorization in 
rational models links decisions under certainty, risk, and 
uncertainty. Certainty implies known consequences for all 
alternatives, while risk concedes alternatives have conse­
quences with known probabilities of success/failure. Only 
the uncertainty condition acknowledges the undefinable or 
unknown probabilities for outcomes. Yet, even in the latter 
condition, "the preferences of the chooser are generally 
assumed to be certain." (Thorson, 1976) Further, these 
assumptions emphasize that preferences are established by 
the individual based on careful assessment of the subject's 
self-interest (Kirkpatrick, 1975b)•
Are such assumptions too limiting on decision­
making?: One game theorist even questions whether various
social and psychological processes should be ignored, or 
assumed to be irrelevant in decisional analysis (Shubik, 
1964: 58).
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Do individuals misperceive the value in certain 
outcomes? . . .  Are there gaps in an individual's 
knowledge of outcomes? Are there gaps in an indi­
vidual' s knowledge of the alternatives available to 
him? Does an individual's value for an outcome 
depend on the value of the outcome to others than 
himself?
A further debilitating problem in the model's use­
fulness for decision-making analysis centers on its norma­
tive base. The rational choice economist, for example, often 
argues that this is the system whereby the market system 
ought to operate, not that it actually does. Yet, as 
Steinbruner (1974: 26) notes,
. . . the empirical validity and the normative 
validity of the paradigm are inextricably bound.
. . .  If no concrete instances of rational decision 
making could be observed, one would quickly discard 
the theory as a utopian ideal.
It is not the formal or deductive nature of the model that 
is the principal barrier to its use in explaining decision 
making; rather it is finding situations that are appropriate 
for such analysis: individual preference ordering (based
on relative values), fairly complete information on both 
the available alternatives as well as on their consequences, 
and the final choice based on the above situation. While 
few political or policy decisions fall under this rubric, 
and few actual empirical studies have been conducted in a 
natural decisional context (Kirkpatrick, 1975b), there con­
tinues to be an exhaustive literature compiled on voting, 
power, regulation of public policy, and bargaining based on 
this model (for review see Riker and Ordshook, 1973; Niemi 
and Wiesberg, 1975).
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One final element of rational choice models makes 
their applicability for most small group decision making 
inadequate. When the model examines collective decision 
making, it assumes that such social choices are simply aggre­
gates of individual choices (for a review, see Thorsen,
1976; Weisberg, 1975; Plott, 1976). This feature, like those 
regarding complete information and established preferences, 
should be tested rather than assumed. If group decisions 
are more than an aggregate of self-interests, and are related 
to social and psychological processes unique to collective 
decision making, then the assumption regarding social choice 
is inadequate.
When dependent on this individual self-interest 
assumption, rational choice models are limited in the kinds 
of designs and methods that can be employed. Specifically, 
most rational choice analyses center on giving the subjects 
in the study monetary rewards for maximizing their outcomes 
(see, for example, Plott, 1976). Although more likely to 
initiate the desired self-interest motive among the sub­
jects, such designs still cannot account for the kind of 
group interactions that occur independent of the desired 
effect. Economic self-interest is only a single case of the 
myriad of rival hypotheses for individual preferences, both 
in economic as well as political environments.
This critique does not imply that rational choice 
theories are incorrect; rather, as one proponent asks
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(Thorson, 1976: 86), "in what contexts or decision environments
do what kinds (if any) of rationality assumptions make sense?"
He further adds.
To the extent . . .  that one's concern is with the 
interaction between decision environment and appro­
priate rationality assumptions, decision environ­
ment variables must be explicitly included in the 
experimental design.
The rational choice model's use in political science 
centers on the specifics of choice behavior independent of 
the overall decision-meücing process. In the limited number 
of decisional environments where the model's assumptions are 
not too restrictive, the model caui be an excellent empirical 
test of reality. For example, Becker and McClintock (1967) 
note the model's usefulness in sensory discrimination and 
signal detection designs. In understanding small group 
decision-making processes, however, the model simplifies 
reality to the point where behavior lacks meaning outside 
the rational process itself. That is, the model becomes a 
tautology; behavior conforms to rational processes (indi­
vidual self-interest, preference orderings) because the 
nature of the study reinforces only behavior that conforms 
to rational preferences (maximizing the individual's payoff).
Psychological Utilitarian Models
Building on the rational choice tradition, psycholo­
gists have focused on a more limited version of the rational 
model, specifically linked to expected utility. Instead of 
values and preferences based on monetary earnings alone.
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other variables are included in defining the dimensionality 
of utility. Several authors referred to as utility- 
revisionists have noted that economic self-interest is 
linked with the emotional investment of the individual deci­
sion maker (Siegel, 1964; Homans, 1961; Davidson, Suppes and 
Siegel, 1957).
Despite such revisions, the framework, assumptions, 
and disciplinary research methods are still inextricably 
aligned with the original rational-economic paradigm. As 
Kirkpatrick (1975b: 48) notes, the model ". . .is concerned 
with some fallible components of human ability, it often 
only implies the operation of psychological factors and per­
ceptual distortion."
Although reviewed elsewhere in greater depth (Kirk­
patrick, 1975b; Kirkpatrick et al., 1975), the findings of 
the utility-revisionists have indicated a substantial amount 
of deviation from the rational framework, especially with 
regard to the subject's abilities to process information 
which may drastically delay or alter the final choice of the 
decision maker (Edwards, 1956; Coombs and Komouta (1958; 
Peterson, Schneider, and Miller, 1965).
Recent research in the social choice, or collective- 
decision context, has attempted to explicate various deci­
sional processes based on group decision making. Fiorina 
and Plott (forthcoming) examine decisions of experimental 
committees in the hope of finding some optimal process
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solution in each group decision. Although an admirêible 
effort in bridging the theory/data gap in such models, 
their efforts still center on monetary rewards based on 
certainty in the subject's preference-orderings for moving 
a point on a blackboard to an optimal pay-off solution. 
Nevertheless, the treatments in their study do experimentally 
manipulate the "induced preference configuration" (Fiorina 
and Plott, forthcoming: 7).
While not dismissing the necessity of formal, deduc­
tive treatments of decision processes, psychological- 
utiliteurian models' attempts at mathematizing decision­
making processes seem premature. As in the case of rational 
choice theory, the underlying assumptions of the model should 
be tested against evidence of psychological and sociological 
pressures on the individual that may not only negate pos­
sible rational processes, but may also imply principles 
that explain decision-making behavior in a totally differ­
ent paradigm. As noted in a previous analysis of such 
attempts (Kirkpatrick et al., 1975), most psychological- 
utility models have failed to escape the rational mode.
Cybernetic Model
The cybernetic model is a crucial re-evaluation of 
the rational economic paradigm with several major changes 
in the underlying assumptions. Unlike the rational model's 
roots in the economic discipline, however, no single social
15
science base can be surmised. Both psychology and management 
have constructed major theses around the model, although for 
quite divergent and unrelated purposes (a point developed 
later in this discussion).
In its simplest and purest form, the cybernetic 
model is built around a simple mechanical device, the thermo­
stat- In heating systems this device activates the furnace 
when the temperature drops below a specified temperature 
level, and deactivates the system when the furnace has ade­
quately heated the desired area. This system is built 
around a tight, short-cycle information feedback based on 
the actual temperature and the desired level of the tempera­
ture (for a more complete discussion, see Beer, 1959).
The decision mechanism in a cybernetic process, 
then, is based on "information feedback and the elimination 
of uncertainty" (Steinbruner, 1974; 51). The complexity of 
the paradigm is based on the level of intricacy developed 
within any particular study using cybernetic assumptions. 
Specifically the cybernetic paradigm hypothesizes a decision 
mechanism that attempts to maintain stability, or homeostasis, 
in the system. The system may in fact be an entire organi­
zation (Katz and Kahn, 1966) or the human brain (Ashby,
1952).
One of the most complete discussions of the cyber­
netic approach has been advanced by Herbert Simon (Simon,
1958; Simon, 1968; March and Simon, 1958). Although most
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of Simon's concepts are returned to at a later point, several 
cybernetic issues should be noted. First, Simon agrees with 
the rational-economic theorists that information, or knowl­
edge, is an importcint underlying concept for decision mak­
ing. The rational-choice theorist accepts the assumption 
that complete information is necessary to establish the final 
ordering of the decision alternatives; Simon notes that 
information is primarily used to reduce uncertainty. Thus, 
Simon centers on information-processing based on a more 
simple stimulus-response model (Simon, 1957: 108). The deci­
sion maker's sensitivity to any particular information item, 
then, is based on a need for information which utilizes a 
feedback channel as part of the decision-making process. If 
the individual sees the information as confusing, irrelevant, 
and thus not fitting the specific needs within his feedback 
mechanism, he rejects that information. Even if the infor­
mation does affect the final outcome, the individual may 
still fail to process the information.
Similarly, cybernetic theorists stress that learning 
is not based on rational, all-inclusive processes, but in­
stead on instrumental processes. The decision maker seeks 
knowledge on a need-to-know basis, seeking information when 
the equilibrium of the system has been disrupted (Stein­
bruner, 1974; 79). Finally, Simon's cybernetic approach is 
most cited for its concern for the satisficing decision 
(Simon, 1957). Instead of a rational decision that weighs
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all of the alternatives, the satisficing decision requires 
only some minimal criteria for acceptance-
It can be argued that Simon's satisficing or cyber­
netic model is little more than a slight adjustment in the 
original rational choice assumption. Indeed, Simon has re­
ferred to the paradigm as a "limited rationality" model of 
decision making (Simon, 1957). Ashby's (1952) cybernetic 
model, however, goes a step further. The decision maker 
makes no overt calculations based on the probability of the 
outcome's success. The emphasis centers more on past exper­
ience and a small number of "critical variables" (Steinbruner, 
1974: 63). Ashby's decision maker is motivated by stability 
and maintenance of his decisional field.
Although a useful model under many circumstances, 
Ashby's "value-free" decision-making process appears to be 
an over-reaction to the rational model. This criticism can 
be leveled at the entire cybernetic paradigm. Most social 
psychology critics would agree that equilibrium is an impor­
tant element of all attitudes, beliefs, and final decisions; 
Beider's balance theory is a case in point (Beider, 1958).
Yet, balance in an individual or group decision-making envi­
ronment has never been argued as the sole reason for the 
final decision. As will be noted later, many decisions 
are made that seem to violate this equilibrium condition.
Simon's limited-rationality model seems more accom­
modating to values and established preferences. Unlike the
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model of Ashby, however, the specific utlization and 
operationalization of the Simon paradigm remains unclear 
(Kirkpatrick et al., 1975). Rational modelers, for example, 
have critiqued Simon's decision-making model as only an ex­
pected utility model based on imperfect information (Riker 
and Ordeshook, 1973: 22). The rational choice theorists 
claim that "if the cost is large enough . . ., it is rational 
to satisfice" (Riker and Ordeshook, 1973: 23).
Another critique is linked to the model's process/ 
outcome difficulties. The processual aspects of individual 
and/or group decisions seem obscured by a simple, or small, 
set of critical variables. For example, cybernetic decision 
theorists would agree that the environment is an intervening 
variable in any cybernetic decision rule; yet many of the 
tests of the model have required that the system's environ­
ment be carefully controlled. At the most mundane and rou­
tine levels of decision making, this assumption is accept­
able; however, when decisions are analyzed at more complex 
levels, i.e., in the collective group context, such simpli­
fications appear more strained.
Nevertheless, the key elements of cybernetic decision 
making, simplifed or satisficing decision rules and instru­
mental learning, are well suited for inclusion in a more 
complex decisional model. Also, the cybernetic paradigm is 
not just another term for incremental decisions. It is, as 
Crecine (1969) has noted, an excellent model for explaining
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incremental change, but the adjustments that occur to restore 
equilibrium may require drastic and radical changes in the 
system (Ashby, 1952: Chapter 7). However, Wildavsky's 
(1975) "strategies" of the process (not the outcome) of 
slight adjustments in what agency heads require for their 
next fiscal year's budget do fit a cybernetic paradigm.
Finally, an appzirent tautology exists in the para­
digm. Since the model requires assumptions that a limited 
set of crucial variables are operationalized and that deci­
sion makers must arrive at their decision based on limited 
rationality, then every decision will conform to the cyber­
netic paradigm. For all three of the previous paradigms—  
rational choice, psychological utility, and cybernetics—  
each implies similar circular arguments because of the limit­
ing assumptions ingrained in each model. Too many questions 
remain unanswered: how do individuals and groups search for
alternatives; how do they evaluate the differences in those 
alternatives; how do the individual's predispositions or 
preferences affect the final decision; are differences re­
solved in groups by rational coalition behavior, or do group 
processes themselves alter decisions? All of these issues 
are "assumed away" in the previous models by accepting 
rational or limited rationality premises. A paradigm is 
needed which treats such questions as hypotheses rather than 




The final set of models are specific types of social 
psychological paradigms applicable to decision making. Two 
basic categories of research are outlined; they include indi­
vidual cognitive processes, and group dynamics and communica­
tion. More diverse treatments of social psychological para­
digms are found elsewhere (Kirkpatrick et al., 1975; Kirk­
patrick et al., 1976a, 1976b; Kirkpatrick, 1975b).
Rational choice and cybernetic models each have dif­
ficulty in examining highly complex decisional issues. Be­
yond these, the "incremental" approach suggests that slight 
adjustments occur while knowledge accumulates (Lindbloom, 
1965). Others suggest, however, that in spite of the seem­
ingly overwhelming complexity of an issue, decisions are 
made (Allison, 1971). The latter behavior, given greater 
uncertainty, cannot be predicted from a rational or cyber­
netic perspective.
Cognitive theory, however, deals with the complexity 
of a situation based on regularities in the cognitive opera­
tion of the mind. It is not the individual attitude that is 
of interest to the cognitive theorist, but the structure of 
beliefs and the way that information is processed based on 
those beliefs. Political science, specifically electoral 
behavior analysis, has examined this concept at great 
length (Converse, 1964; for review see Kirkpatrick and 
Pettit, 1972).
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Similar to competing paradigms, cognitive models 
attempt to examine reduction of uncertainty. Unlike the 
other models, however, the theory does not require the 
application of probabilities or even limited utility cal­
culations to any alternative. The cognitive apparatus 
attempts to establish order (and thereby reduce uncertainty) 
by placing alternatives into general categories. In complex 
situations, cognitive theory allows the use of similar deci­
sion rules to those of the cybernetic paradigm; but instead 
of a few "critical variables," the cognitive model applies 
the more general belief system to those decision rules.
To examine the cognitive model in less abstract 
terms, four specific areas of research shall be examined.
Each of these areas in turn is related to its current 
decision-making applications in political science and related 
disciplines. It should be noted, however, that an interfac­
ing of cognitive theory and its current decision-making ap­
plications is constrained by the paucity of actual tests of 
cognitive theory in decision making. The four theoretical 
areas emphasize information processing and intra-individual 
conflict, primarily from the organizational "Carnegie School" 
framework (for elaboration see Kirkpatrick, 1975b; Kirk­
patrick et al., 1975), as well as the decision maker's cogni­
tive maps and management of inconsistency, based primarily 
on foreign policy literature.
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Information Processing
As discussed previously, Herbert Simon's critique 
of the rational choice perspective led to a more limited view 
of man's inherent rationality. Simon's model emphasized 
decision making with selective exposure to incoming informa­
tion, and further limited through channeling of new knowl­
edge through existing belief systems (Simon, 1957: 81-83; 
Simon, 1958).
It was not until Simon's subsequent research with 
March (Organizations, 1958) that the critique of traditional 
administrative theory focused on how information is pro­
cessed, i.e., on satisficing rather than maximizing utility 
(Simon, 1959; Zeckhauser and Schaefer, 1968). Unlike the 
expectation under the rational model, the processing of in­
formation often occurs independently of, and often prior to, 
any specific cognitive direction. Even in complex decisional 
situations, the mind categorizes and subsumes varied concepts 
under a single rubric, although the specific level of com­
plexity of the belief system is dependent upon factors within 
the individual, such as cognitive complexity (Schroeder 
et al., 1967). Simon's basic division of the information 
processing system includes an evoked set (that which shapes 
behavior, such that information is processed), and an unevoked 
set (which does not affect behavior, whereby the information 
is ignored). Various stimuli (primarily external) and the 
evoked set filter the incoming information. Finally, the
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organized belief structure processes information that is 
congruent with that structure. In this manner cognitive 
information processing is simplified, yet still predicated 
upon the primary belief system of the decision maker (Kirk­
patrick, 1975a). An exact test of this model in an organi­
zational context can be found in Cyert and March (1963).
Intra-Individual Conflict
Dependent primarily on Lewinian field theory (Lewin, 
1935; Miller and Dollard, 1941), March and Simon (1958) have 
noted that the decision maker's internal conflict over a 
choice between alternatives leads to attempts to reduce that 
conflict. When a desired alternative cannot be identified, 
March and Simon hypothesize that the amount of time used in 
deciding will be relatively short, and the final choice will 
more accurately reflect the sequence in which the alterna­
tives are presented. However, under uncertainty (when the 
choice outcome linkage is unknown) the decision maker will 
increase his/her search for information in order to identify 
the consequences of the final choice. Only when there are 
no acceptable alternatives will the individual redefine what 
is acceptable, primarily by altering his/her level of aspira­
tion in the decisional situation (March and Simon, 1958; 
Kirkpatrick et al., 1975).
Cognitive Maps
The most developed use of the cognitive paradigm in 
political science is in the field of foreign policy and
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international relations decision making. Holsti (1976; 12)
defines a cognitive map as:
. . .  a cluster of beliefs . . . [that] provide the 
individual with a more or less coherent way of or­
ganizing and making sense out of- what would other­
wise be a confusing array of signals picked up from 
the environment by his senses.
As originally defined by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962), 
in their seminal monograph on decision making, the central 
element of this approach centers on the motivation of the 
decision maker defined primarily by need satisfaction, ten­
sion reduction, and perception of the individual's "defini­
tion of the situation" (see, for review, Pruitt, 1965; Holsti, 
1976). Most of these foreign policy studies, however, have 
been concerned with the decision maker cind the sources, con­
tent, and structure of the predecisional belief system, not 
with the actual processes of decision (see Holsti, 1976: 24).
Consistency Management
Although seldom directly linked to decision-making 
analysis, the cognitive consistency approach does emphasize 
the small group context. Although the set of theories within 
the consistency model are differentiated by their specific 
designs, consistency theory posits balance in individual 
belief systems (for derivations see Festinger, 1957; 1964; 
Heider, 1958; for a review see Taylor, 1970). The usual 
discussion describes a triad with two subjects and an object. 
If Subject A likes Subject B, and does not like Object C, 
then for the system to be balanced or consistent. Subject B
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should not like Object C. From this point, consistency 
theory becomes too complex to describe in detail here; 
nevertheless, it should be understood that the general con­
struct has great potential for decision-making analysis (for 
example see Kirkpatrick, 1975b).
For the purposes of this study, consistency theory 
is more applicable when dealing with information that is 
inconsistent with the existing belief system. Simon hypothe­
sized that such information is generally ignored; consis­
tency theory allows a more dynamic process. Although dis­
crediting the information is one alternative, the decision 
maker may also change his attitude about the source of the 
information, or possibly change his attitude about the object 
for which the information is provided. This last state of 
attitude change may be relatively rare, but it must be 
evaluated as a possible response (Abelson et al., 1968;
Taylor, 1970).
Finally, no decision maker can achieve perfect con­
sistency; instead, the subject must be able to make coherent 
those potential inconsistencies and resolve the possible 
pressures that may result. Steinbruner (1974: 114-121) illus­
trates the mechanisms applied in foreign policy by a range of 
inferences employed to maintain consistency: inferences of
analogy (use structures in simplier situations and apply 
them to the current situation); inferences of transformation 
(or wishful thinking), inferences of impossibility (denial),
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and negative images (actual change in the balance structure). 
Only in the latter condition will actual changes occur in the 
subject's attitudes, since the former three inferences all 
cure based on restructuring reality, not belief systems.
Group Dynamic and Inter- 
Personal Communication
Any study of decision making in a contemporary envi­
ronment must acknowledge that few decisions are made in a 
social vacuum. Instead, decisions, especially complex ones, 
are finalized only after a considerable amount of interaction 
among small groups of individuals. Given this fact, the con­
cern for decisional analysis must shift towaird greater study 
of the dynamic and interpersonal behaviors of small groups 
in a decisional context.
All of the previous paradigms, including cognitive 
theory, have ignored group decisions. The rational choice 
theorists claim that group decisions (i.e., social choice) 
are no more than some combination of individual decision 
preferences (Riker and Ordeshook, 1973: 83; Thorson, 1976:
82). Cybernetic models have generally treated groups as a 
whole, and thus a type of summary individual (Cyert êind 
March, 1963; for an exception see Crecine, 1969). Cogni­
tive theory, although acknowledging the social milieu, pre­
fers to treat the group context as an element of the external 
environment, rather than the decision process.
Several «ureas of social psychology, as well as 
communications research, have addressed the group dynamics
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and interpersonal communications question in depth, but, 
the treatment of decision making as a concept within these 
fields has been relatively minimal (for an exception see 
Collins and Guetzkow, 1964). Those sub-fields that are 
most relevant to decisional analysis are briefly examined 
below. In each area, elements of group processes are noted 
that extend beyond any individual-level judgments; thus, the 
unstated assumption of this set of theories posits that group 
processes are more than an aggregate of individual-level 
attitudes and beliefs. The three areas examine communication 
in small groups, group leadership, and individual versus 
group decision making.
Communication in Small Groups
Communication is regarded as an essential social 
process which determines man’s use of symbols, interactions, 
and his relationship with others. Because of its widespread 
use and its varied definitional classifications between and 
even within academic disciplines, no strict definition is 
sought. Most communication literature in the social sciences 
derives its basic formulation from the S-O-R (stimulus- 
organism-response) model and thus reflects S. S. Steven's 
definition. "Communication is the discriminatory response 
of an organism to a stimulus" (as quoted in Barnlund, 1968: 
5).
Our concern is for the interpersonal communication 
patterns in a specific environment— the small group. More
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specifically, the emphasis in this study is on verbal 
communication, although non-verbal communication (specifi­
cally through symbolic behavior) is quite relevant for anal­
ysis (see Graber, 1976). Further, communication in a group 
environment should be examined as a process of sending and 
receiving messages. By so doing, the communicative act must 
be analyzed beyond the structural component of the group to 
include the action component, which involves the interaction 
between group members based on the task and social dimen­
sions of the small group (Fisher, 1974).
It must be recognized that small group communication 
is a special case of interpersonal communication- Face-to- 
face interaction becomes more focused, yet obviously not 
equivalent to dyadic communication. Given a small group of 
five persons, the involvement of subjects in verbal interac­
tion in the group setting may vary widely from those who 
speak out and lead discussions, to others who may be rela­
tively passive participants in any interaction (Barnlund, 
1968; 10).
Finding specific measures to analyze small group 
communication and its myriad of elements and levels of inter­
action is no trivial task. Recent attempts have been made 
to integrate these different components (Madron, 1969), and 
the most fruitful of these may be Bales' path-breaking inter­
action process analysis, centering upon task versus social- 
emotional areas of interaction (Bales, 1950). Bales'
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categories delineate communication in small groups in a 
manner that examines the type of interaction, focuses on 
each subject's contributions to the group discussion, and 
develops methods of identifying leaders in the task and 
social environments. Recent studies by Bennis and Shepard 
(1961) and Tuckman (1965) have also clearly separated the 
task and socio-emotional dimensions.
All of these approaches have found that small groups 
move through phases of group cohesiveness and consciousness 
whereby initially the members are relatively individualistic, 
and attempts to define the problem area are often frustrated. 
Groups then evolve through a conflictual period until reach­
ing a high group cohesiveness level. Finally, group members 
begin interchanging roles (role specialization declines) 
whereby each member can adapt to each other's feelings and 
attitudes (Fisher, 1974: 135).
Another potential procedure for analysis of small 
group interaction is the sociometric method, specifically 
beginning with research by J. L. Moreno (1951) that measures 
interpersonal choice. As Madron (1969) notes, the usefulness 
for such choice measures in political decision-making groups 
may give political science a new dimension to measure com­
munication, cliques, and party roles at all levels of gov­
ernment (for a more extensive discussion see Hare, 1962: 
407-11; Miller, 1970; 140-142).
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Obviously, the potential for investigating small 
group communication goes beyond any discussion in this con­
text. Nevertheless, applications of small group communica­
tion to a decisional framework are still quite rare, despite 
attempts to stimulate such efforts in political science 
(Barber, 1966; Madron, 1969).
Group Leadership
Recognizing that leadership is treated in a diversity 
of ways, it is still possible to find some pattern to the 
study of this complex phenomenon. Most social psychological 
research on leadership has emphasized personality character­
istics and traits of leadership (Gibb, 1968), as well as the 
effects of democratic versus authoritarian leadership on 
group performance (Stogdill, 1974; 365-410). This line of 
research has led to efforts that apply the findings to work 
environments and training of leaders in a diversity of 
izational areas (see, for example, Scott and Mitchell, 1976: 
282-300; Kelly, 1974: 359-421).
Although a wealth of theories of leadership types 
have been advanced (Stogdill, 1974: 17-31), the key to this 
analysis is the set of leadership studies that rely on inter­
action in the small group. There can be no doubt that lead­
ership is often formal and that leaders are selected by 
those outside the immediate small group. Obviously, the 
presence of a formal leader affects the behavior of the 
group, but efforts should be made toward analyzing the
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patterns of behavior that occur in group leadership 
situations without that constraint. In this context, lead­
ership is based more on the subject’s involvement in group 
discussion, ability to influence others, and expertise in 
the particular situation. Stogdill (1974: 20-21) identifies 
this type of leadership hypothesis as interaction-expectation 
theory. The basis of this theory of leadership comes from 
Homans' (1950) discussion of leadership as frequency of 
interaction and participation in group activities. Stogdill 
(1959) refines the leadership role such that the patterns 
that an individual establishes in group interaction will 
define the expectations that group members have on the future 
structure of interactions within the group. Bass (1960) and 
House (1970) advance the view that the leader's interactions 
can be further explained by noting that leaders have more 
well-defined motives and goals for their interaction.
One further refinement by Fiedler (1967) emphasizes 
an important additional component— situational demands. 
Fiedler's contingency theory of leadership differentiates 
between the task and socio-emotional leader. Although an 
individual can fulfill both roles, those who are more task- 
oriented tend to assume leadership roles in simple and com­
plex problem environments, while those whose interactions 
with group members are more social and emotional in nature 
tend to be effective leaders in situations with moderate 
demands on problem solution (see also Hemphill, 1954).
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Finally, leaders are generally viewed as the most 
likely to conform to the norms of the group (Homans, 1950). 
Yet, the reasons for such conformity clearly reflect the 
leader's ability to influence those norms (Phillips and 
Erickson, 1970: 79-81). In a decision-making group, then, 
the leader's successfulness in moving decisions in the direc­
tion that he/she desires becomes crucial. In order to influ­
ence the final decision, however, the leader must be able to 
interact with the rest of the group in a manner that gains 
a favorable decision. Thus, the justification for examining 
leadership from an interaction framework, rather than a trait 
or structural viewpoint, illustrates the need for a behav­
ioral model of leadership in small groups.
Individual Versus Group Decision 
Making in Problem-Solving Tasks
A variety of research has been most concerned with 
effectiveness in accomplishing tasks at the individual and 
group level. Studies in this area have attempted to deter­
mine when groups should be used, and when the task should be 
left to individual decision makers. Although studies of 
group performance are quite prevalent in social psychology 
and related fields, the conditions under which groups are 
effective in decision making remain largely undetermined 
(Hare, 1972). In fact, the general finding of much of this 
literature is that groups are unreliable in performing im­
portant tasks (for reviews see Collins and Guetzkow, 1964; 
Hackman and Morris, 1975).
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One of the most thorough condemnations of group 
decision making is Irving Janis* Victims of Groupthink 
(1972). Janis' view is that groups may become excessively 
cohesive, to the point where the group ignores all informa­
tion and alternatives that impinge on their agreement.
Janis uses anecdotal evidence from various foreign-policy 
fiascos to illustrate this group failure syndrome. "Group­
think " can be thought of as an extreme form of limited search 
and satisficing behavior first described by Simon for indi­
vidual decisions.
Other procedures such as T-groups, sensitivity train­
ing, and "brainstorming" are techniques that attempt to use 
group situations to produce more effective outcomes than 
would individuals; all have met with only limited success. 
Brainstorming is a case in point. This technique attempts 
to produce more creative solutions to various tasks than 
would an individual alone, but some evidence indicates that 
the creativity of individuals is repressed, not enhanced, 
in a brainstorming environment (Dunnette et al., 1963; Hackman 
and Morris, 1975).
Focused analyses of group interaction processes indi­
cate that the collective environment may dramatically affect 
the nature of individual positions, especially at the small 
group level. A rather large body of literature emphasizing 
group risk-taking behavior hypothesizes that group decisions 
are significantly different from individual decisions (for a
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review, see Kirkpatrick and Robertson, 1976), This literature 
emphasizes the empirical differences produced by group inter­
action processes, rather than the more applied performance 
concerns of the effectiveness studies. The specific empiri­
cal constructs of group risk-taking analysis will be treated 
in Chapter II.
In conclusion, there are obvious differences in deci­
sions made by groups versus individuals on a wide variety of 
tasks. Maier (1970: 431-44), one of the principle authors 
on group problem solving, claims that the deficiencies of 
group decisions (conformity pressure, heterogeneity of solu­
tions, and domination by individual members who want to "win" 
the argument) can affect the group's decisional task in such 
a manner as to damage the usefulness of the assets of the 
group process, i.e., greater total information and diversity 
of alternatives as well as acceptance of the solution by 
participants in the decisional solution. As Thibaut and 
Kelley (1961: 268) note, if the difficulties inherent in a 
group envionment can be overcome, the resulting diversity 
and quantity of information should provide "for greater inter­
stimulation of ideas without any loss of innovative creativ­
ity due to social constraints." However, it remains an 
empirical question as to what conditions foster the effec­
tiveness of group decisions.
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Summary of Cognitive Processes 
and Group Dynamics
The above discussion of the applicability of social 
psychological models for decision making dichotomized the 
elements of individual (cognitive) and collective (group) 
processes. This distinction was applied primarily to delin­
eate the crucial sub-processes that are hypothesized in group 
decision making. Yet, the dichotomization is only a simpli­
fication device; to examine only individual or group pro­
cesses would be contrary to the basic assumption of social 
psychology that human behavior is an intertwining of indi­
vidual psychological factors with the broader collective 
environment (Kirkpatrick, 1975b).
In the previous review of decision making, however, 
the clear implication is that decisions are seldom examined 
from a truly social psychological paradigm that integrates 
cognitive and group dynamic notions into a broader framework 
for processual analysis. This review delineated the kinds 
of Vcuriables at the cognitive/individual level and the forms 
of group dynamic factors that shape the final group decision. 
A model is now required which can link these two factors in 
a process explanation of group decision making.
CHAPTER II
DECISION PROCESS: SEARCH BEHAVIOR
AND CHOICE SHIFT
Introduction
Various approaches used for decision-making analysis 
have been largely inadequate for explaining the decisional 
process. For rational choice theorists, the process of 
decision making is "assumed away" by making strong assump­
tions about the nature of man's capacity to process informa­
tion and weigh alternatives. The cognitive models, at the 
other end of the spectrum, concentrate on the process of 
decision making at the expense of not explaining the final 
decisional outcome. "Decision-making scholars need not be 
limited to choices within this traditional dichotomy, espec­
ially with respect to the analysis of political decision 
making by small groups." (Kirkpatrick et al., 1976b: 35).
It is the fundamental premise of this study that the 
processing of information and the final choice/outcomes can 
be treated in the same framework. Specifically, the two 
fundamental elements involved in any decision-making analy­
sis should include the search for alternatives and information
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concerning those alternatives, and the shifting of choices 
dependent upon the perceived consequences of the various 
alternatives.
As in all of the previous treatments of decision 
making, the fundamental assumption remains that decisions 
are in part an attempt to reduce uncertainty, both in the 
alternatives and the final choice. However, the view of 
this study adds that in a small group context, decision mak­
ing is based on communication, and the reduction of uncer­
tainty requires communication among members of the small 
group (Kirkpatrick et al., 1976b; Dyson et al., 1972; Davis, 
1974; Deutsch, 1966). One principal means of uncertainty 
reduction is the search for information and alternatives by 
decisional groups. This search behavior then determines, in 
part, the propensity of members of groups to shift their 
individual preferences. The framework for such analysis, 
as described below, makes it feasible to link processes and 
final decisions in a single decisional model.
Search Behavior and Cognitive 
Information Processing
"Decision making is generally characterized by choice 
behavior. As such, it is necessarily information-dependent" 
(Kirkpatrick et al., 1976b: 36). The problem, then, is to 
gain sufficient information to reduce the individual's (or 
group's) uncertainty about the choice, and thus reduce the 
possibilities for error. The literature most applicable to
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this question is the cognitive process framework mentioned 
earlier. Specifically, the research originating in the 
"Carnegie School" and Herbert Simon's work is more relevant 
in this context because of its acceptance of the limits on 
information processing: fragmentary knowledge of conse­
quences, a limited set of alternatives, and values that are 
often only vaguely defined (Simon, 1957: 81-83). Yet, the 
most important element of Simon's work for this study is 
his emphasis on the search for information. As March and 
Simon (1958: 174) emphasize, "a theory of choice without a 
theory of search is inadequate."
The information-processing approach emphasizes the 
juxtaposition of the individual's existing belief structure 
and the level of cognitive complexity with which the infor­
mation is processed— from pre-existing as well as new 
sources. The manner in which the individual or group deals 
with the information is the key element of the search pro­
cess.
Specifically, search behavior consists of several 
different kinds of information search: the nature of the 
problem itself, the nature and consequences of the poten­
tial alternatives, and feedback from previous decisions on 
the problem, or those deemed similar to the problem (Kirk­
patrick et al., 1975; Skjei, 1973). Further, in a small 
group where political issues are involved, decision makers 
face an open solution set, i.e., no single correct decision
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can be ascertained. Thus, the information to be processed 
will include interpersonal negotiation, bargaining, and 
compromise (Dyson et al., 1972). Once again the importance 
of interpersonal communication becomes paramount, but unfor­
tunately very little of the information-processing litera­
ture notes the overlap of communication and search. In 
fact, recent developments in cognitive psychology have 
turned more to the physiological structure of the brain, 
research which, though certainly relevant, becomes too ab­
stract and removed from the actual processes of decision 
making (see, for example, Solso, 1975; Kantowitz, 1974).
Taking cues from Simon's early work on limited 
rationality and satisficing behavior, this research effort 
will outline the primary search behaviors established in 
groups by examining previous typologies of information pro­
cessing. Yet, using Simon's model, one must first estab­
lish the limitations of search, specifically the constraints 
that inhibit the reduction of uncertainty (for review, see 
Kirkpatrick et al., 1976b).
Constraints on the Search Process and 
Uncertainty Reduction in Decision Making
Simon's view that decision making and search behav­
ior seldom meet the rational model of maximized search for 
alternatives and complete information leads him to propose 
the "limited rationality" approach. Unfortunately, Simon's 
treatment of limited search emphasizes a fairly rationalistic
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approach to satisficing, i.e., the individual determines when 
there is sufficient information to meet some minimal criter­
ia. Yet, the search for information is more complex and the 
factors that inhibit a rational or comprehensive search in­
volve more constraints than a guasi-rational process whereby 
the decision maker cuts off search on the basis of some mini­
mal criteria.
The ability of decision makers, especially in a group 
context, to engage in comprehensive search that will reduce 
all uncertainty appears limited. Even if it were feasible, 
the costs would often be prohibitive. As Downs (1967: 3) 
observes:.
Information is costly because it takes time, effort, 
and sometimes money to obtain data and comprehend 
their meaning. Decision makers have only limited 
capabilities regarding the amount of time they can 
spend making decisions, the number of issues they 
can consider simultaneously, and the amount of data 
they can absorb regarding any one problem.
Thus, if uncertainty does exist, no matter how "rational" 
the process, the kinds of constraints on uncertainty reduc­
tion should be specified. Those constraints include limita­
tions on the kind and amount of information that Downs and 
Simon describe, but also motive and personality factors that 
all fall outside any rational or guasi-rational constraint 
process. Specifically, environmental (information, organi­
zation, situation), individual (affective and cognitive), 




Given the unrealistic nature of comprehensive search. 
Downs suggests that decision makers will create some form of 
cost-benefit criteria by which the need for information is 
weighed against the costs involved in further search (Downs, 
1967). This particular treatment regards the search con­
straint as information economy, but the constraint on infor­
mation remains part of a rational process. In fact, halting 
the search for new information or alternatives when it is 
apparent that the costs outweigh the benefits is the epitome 
of rationality; thus, using the information economy approach 
requires the same problematic assumptions of the rational 
choice model. Further, since the small group is the focus 
in this analysis, it is doubtful that all members of a 
decision-making collective will have the same cost-benefit 
configuration for any particular situation (Davis, 1974).
Even if a cost-benefit ratio can be determined, the 
assertion that additional units of information reduce uncer­
tainty is at best an assumption, and potentially a fallacy. 
Consumer researchers, for example, have found evidence to 
indicate that information overload can occur in a preferred- 
choice environment, and that creativity may be depressed 
when information levels are too high (Jacoby, 1975: 15-16). 
Information overload may be a potentially debilitating fac­
tor on the search process by reducing the group’s willing­
ness to make decisions. Thus, a real constraint on decision
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making may be the amount and diversity of information 
presented to the group.
Information with which the group is familiar or 
which is perceived as similar to previous information, is 
more easily processed than new or unique information (Park 
and Sheth, 1975: 71-77). This hypothesis has seldom been 
tested beyond research in consumer and marketing areas; 
nevertheless, it suggests that prior familiarity may be an 
important constraint on the search process. By this view, 
a group may ignore or discount information that is divergent 
from established patterns. Further evidence of this effect 
can be derived from learning theory's emphasis on the need 
to place information into categories (Posner and Snyder, 
1975; Jacoby, 1975).
In a political context, the information to be pro­
cessed is often imprecise and heavily value-laden. Decision 
makers are then confronted with a wide latitutde of choices 
for processing the information (Warr and Knapper, 1968). As 
the cognitive model suggests, the individual's established 
belief system will screen the incoming information, placing 
additional restraints on the kinds and amounts of informa­
tion to be processed (Davis, 1974). Thus, a further con­
straint on information is sunk cost, or the predisposition 
of the members of the group toward certain types of infor­
mation congruent with their current attitudes (Wilensky, 
1967).
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Although Down's guasi-rational economy of information 
approach may not be an adequate description of informational 
constraints on the search process, the preceding discussion 
has outlined areas that place very real "costs" on the reduc­
tion of uncertainty by information search. Specifically, 
information may be discounted if the group encounters infor­
mation overload (too much information), information that is 
unfamiliar or does not fit any established categories, or 
information that fails to conform to the group members’ 
belief systems. Limited time and resource availability con­
founded with the above costs may often restrict information­
al usage by much more than any economy of information approach 
would predict.
Organizational Constraints
Traditional patterns of behavior within the broader 
organization, or more specific routines within an established 
small group, limit the type and quantity of information 
acquired in a search process. Simon (1957) includes organi­
zational constraints in his "satisficing" model because 
the range of decision rules and acceptable alternatives to 
a decision maker are often highly limited by the organiza­
tion. Wildavsky (1974: 6-62), for example, suggests that 
budget decision making is highly restricted because adminis­
trators are expected to increase their budget requests while 
legislative appropriation committees tend to reduce the 
agency requests. Wildavsky refers to this as a "calculation
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and strategy" process, yet the expected behavior is so 
tightly constrained as to allow only limited flexibility.
The organization, then, limits the range of alterna­
tives prior to any search. Even within large networks, the 
organizational routines within specialized elements may 
greatly differ (Cyert and March, 1963). The type and kind 
of search within a research and development sub-unit would 
obviously differ from the accounting services division, 
even within the same organization, Allison's (1971) study 
of the Cuban missile crisis further illustrates how deci­
sion makers, by the nature of the U.S. National Security 
Council's organization, limit the alternatives and informa­
tion processes.
Standard administrative procedures provide a signifi­
cant constraint on the search for information. Information 
that fails to meet the goals, guidelines, decision rules, 
or acceptable range of alternatives of any decisional envi­
ronment is ignored or rejected. By this process, informa­
tion is channeled through an organizational screen (Feldman 
and Kanter, 1965). One would not expect General Motors, 
for example, to consider the alternative of asking the fed­
eral government to nationalize their industry; such alterna­
tives are not likely to pass through the organizational fil­
ter. The inclusion of organization constraint on uncertainty 
reduction, although further restricting the search for in­
formation, does provide a means for a more realistic
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environment for the empirical analysis of decision making 
than more rationalistic models.
Situational Constraints
An obvious restriction on information search is the 
situational environment. Consideration of alternatives and 
the amount of information is generally restricted when a 
crisis situation confronts decision makers (Hermann, 1969; 
Holsti cind George, 1975). Because of the stressful environ­
ment cind the limited amount of time available, decisional 
search is more quickly overloaded. Janis' (1971) study is 
illustrative of social psychological research on the inhibit­
ing qualities of stress upon behavior.
The foreign policy decision-making literature empha­
sizes the definition of the situation as dependent on the 
initial reaction of the decision maker to the situation pre­
sented (Snyder et al., 1962). Unfortunately, tests of this 
foreign policy model have been difficult to operationalize 
beyond single case studies (Allison, 1971). Recent efforts 
have illustrated that less encompassing and more finite 
models of situational constraint can aid in explaining 
search behavior in foreign policy (Holsti; 1967, 1976;
Pruitt, 1965).
Situational factors can affect search behavior by 
the controversy that may surround certain issues in a par­
ticular time frame. Presidential commissions which deal 
with an explosive issue before the public will engage in
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different forms of search behavior than a commission that is 
relatively unknown (Wolanin, 1975). The Kerner Commission's 
study of urban violence, for example, faced a highly dif­
fused and polarized population in gathering its data in the 
mid-1960s; such a commission today might reach the same con­
clusion, but the search would be quite different in a less 
polarized environment.
In the previous example, the members of the deci­
sional group often bring with them more strongly-held pre­
dispositions than would otherwise be expected. Thus, the 
search process is more likely to follow directions that 
attempt to confirm those predispositions than in a less 
polarized environment. The cognitive rigidity and dogmatism 
of decision makers will significantly affect the capacity as 
well as the type of search by the group (Abelson, 1971; 
Holsti, 1976).
Crises, the definition of the situation, and the 
level of controversy of an issue can dramatically affect the 
quality and quantity of search. The literature does not 
suggest that search is only restricted under these condi­
tions; indeed, the degree of controversy and the complexity 
with which group members view the situation may enhance and 
increase search. Only in a stressful environment has the 
cognitive processing literature suggested that search is 
reduced (Janis, 1971), the other areas remain open to test­
ing. Finally, the uniqueness of particular situational
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environments may inhibit search processes; yet it is the 
premise of this analysis, as well as much of empirical 
social science, that regularities do exist across situations 
so that relativistic arguments can be called into question.
Motive Constraints
The preceding constraints have emphasized the effects 
of the environment upon search behavior and decision making. 
The three remaining sets of constraints suggest a range of 
individual and group variables that affect search, and ulti­
mately the decisions of small groups.
The first set of individual constraints are those 
factors in the basic personality structures of the members 
of a small group. These motives, or affective needs, pro­
vide the functional requisites for individuals to engage in 
search behavior in much the same manner as personality con­
structs are linked to the functional needs of any individual 
behavior (Smith et al., 1956; Lane, 1959; see discussion by 
Kirkpatrick and Pettit, 1972; 267-270; Kirkpatrick et al., 
1976a: 38-40). There would be no way to effectively review 
all of the possible personality attributes that could alter 
search behavior and decision making, but in general, there 
is a relationship between need fulfillment and the influ­
ences that information (cind significant others) have on the 
individual. One hypothesis asks that beliefs based on the 
object appraisal function will be more influenced by
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information than beliefs dependent on social adjustment 
needs (Smith, 1968; Kirkpatrick et al., 1976a).
Other findings from the personality literature illus­
trate that certain personality characteristics may alter the 
search process. Decision makers who are low in self-esteem, 
high in conformity, dogmatism, and authoritarianism tend to 
restrict search in order not to increase anxiety about their 
predispositions (Knutson, 1972; Lasswell, 1954). Individuals 
who have high levels of ego involvement and who have pro­
gressed beyond inward needs to other-directed needs (e.g., 
self-actualization) may engage in a wider frame of search 
without exceeding their own tolerance of ambiguity (Knutson, 
1972; Ferguson, 1962).
Two problems remain from the above findings on per­
sonality and search. First, does greater willingness to 
accept uncertainty imply greater and more varied search be­
havior? Beginning with Simon, decision theorists have empha­
sized that search reduces uncertainty; yet, if individuals 
tend to be tolerant of ambiguity and uncertainty, they should 
be more willing to half or reduce search. Further, the amount 
of search by dogmatic and authoritarian personalities would 
not necessarily be low, but only confined to the alterna­
tives acceptable to the decision maker's predisposition.
The second problem emphasizes the interface of indi­
vidual personality factors with group factors. Individuals 
who are low in self-esteem and self-control (e.g., locus of
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control) are generally high in conformity; such personality 
types will more likely yield to others in a group environ­
ment and accept their determination of search. Personality 
variables are needed which link the interface of individual 
needs and group functions; locus-of-control is one such 
variable. In a review of this personality characteristic, 
Lefcourt (1976) emphasizes that subjects who feel that ex­
ternal events control their situations are likely to defer 
to others in group decision making, as well as more likely 
to avoid additional search that might affect their predis­
positions. Another scale useful in examining personality 
in a group environment is the Machiavellian scale. The 
findings on this construct suggest that high Machiavellians 
represent an interface of authoritarian personality types 
who also manipulate others (Christie and Geis, 1970). Thus, 
Machiavellians should try to manipulate search toward their 
predispositions, eliminating or ignoring different alterna­
tives.
Despite the previous elements, scholars have made 
very little progress in actually determining the impacts of 
personality factors on search behavior and decision making. 
Rational choice and limited rationality models have reduced 
personality constructs to elements of the environment that 
are then controlled. Sidney Verba (1961) hypothesizes that 
only in a situation where the information and the alterna­
tives are highly detailed with recognized and accepted
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differences between the alternatives, can one suggest that 
personality will not influence decision making. The more 
ambiguous the information and choices, the greater the influ­
ence of personality upon decision making. Unfortunately, 
no tests of this argument have been made, either in experi­
mental or "real world" contexts. It is evident from the pre­
ceding discussion that personality, if not the crucial as­
pect of search in groups, can constrain the process to such 
an extent that information-processing is altered.
Cognitive Constraints
A second individual-level limitation on the search 
process is the specific cognitive and intellectual con­
straints on the information-processing abilities of the 
decision maker. A fundamental aspect of cognitive theory 
delineates the individual's perception of the environment 
and the stimulus as a constructed and screened image; cogni­
tive theorists emphasize that perception of stimuli and 
events seldom mirror actual reality (Neisser, 1966). This re­
definition of reality constrains search by limiting the pro­
cess to information that either "passes through" this per­
ceptual screen, or is reconstructed to fit the decision 
maker's perceptual image.
The general class of cognitive limitations that 
affect search behavior outline simplification rules, cogni­
tive complexity, and information integration as the prime 
elements that restructure and restrain information processing.
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Simplification rules allow the decision maker (or group) to 
examine and process a large quantity of information in a 
limited time frame. This simplification process allows the 
individual to establish "rules of thumb" or heuristics in 
processing information (Davis, 1974: Newall et al., 1958).
Although a diversity of rules of thumb can be em­
ployed (Steinbruner, 1974: 113), two are delineated as 
applicable constraints on the securch process. First, deci­
sion makers use analogy to fit current problem information 
into prior decisional frameworks. For example, budgetary 
policy making in Congressional appropriation committees has 
long relied on conçaring the current year's request with the 
base from the previous year (Wildavsky, 1974: 47-62), while 
agencies have long attempted to budget additional programs 
by claiming the new program is only an extension of an exist­
ing policy (Wildavsky, 1974: 111-123).
In addition, a second simplification rule is to rely 
on information primarily concerned with the immediate needs 
of the decision maker. That is, decision makers examine 
only information that has a short-term focus. By searching 
only short-term or immediate solution information, decision 
makers may avoid sharp changes in beliefs. Both of these 
simplification rules illustrate cognitive theory's funda­
mental premise that decision meücers prefer stability to radi­
cal revision of their information-processing system (Stein­
bruner, 1974: 118). By using simplification rules on the
52
available alternatives and incoming information, decision 
makers avoid situations that may challenge the stability of 
their belief systems.
Cognitive theorists have outlined an additional con­
straint on information processing: the cognitive complexity
of the decision maker. Schroder, Driver, and Struefert 
{1967: 22) indicate that the cognitively complex decision 
maker can examine several different dimensions of informa­
tion, combine those dimensions in several ways, use multiple 
compaurison rules to examine the alternatives, and create 
structures for generating complex relationships between the 
information categories (see also Shapiro and Bonham, 1973). 
Groups which have highly complex members engage in greater 
search behavior (Nidorf and Crockett, 1964) and yet are able 
to combine the new stimulus material with information already 
processed (Davis, 1974), although the processing capabilities 
still decline in highly complex situational environments 
(Schroder et al., 1967: 29-41).
A final cognitive constraint, information integra­
tion, is a fusion of the previous two limitations. The inte­
gration approach links the amount and type of information 
processed with a weighting scheme based on the values and 
beliefs of the decision maker. Specifically, the theory 
emphasizes that a simplification rule allows subjects to 
form initial impressions of a stimulus (based on predisposi­
tions) before any information is processed, thus performing
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an important screen (the weighting scheme) upon all incoming 
information (Kaplan, 1975: 142-144, Anderson, 1974). Using 
the information constraint, decision makers require a rela­
tively large amount of information in opposition to their 
predispositions before they will reverse or alter their ini­
tial evaluations of the alternatives and choices available. 
Obviously, the weaker the initial impression or predisposi­
tion, the less the amount and diversity of information re­
quired to alter that position.^
Group Constraints
Given the focus of this study on small group decision 
making, any constraints inherent in the group process of 
searching for information are important. As discussed in 
Chapter I, group problem solving differs from individual 
processes in the multiplicity of alternatives examined, the 
receptivity of the group (Kelley and Thibaut, 1968), the 
creativity of the alternatives derived (Maier, 1970), and 
especially the time span and accuracy with which the group 
responds to the decisional problem (Thibaut and Kelley,
1959).
More specifically, the group's capacity and willing­
ness to deal with a particular problem may be constrained
It should be obvious to the reader that the inte­
gration model is a special case of an attitude change model, 
specifically linked to Pishbein's (1967) theory of attitude 
and to Anderson's (1971) developments of a cognitive algebra 
approach for modeling integration and change.
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by cohesion and conformity tendencies, the level of consensus, 
and the nature of leadership in a collective environment- 
The first of these, cohesion and conformity tendencies, may 
be the most debilitating of the constraints on the search 
process. Jeuiis’ (1972) "groupthink" concept anphasizes this 
constraint. Analyzing veirious foreign policy decisions,
Janis posits that groups build cohesion which heightens con­
formity in the search process such that initial errors are 
seldom corrected.
Although based on anecdotal evidence, Janis' study 
supports findings about the uniformity tendencies of small 
groups (Zajonc, 1966; Cartwright, 1968), as well as those 
concerning abilities to alter subjects' perceptions of 
reality by using divergent group opinion (Asch, 1951). Thus, 
groups tend to reinforce commonly held predispositions, ig­
nore new divergent information, and suppress dissenting 
views (Davis, 1974).
Yet cohesion has its positive role on the group pro­
cess which may heighten information search. One of the 
prime reasons for cohesion relates to the attractiveness of 
the group goals to the individual (Gross and Martin, 1952). 
Cohesive groups increase the security of its members and 
thus lower anxiety about group interaction (Lewin, 1947).
If cohesion is a desired trait for group discussion and 
decision making, how does it reduce information search? 
Unfortunately, the answer is rather vague. At some point,
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cohesion leads to excessive conformity such that Janis' 
"groupthink" is operable. Where that point is remains an 
unanswered question for small group researchers.
A corollary to the conformity constraint is the 
level of pre-decisional consensus in the group. If the 
group predispositions are highly similar, the amount of 
search should be reduced. The search process which follows 
need not be concerned with bargaining and negotiation 
(Kirkpatrick et al., 1976a), and the information collected 
should reflect the group consensus. Alternatively, when 
group members have divergent positions, search should in­
crease (Kelley and Thibaut, 1968).
A further constraint on pre-decisional search is the 
nature of leadership in the small group environment. Al­
though reviewed in greater depth in Chapter I, leadership 
style and characteristics do have major effects on group 
task performance (Stogdill, 1974: 364-407). However, most 
of these studies have examined member satisfaction and the 
productivity of the group, seldom noting the process of 
search that affects such outcomes.
As a constraint on information search, the assess­
ment of leadership must note the emergence of leadership in 
group discussion, as well as the effects the leader has on 
group behavior. Because this view assumes that leadership 
is defined by the group, measures of sociometric choice 
whereby group members decide who most fits the leader role
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(Stogdill, 1974: Chapter 18), as well as interaction methods 
for isolating leader behavior, are utilized (Madron, 1969). 
Thus, leaders can be identified in a group environment inde­
pendent of formal role status; although such formal leader­
ship is necessary for a complete understanding of leader­
ship's effects on group search behavior. Once identified 
(whether formal, interactional, or sociometrically based) 
the leader's predispositions and acceptance of divergent 
information can then alter the search for information by the 
group (Maier and Solem, 1952; Kirkpatrick et al., 1976a). 
Further, the absence of a leader or the presence of compet­
ing leaders may decrease or increase search, respectively.
It is apparent that decision makers need information, 
but the gathering and processing of information is con­
strained by an assortment of individual and group factors, 
as well as environmental pressures inherent in organization­
al eind situational specifics. Constraints even exist in the 
very nature and complexity of the information sought. The 
previous discussion is an attempt to delineate some of those 
constraints. In order to understand the processes used in 
small group decision making, such restraints upon search 
behavior must be delineated. No single study can examine 
all constraints on search; this study is no exception. In 
Chapter III, the specific constraints to be examined in 
this analysis are outlined. Before turning to those con­
straints, however, the measures of search behavior used in 
this study are described.
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Measures of Search Behavior
There are many ways in which search may be measured. 
Thus, the array of potential measures available cannot be 
quantified and examined in a single study. The following 
section, therefore, is not meant to be an exhaustive cate­
gorization. A typology of search used by one author is 
briefly examined, and the final measures for this study are 
outlined.
One typology of search behavior differentiates be­
tween types of decision information, based on the stages of 
search from developing objectives to feedback on the final 
decision. Skjei (1973: 9-46) suggests four types of rele­
vant information: (1) problem information; (2) problem
environment information; (3) alternatives information; and 
(4) feedback information. Problem information is examined 
in the early stages of search whereby decision makers estab­
lish basic objectives, needs, and methods to find the re­
quired information. Problem environment information is con­
cerned with factors that are external to the problem which 
decision makers cannot control. Generally, the environ­
mental factors include legal, cultural, resource, and popu­
lation variables that constrain search (similar to situa­
tional constraint examined earlier). Alternatives 
information obviously involves the possible choices and the 
comparison of the benefits and costs of each alternative. 
Finally, feedback information refers to previous decisions 
related to the current problem.
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Skjei's approach relies heavily on pre-decisional 
information, i.e., problem information, problem environ­
ment information, and alternatives information. Using his 
framework, the search process could be exhaustive, thus a 
rational planning process; or the search could be limited 
and more dependent on feedback information, thus similar to 
an incremental model (Kirkpatrick et al., 1975). It is 
important to note, however, that the Skjei typology does 
not actually measure such a continuum.
Further, the categories are not easily differen­
tiated, especially when search does not follow a rational 
stage-like process. Specifically, if decision makers order­
ly define the problem, set the intangibles, then search for 
alternatives, and finally examine previous decisions, the 
process easily differentiates between categories. This is 
the central problem of the Skjei framework; when groups 
merge the categories and search no longer follows a linear 
stage model, differentiating between categories becomes 
extremely complex. In fact, the Skjei typology forces 
rationalistic processes upon decisional search, for it is 
only an assumption that search follows the pattern defined. 
The categories lack sufficient theoretical and empirical 
justification to force the particular typology on search.
Given the current absence of theoretical specificity 
to any particular typology, this study suggests that the 
measures important to defining the search process be examined
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before any particular typology is applied. The following is 
an abbreviated set of variables necessary to define search 
in a small group (for further explanation see Kirkpatrick 
et al., 1976b).
 Requests for information from other group members
(volume and type)
 Amount of information provided to other group mem­
bers (volume)
 Specifics of information provided to other group
members (type)
 Divergence of alternatives provided to other
group members (volume and type)
 Efforts to stimulate, terminate, or channel group
search (volume)
 Amount of information internally or externally
generated (volume)
At this juncture, it is best to picture a specific 
small group discussion. In any discussion, unless fairly 
restrictive rules are employed, the interaction among group 
members seems often jumbled and confusing to the untrained 
observer: manbers interrupt each other; questions are
introduced and not answered; one member talks at the same 
time as another; one member discusses the problem outlining 
the information available while another ignores the infor­
mation and presses the group for a decision. Yet, even in 
such an apparent morass, group members find common ground, 
engage in bargaining and compromise, and reach a final deci­
sion. Search behavior has occurred; yet, if dependent upon 
a rational process model and categories such as Skjei's, the 
process may still appear mysterious.
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A separation of such categories is accomplished by 
first delineating two crucial sub-elements of search: the
sheer volume and the diversity of types of information (both 
between and within alternatives). As stated earlier, infor­
mation is necessary in order to reduce uncertainty; as such 
the volume of information available becomes crucial in that 
reduction process. Each of the models discussed in Chapter 
X emphasizes the volume of search, from rational choice models 
and exhaustive search to the limited and satisficing search 
of the cybernetic paradigm.
The type of information is a more complex issue, 
for defining types implies some form of classification. The 
scheme utilized in this study, however, centers on rival 
measures of information types that begin with the simple and 
progress to more complex and diverse categorizations. Each 
relies on a description of the specific interaction of group 
members and their use of information. First, and most ob­
viously, any categorization should note whether a particular 
statement, using Skjei’s term, has alternatives information 
in its context. Often decision makers make statements devoid 
of any specific information that deals with the choices 
available. This does not meêin, however, that such state­
ments are unimportant to group discussion, only that they 
lack alternatives information content. Search behavior can 
be enhanced by positive responses to others' ideas, or by 
simple questions asking clarification of another group
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member's position. Asking another member of the group 
their vote, for example, may not deal with specific infor­
mation about the alternatives, yet it does contribute to 
the knowledge of each group member's position on a deci­
sional problem.
Having noted the usefulness of statements devoid of 
alternatives information, the emphasis of the information- 
processing technique remains on the ability of alternative- 
based information in reducing uncertainty and establishing 
group decisions. Although a widely-held view in the liter­
ature, this premise will be tested by examining the ratio of 
alternatives information in group interaction against all 
other forms of interaction.
A second information classification emphasizes the 
use of available information against the use of information 
generated externally, or that is new to the group situation 
(Davis, 1974; Kirkpatrick et al., 1976b). In any small 
group, information may be given or presently available for 
the group's use, or decision makers may bring it into con­
sideration themselves— either by external requests for others 
to compile, or assembled and brought into the discussion by 
a single decision maker. Such a measure of search behavior 
emphasizes the dependence of decision makers on available 
versus unique or new information. If decision makers depend 
solely on available or given information, search involves 
only the processing of the information, not the gathering of
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information relevant to the problem. Further, decision 
makers who can bring to bear externally-generated information 
upon a decisional problem may have a greater effect on the 
final decision-
In any group discussion, certain information gains 
a greater weight in the final solution by the sheer reliance 
of the group members upon such information "bits" (Simon, 
1958). Thus, a further classification of types of informa­
tion available for search is the dependence upon particular 
information items for arriving at a final decision. It 
should be emphasized that greater discussion does not neces­
sarily imply increased explanatory power, yet the social 
judgment literature does favor such an operationalization 
when discussing information impact (Kaplan, 1975; Anderson, 
1971, Bettman et al., 1975). Of interest, however, is the 
final effect that single alternative search may have on 
decision making. The greater the information and the 
greater the dependence upon a single alternative, the 
stronger the likelihood that other alternatives will be re­
jected. As hypothesized later in this study, even when the 
available information is equally weighted, the group's 
search process, vis a vis group interaction, will emphasize 
the alternative desired by the group. This conforms to cog­
nitive theory's premise that decision makers filter incom­
ing information in a manner that reduces the weight of
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information in opposition to their predispositions (Kirkpatrick, 
1975b).
Search behavior must be understood from its primary 
sub-elements; volume and type of information. Several ways 
of analyzing these aspects have been suggested: each will
be incorporated into the analysis of search behavior in 
Chapter IV. This study's approach centers not on estab­
lishing a taxonomy that requires some acceptance of a stage­
like process of search behavior; instead, this analysis 
posits that the keys to understanding search behavior are 
the constraints imposed upon information-processing dis­
cussed earlier in the chapter. The constraints, in fact, 
underlie all cognitive aspects of the process, for the con­
straints are the limitations upon search behavior that pre­
vent rational, complete, and exhaustive search. Since vol­
ume and complexity (type) are the two principal dimensions, 
these two general variables and their elements become the 
dependent variables in a search behavior model. In Chapter 
III the search measures (dependent variables) and the con­
straints (independent variables) are specified, and the 
hypotheses implicit in the preceding discussion are out­
lined before being tested in the fourth chapter.
Choice Shifts and Group 
Decisional Processes
Search behavior is the process whereby alternatives 
are enumerated and the costs and benefits are assessed based on
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the information processed. Search, however, is not choice; 
a necessary function of any decision-making theory is to 
explain the effects of group processes on the outcome, or 
the final decision. Specifically, what shifts occur between 
the decision maker's predisposition and the final group deci­
sion, and why do these shifts occur? To depend solely on 
the study of information search behavior to answer these 
questions is inadequate; a more complete picture must include 
various individual and group characteristics that address the 
specifics of individual-group shift. The following treats 
a rather substantial body of social-psychological theory 
relevant to such shifts.
The Shift to Risk Phenomenon
A central premise of conventional wisdom about polit­
ical groups posits that collective decisions are a rather 
slow and conservative decisional tool. Compromise and 
middle-of-the-road positions are frequently used to describe 
such group decisions. As noted in Chapter 1, groups do take 
greater time in making decisions, and are not as creative 
on a problem-solving task as a single individual.
Whyte's (1956) classic view of the "organization 
man" pervades the popular view of political leaders as cau­
tious decision makers. The Peter "principle" (Hull and 
Peter, 1969) and Kaufman's (1973) "decidophobia" have fur­
ther outlined the cautious and even timid manner in which 
decisions are made in our society, within and outside group
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confines. Yet, "risky shift" research in social psychology 
has found that the general principle, across cases and even 
cultures, is that groups are more willing to take risks in 
their decisions than individuals. The conflict between 
these two schools of theory exemplifies the need for more 
systematic attention to the question.
The shift-to-risk paradigm's central hypothesis is 
that groups will engage in greater risk-taking behavior 
than would individuals acting alone. In the only compre­
hensive volume on the sub]ect, Kogan and Wallach (1964: 1) 
justify the importance of the concept for decision-making 
analysis:
Decision-making . . . involves the weighing of 
alternatives and their likelihoods . . . Issues 
concerning the avoidance or acceptance of risks in 
arriving at decisions hence are likely to be impor­
tant ingredients in thinking processes.
In order to properly evaluate the "risky-shift" 
paradigm, a brief review of the theoretically distinct 
models employed in explanations of the hypothesis is in­
cluded. The evolution of the risk conceptualization is then 
broadened to a more general choice-shift formulation, and 
its applicability to political decision analysis is out­
lined.
Most research in the risky-shift mold has been 
dependent on a single measurement instrument, the "Choice 
Dilemma Questionnaire" (CDQ), first constructed by Kogan 
and Wallach in 1959 to measure sex differences (Wallach and
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Kogan, 1959: 554-64) and subsequently revised for the 
measurement of group risk-taking behavior by Stoner (1961). 
The CDQ is a series of hypothetical life situations in which 
subjects are asked to pick between two choices, one involv­
ing great risk of failure but high desirability, and the 
other involving a cautious choice. The CDQ instrument asks 
the individual to pick the acceptable probability for suc­
cess of the risky alternative before recommending its adop­
tion. Twelve CDQ items are traditionally employed ranging 
from job-related situations to questions about marriage.
Of the twelve items normally employed, only one is political 
(for a complete list see Kogan and Wallach, 1964: Appendix 
E).
The items are pretested on each subject individually, 
and then responses are examined again in some form of experi­
mental treatment involving group interaction. Mean responses 
are examined under pretest and treatment conditions in order 
to determine significant shifts in the recommendations. The 
shift has been referred to as the risky shift because of the 
tendency of the mean responses after group discussion to 
move toward greater risk. Such responses occur both in the 
group decision itself as well as in the posttest responses 
of group members, although the latter is not generally sub­
sumed under the concept of risky shift^ (Dion et al., 1970).
2This point is not a trivial one. The choice-shift 
paradigm used in the analysis, and the risky shift model as 
well, are less concerned about whether individuals still
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Explanations for the shift-to-risk phenomenon have 
engaged a large volume of research in the social psychology 
field. Over 300 research efforts have been conducted using 
the CDQ since the original work by Stoner (Myers, 1973); 
thus, comprehensive reviews of the literature are available 
elsewhere (Vinokur, 1971b; Brown, 1965; Dion et al., 1970; 
Pruitt, 1971). The myriad of research efforts can be sub­
sumed under four major categories of explanation: statis­
tical, cognitive, interactive, and affective models (Kirk­
patrick et al., 1976b; Kirkpatrick, 1975b).
Statistical Models
This set of models treats the group shift primarily 
in terms of decisional rules and other strictures upon the 
decisional process. Similar to the organizational constraint 
on search, this model suggests that certain structural prop­
erties, such as the decisional rule, are the prime explana­
tions for group risk-taking behavior (Zajonc et al., 1972). 
Most group risk studies have used a consensus decision rule, 
and yet a rule can be employed without requiring a consensus 
recommendation. Yet, in one risk-taking study employing a 
majority decision rule, significant risky shifts occurred 
(Wallach and Kogan, 1965). Although less theoretically 
satisfying than other models, the statistical model does
accept the group decision after the group is dissolved—  
although they generally do (Dion et al., 1970). The interest, 
instead, centers on the group decision alone and how it differs 
from individual predispositions.
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imply that functions other than the actual behavior inside 
the group may explain risk-taking behavior. Further, the 
model allows for a potentially crucial variable to enter 
the equation, the decision rule.
Cognitive Models
Two sets of explanation are most evident in cogni­
tive models of risk-taking behavior. The first has its roots 
in the subjective utility model emphasizing risk-level pref­
erences based on rational principles (Lee, 1971). Specifi­
cally, individuals change their risk preferences because the 
value for success is altered during group discussion, and 
not for any aspects of the group discussion itself. Most of 
the tests of this approach have used gambling situations 
(not CDQ items) with limited success (Burnstein et al.,
1971; Cartwright, 1971; Vinokur, 1971a).
The second set of cognitive models emphasizes the 
use of "information relevant to the task." This approach 
posits that it is the additional information generated by 
group discussion that is the key to the group shift. Inter­
action among members is only important in that it enables 
greater information specification by the group (Kogan and 
Wallach, 1967; Pruitt and Teger, 1969). Thus, "information 
relevant to the task" theory posits a technique for reducing 
uncertainty through greater information search. The model's 
prime purpose is not the measurement of group shift, but the 
results of group search. As such, the approach lacks the
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sophistication of the constraint paradigm posited earlier 
in this chapter.
Both sets of cognitive models, however, emphasize 
that group shifts are not a function of group processes, 
but instead rely on principles whereby the individual reduces 
the uncertainty about any particular alternative. The weight 
of the latter process cannot be adequately assessed until the 
two processes are examined separately, for as critics of cog­
nitive approaches to risk have illustrated, empirical evi­
dence validating increased information without group discus­
sion remains unconfirmed (Dion et al., 1970). Tests of 
"information relevant to the task" theory have been unable 
to separate information processing from the group discussion 
element.
Interactive Models
Primarily dependent on sociological patterns of inter­
action, this class of risk-taking models emphasizes emerging 
leadership patterns that occur in a group environment. Lead­
ership theory hypothesizes that individuals who have high 
risk levels before the group meeting are more persuasive in 
group discussion (Marquis, 1962; Wallach et al., 1962). Two 
sub-processes have been suggested as relevant to this 
approach. One model, leader confidence theory, posits that 
decision makers who are high risk takers are more confident, 
and thus more influential on the final group decision.
Thus, prior certainty by one member of the group should
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reduce uncertainty for the rest (Pruitt, 1971). This 
hypothesis assumes that greater confidence dictates greater 
risk. Unfortunately, when cautious shifts occur, as they 
do on some CDQ items, leader confidence theory cannot claim 
that caution is equated with confidence.
The same difficulty remains for the alternative 
interactive model, "rhetoric of risk" theory. The hypothe­
sis suggests that risky language is more dramatic and thus 
more persuasive than cautious arguments (Pruitt, 1971). 
Obviously, when cautious shifts occur, a "rhetoric of cau­
tion" hypothesis is not plausible. In general, interactive 
approaches assume that influences occurring during group 
discussion are purely informational rather than affective 
(Vinokur, 1971a). The affective element of group interaction 
has been too widely illustrated in group problem solving to 
be dismissed in such a manner (Rettig, 1966; Kelley and 
Thibaut, 1968).
Affective Models
The final class of risk-taking models are those which 
emphasize group effects on individuals. Affective models 
are the most widely tested of the risk-taking phenomena; 
each of the major hypotheses are outlined below.
Diffusion-of-responsibility theory. The earliest of 
the risk-taking explanations, diffusion-of-responsibility, 
posits that group decisions allow the decision maker to 
reduce his/her anxiety about risk, thereby diffusing
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individual responsibility for possible failure and 
facilitating risky shifts (Kogan and Wallach, 1967). Thus, 
the diffusion hypothesis represents a true group effect 
which cannot occur with isolated individuals (Pruitt and 
Teger, 1967; Secord and Backman, 1964). There has been 
considerable confusion as to what are the necessary and suf­
ficient conditions for confirmation of diffusion-of- 
responsibility theory. The original formulation only re­
quired unanimous group decisions for responsibility- 
diffusion (Wallach et al., 1964); however, later findings 
suggesting that group discussion, not decisions, produces a 
risky-shift effect forced a further re-evaluation (Wallach 
and Kogan, 1965).
The final formulation of diffusion-of-responsibility 
theory proposes a causal chain such that (1) affective bonds 
are created in group discussion which (2) permit diffusion 
of responsibility which in turn (3) allow groups to shift 
to greater risk. Although the evidence is strong that a 
group effect operates to increase risk-taking behavior (for 
a review, see Dion et al., 1970), efforts to confirm 
diffusion-of-responsibility theory have been extremely mixed 
(Teger and Pruitt, 1967; Marquis, 1962). One study suggests 
that when diffusion of responsibility actually occurs among 
group members, no shift results (Pruitt and Teger, 1969).
The latter study found evidence, however, that strong affec­
tive and emotional bonds, when measured as group cohesiveness.
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results in greater risk-taking, and that cohesion is not as 
effective in producing a risky shift in situations when 
group discussion is prohibited (Pruitt and Teger, 1969). 
Noting this phenomenon, Dion and his colleagues (1970) sug­
gest that members of a cohesive group do not seek to dis­
place personal responsibility for failure on others in the 
group. For whatever reason, the evidence indicates that the 
causal chain posited by responsibility-diffusion theorists 
is valid to the extent that group discussion leads to cohes­
iveness and eventually to greater risk; but the filter 
mechanism for that shift is not the ability to diffuse 
responsibility among group members.
Familiarization theory. This hypothesis suggests 
that group discussion is only a single method for individ­
uals to become acquainted, or familiar, with the informa­
tion. After the decision maker becomes more confident of 
the information, uncertainty is reduced and the risky shift 
occurs (Bateson, 1966; Flanders and Thistlethwaite, 1967). 
This pseudo-group effect holds that subjects should engage 
in risky shifts if allowed to simply peruse the available 
information in more detail. Replications of the early work 
on the familiarization hypothesis have failed to provide 
significant shifts, especially against group discussion 
conditions, thus raising serious questions about the general- 
izability of the early work (Teger et al., 1970; Dion and 
Miller, 1971; Castore, 1972).
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An underlying theoretical problem remains in the 
familiarization approach. The hypothesis assumes that indi­
viduals, or groups, will act rationally, when given suffic­
ient time to consider the problem. Flanders and Thistle­
thwaite (1967) refer to this process as comprehension, while 
Bateson (1966) uses the more general concept of uncertainty- 
reduction. Once again, risk becomes synonymous with cer­
tainty no matter what the subject. Marquis (1968) provides 
evidence that on CDQ items which traditionally favor cautious 
shifts, familiarization still leads to cautious shifts. Yet, 
if familiarization increases comprehension and reduces uncer­
tainty, a risky shift should occur. Others have illustrated 
similar problems with the familiarization approach (Myers, 
1967; Vidmar, 1970).
Value theory. The most widely supported explanation 
of risk-taking behavior, the risk-as-value hypothesis (Brown, 
1965), proposes a two-step causal chain. When risk is the 
admired or valued choice, decision makers see themselves as 
more risky than others in the decisional system. When the 
subject enters the group environment, others may have chosen 
as risky, or even more risky, alternatives. As a result, 
the decision maker and the group shift further out on the 
risky dimension (Stoner, 1968).
The strength of value theory is that it can account 
for cautious shifts as well as risky ones, whereas the other 
affective models are applicable to risk alone. If the
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cautious response is the more valued response, then shifts 
should occur in that direction. Two of the original CDQ 
items, as well as items constructed later by Stoner (1968}, 
have engaged such cautious shifts. The plausibility of cau­
tious shifts, especially in political contexts, heightens 
the critical importance of value theory as a potential 
explanatory framework for political small groups.
Although a wide diversity of subcategories of value 
theory have been outlined elsewhere (Kirkpatrick and Robert­
son, 1976}, several critical categorizations are examined 
here. First, the value shift can be conceived as a social 
comparisons process whereby group interaction and discus­
sion offers subjects the opportunity to discover the risk 
levels of others and to adjust their own risk levels accord­
ingly (Brown, 1965)- By making such comparisons, groups 
will then shift toward the valued direction, whether risky 
or cautious. Brown's approach is derived from Binds' (1962) 
findings that subjects see themselves as more willing to 
make risky choices than other subjects like them on a pre­
test, and from subsequent research by Teger and Pruitt (1967), 
who found that group discussion includes this comparison 
process. Stoner (1968) further illustrates that when under­
lying values can be found on an item, shifts occur in the 
direction of that value.
A corollary to the social comparison hypothesis 
bases its explanation on the presence of pluralistic ignorance
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and that group discussion enables subjects to discover the 
positions of others (Levinger and Schneider, 1969). Both 
of these approaches to value theory emphasize that informa­
tion relevant to members' positions is the key to the shift, 
yet Teger and Pruitt (1967) have found that group discus­
sion must go beyond preferences in order to elicit a group 
shift.
A third value explanation emphasizes that a decision 
maker’s level of commitment induced by group discussion 
serves to crystallize original decisions (Moscovici and 
Zavalloni, 1969). Commitment theory acknowledges the ele­
ment of knowing group members' positions, yet emphasizes 
that the processes of information handling and individual 
interaction are the keys to the shift. Linkage to value 
theory is accomplished by the assertion that greater commit­
ment is predicted in the valued direction.
The validity of value theory, although the most 
widely supported of the risk-taking models, does not assume 
that all other models are inadequate. In fact, each of the 
risk-taking models are not so exclusive that confirmation 
of one is a rejection of all others. The theoretical liter­
ature on risk-taking has been generally myopic in its sim­
plistic treatment of one of the alternative models without 
adequately fusing aspects of other approaches.
The Choice Shift Model
As previously noted, only value theory can adequately 
account for cautious as well as risky shifts, although
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components of value theory are not mutually exclusive from 
other models. Part of the dilemma reflects the over­
reliance on the Choice Dilemma Questionnaire (CDQ) and the 
measurement of risk-caution as the prime continuum. Politi­
cal decision making is obviously more complex than calculat­
ing the probabilities necessary for success of a particular 
outcome; in fact, risk-caution may be too confining a prin­
cipal by which to categorize decision making. Risk is only 
one element of choice-shift behavior and of group effects on 
individuals (Walker, 1976).
Levinger and Schneider (1969) were the first to use 
the more general "choice shift" conceptualization. Yet, 
their choice shift reference emphasizes only the possibili­
ties of cautious shifts. Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969) 
broaden choice shift concepts with non-CDQ measures, specif­
ically attitude shifts of French students toward DeGaulle and 
Americans. Myers and Bishop (1971) further extend the choice 
shift model on race relation attitudes among American stu­
dents.
Rather than forcing subjects to define the probabil­
ity of success of any given alternative— a concept more de­
pendent on the rational weighting of alternatives— the choice 
shift literature prefers to utilize other measurement scales 
such as Likert or Semantic Differential techniques (Doise, 
1969; Gouge and Fraser, 1972; and Paicheler and Bouchet,
1973). Yet, as in the earlier risky-shift formulation.
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the measurement of shift remains a group dynamics 
phenomenon.
Given the need for measurement of political choice, 
the new attitude shift approach allows greater emphasis on 
choice— not on probabilities of success. Using Likert or 
similar techniques, subjects choose between alternatives 
which may have little relation to risk-caution. Further­
more, alternative-based items allow consideration of a more 
natural mid-point (neutrality) as a base from which to anal­
yze judgments; the CDQ measurement of risk has no neutral 
point— only a continuum of probabilities of success on the 
risky alternative (Kirkpatrick and Robertson, 1976; Myers 
and Lamm, 1976).
For purposes of this study, the alternative-based 
choice shift model is more applicable for development of 
explanations of group decision making in a political context. 
In accord with this rationale, a new battery of items has 
been developed which is more relevant to a political 
decision-making environment (see also Kirkpatrick et al., 
1975, for earlier efforts to modify CDQ). The five items 
emphasize policy issues on which "real world" political 
groups must often make decisions. The details of the items 
and the measurement are examined in Chapter III (see also 
Kirkpatrick and Robertson, 1976).
Fundamental to the measurement of choice shifts is 
the consideration of the underlying continuum. In most
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studies, a seven-item Likert scale is used where two 
alternatives are noted, and subjects can agree with either 
choice, as well as establish the strength of their recommen­
dation on a bipolar scale. Thus, instead of risk-caution 
as the prime continuum, group shifts are examined within a 
group extremization framework. Extremization posits that 
group decisions will be less neutral than the mean of ini­
tial subject responses (Myers and Lamm, 1976).
Given that the risk-taking paradigm is only a spec­
ial case of the choice shift/extremization approach, some 
of the vast literature of risk taking can be re-conceptualized 
for political choice shifts. Value theory remains testable 
in its present form; in fact, the value hypothesis has been 
widely confirmed in the attitude/choice shift literature 
(Moscovici and Zavalloni, 1969). The following section de­
lineates how risk-taking models can be redefined to test 
choice shifts based on an extremization continuum (see also 
Kirkpatrick et al., 1975).
Statistical model. Although little attention has 
been paid to the influence of group decision rules, such 
effects cannot be easily dismissed in a political environ­
ment. Informal decision rules in Congressional committees, 
for example, alter the speed and the results of decision 
making and policy in the legislature. One legislative 
scholar even notes that decision rules are the crucial set 
of intervening variables between individual predispositions 
and goals and the final committee decision (Penno, 1973).
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The choice shift literature has generally rejected 
this structural constraint, although treatment of its effects 
has centered primarily on the pretest distribution alone 
(Myers and Lamm, 1976). The hypothesis, however, goes be­
yond any strict statistical dispersion of individual predis­
positions; the decision rule should be treated as a specific 
influence on group decisional shifts. Using an earlier set 
of policy items similar to those in this study, the findings 
illustrated that groups under an imposed majority-decision 
rule engage in greater shifts than consensus-decision groups 
(Kirkpatrick and Robertson, 1976).
Interactive Model. Among this class of models, 
Pruitt's (1971) discussion of leadership-confidence theory 
has the most relevance to choice shifts. Decision makers 
whose predispositions are already extreme (toward the end­
point of the continuum) should have the greatest influence 
on the group shift.
The specific hypothesis suggests that group leaders, 
as identified by interaction and sociometric measures, will 
be individuals whose pretest positions are the most extreme 
and yet are the most similar to the final group decision. 
Alternatively, personality variables which operationalize 
leadership patterns, such as the Machiavellian scale, are 
applicable as intervening variables in determining the kind 
of subject willing to assume a leadership role (Christie and 
Geis, 1970). Subjects with Machiavellian personalities
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are hypothesized to be extreme on pretest positions while 
influencing group decisions in accordance with those posi­
tions.
Familiarization model. Although this affective 
model has been rejected as an explanation of the risky shift, 
its applicability for the choice shift remains unexplored.
By hypothesizing that familiarization provides for reduced 
uncertainty and greater comprehension, the approach suggests 
that decisional shifts are only a conceptualization of learn­
ing. Thus, greater information, or even greater time for 
studying a problem, should increase the tendency to shift.
The familiarization hypothesis is essentially a control 
group model whereby decision makers given the opportunity to 
examine the available information should engage in greater 
shifts without actual group discussion.
Diffusion-of-responsibility model. The basic 
responsibility-diffusion hypothesis suggests that group dis­
cussion reduces subjects' anxiety about risk. Thus, for 
choice shifts its conceptualization is built on anxiety- 
reduction for decision makers through group bonds. Such 
individual bonds to a group are among the most widely cited 
elements crucial to a strong group environment, whether task 
or emotional in nature (Bennis et al., 1973; Mills, 1967; 
Crosbie, 1975). Although specific operationalizations have 
been quite diverse, most rely on various measures of group 
cohesiveness, usually measured by posttest sociometric
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scores. The diffusion-of-responsibility hypothesis would 
then posit that the groups that engage in the greatest shifts 
toward the extremes would be the most cohesive.
The Value Model eind the Polarization Hypothesis. As 
noted previously, value theory has been widely confirmed in 
the attitude/choice shift literature, yet only recently has 
the model been more carefully defined. Specifically, Myers 
and Lamm (1976) refer to the value model as a special case 
of the group polarization hypothesis where the group decision 
will tend to be more extreme in the same direction as the 
mean of the pretest responses. Thus, group polarization is 
one example of the more general choice shift continuum—  
group extremization. The latter only requires shift away 
from neutrality, while polarization's emphasis is on shift 
toward a stronger position (more extreme) for a particular 
alternative. In a review of the choice shift literature in 
social psychology, Myers and Lamm (1976) find strong evidence 
for the polarization effect.
The strongest influence of the various sub-hypotheses 
of polarization or value theory centers on what Myers and 
Lamm (1976) call the informational influence interpretation, 
or what is more generally cited as the commitment interpre­
tation referred to earlier in the chapter (Brown, 1965).
Given initial predispositions on a particular choice, commit­
ment theory emphasizes that subjects will tend to enhance 
those positions by examining information that is supportive, 
not contrary, to those positions.
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Yet, value theory is different from polarization 
because the hypothesis notes that decision makers see them­
selves closer to the desired or valued choice than others. 
When this occurs, any shift that occurs should be in that 
desired direction. The polarization hypothesis makes no 
assumption about other's predispositions. In a group deci­
sional environment the two hypotheses would differ. The 
polarization hypothesis predicts that group shifts should be 
only in the same direction as the mean of the initial pre­
dispositions; confirmation of the value hypothesis requires 
that the shift direction is in the valued direction which 
might be in the opposite direction (toward the second alter­
native) of the initial predisposition of the group (Kirk­
patrick and Robertson, 1976).
Since redefinition is required for most of the cur­
rent risk-taking models, new operationalizations based on 
established theoretical constructs have been suggested for 
political choice shifts. Further, each of the models should 
be examined together; all are interrelated to the extent 
that acceptance of one does not reject all others (Kirk­
patrick et al., 1975; Myers and Lamm, 1976). In a departure 
from more conventional research, decision rules (statistical 
model) and value theory have been analyzed as to their 
effects on choice shifts in a single study (Kirkpatrick and 
Robertson, 1976). This study will expand those notions to 
a broader test of each of the choice shift models.
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Search and Choice Shifts— Linkages
The two fundamental decision processes of searching 
for information and alternatives and shifting choices in a 
group environment have been outlined in this chapter. Each 
complements the other, yet there is no research which 
attempts to link these processes (Kirkpatrick et al., 1976b). 
The choice shift paradigm emphasizes the process whereby 
individual positions are altered by the effects groups have 
on the consequences of any particular decision. The search 
for information and alternatives are not considered by the 
choice shift model.
The search literature prefers emphasis on the con­
straints of reducing uncertainty by gathering information 
for decisional solutions (Kirkpatrick et al., 1975), but the 
resulting decision, or the consequences of the search pro­
cess are ignored. Yet, as described throughout this chapter, 
the independent variables that alter choice shifts are in 
the same class of effects as those operating on the search 
process. For example, what effect does a group constraint 
such as cohesion level have on the entire decisional pro­
cess? The search and choice shift processes both theorize 
that group cohesion would increase the amount of seairch and 
size of shift. It is the argument in this study and else­
where (Kirkpatrick et al., 1976a) that knowledge of either 




The preceding theory and research serve as guides to 
building a model of decision making based on the two com­
ponent elements of such theory: search and choice shift
behavior. In order to link the entire process, a framework 
for analyzing decision making is displayed in Figure 1. The 
framework is offered as a simplifying device and as a trans­
lation mechanism for movement from theory to specific oper­
ationalization of its component parts. The categorizations 
do not address all of the subtle and highly complex effects 
discussed in the last two chapters; yet, the framework does 
outline the primary components of this investigation. In 
addition, the linkages between and within the search and 
choice shift processes are still fairly crude given the 
cd)sence of specific social psychological and group dynamics 
literature (Kirkpatrick et al., 1976a).
The framework is divided into four segments: inde­
pendent variables that constrain decision making; the search 
process; the choice shift process; and the resulting outcomes. 
The constraints have been examined both in the search process 
and as underlying elements of the choice shift process. 
Although environmental constraints are more complex than the 
three elements noted, each of these describes a crucial ele­
ment affecting group decision making. These include (1) in­
formation, varying in its level of complexity, volume, over­
load capacity, and costs for obtaining it; (2) organizational
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constriants based on decision rules, procedures, and 
general characteristics; and (3) situational variables which 
vary across time and policy emphasis such as routine versus 
crisis situations.
The general set of environmental factors are mediated 
by constraints on individuals and groups. Those variables 
that are individually determined include motive/functional 
needs and cognitive constraints such as heuristic rules and 
individual cognitive complexity. Finally, a set of group 
constraints are operative, including group values, levels of 
cohesion, diffusion and familiarization processes, and lead­
ership patterns. As the diagram indicates, the latter two 
constraints filter the environmental factor and bear directly 
on the search process, and either directly or indirectly 
alter group shift. Some of the elements are more relevant 
for the search process than the shift element; however, each 
set requires operationalization and empirical testing for 
effects.
The search process provides outputs in both the 
amount and the type of information processed, as well as 
the alternatives/consequences of the choices. These outputs 
become the focal points for the evaluation of the alterna­
tives and final choices in the shift process. The latter 
may also be affected by specific constraints in the indi­
vidual and group domains. Further, where conditions of 
search are weak, or nonexistent, shifts that occur will be 
uniformly explained by such constraining factors.
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The search process is not meant to be a "black box"; in other 
studies the framework for search is more complex (Kirk­
patrick et al., 1976b). As noted earlier in the chapter, 
schemes for specific explanation of search lie primarily in 
its environmental, individual, and group constraints. More 
complex systems based on information-integration (Anderson, 
1974) or evocation rules (Simon, 1957; Kirkpatrick et al., 
1976b) require rationalizing assumptions about the stages of 
search; stages which cannot at this time be empirically 
tested. The keys to the search process, both in volume and 
type of information, are the set of constraints that prevent 
a totally rational, exhaustive, and comprehensive result; 
thus, the constraints are the prime explanation of the lim­
itations on search behavior (March and Simon, 1958).
The shift process involves decision makers who dev­
elop orientations to prior and subsequent consequences for 
the alternatives and information provided by the search 
process. Further, group shifts may be altered by individual 
and group factors. The final group choice, as partially 
determined by additional intervening variables, such as the 
group decision rule, is compared to the individual predis­
positions before the group process began (Kirkpatrick et 
al., 1975).
Finally, the group decision presumably has some 
outcome; such results have obvious policy relevance (or 
may be policy) for the decision-making group. The content
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of the outcome may fall within several policy dimensions: 
routine versus innovative policy, system maintenance or 
lifestyle values (Williams, 1961; Kirkpatrick and Morgan, 
1971), or distributive, regulatory, or redistributive poli­
cies (Lowi, 1964). While other conceptualizations are pos­
sible (such as incremental and nonincremental decisions), 
the above outcome types emphasize the results of the deci­
sional process. The outcome element of the framework is 
only presented to complete the model. Given the experi­
mental emphasis of this investigation, the study of outcome 
typologies cannot be adequately examined; however, the deci­
sion items focus on various policy areas.
Unlike the decisional frameworks outlined in Chapter 
I, this model links individual, group, and environmental 
factors to both the search and the final choice or shift 
process while still dependent on basic social-psychological 
theory. Moreover, the framework components can be oper­
ationalized, specified through bivariate and multivariate 
hypotheses, and empirically tested. It is to this goal that 
this investigation turns to Chapter III.
CHAPTER III
RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES FOR 
EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF SMALL 
GROUP DECISION MAKING
Decision-making analysis has traditionally centered 
on the normative evaluation of the outcomes of decisions by 
individuals. The purpose of this study is to empirically 
examine the process of decision making, primarily in a 
small group context- After the description of alternative 
models for this form of decisional analysis in Chapter I, 
the specific framework for examining decision making was 
detailed. The bulk of the present chapter deals with the 
specifications necessary for operationalizing the framework 
and for delineating the detailed research design to test the 
resulting hypotheses for explaining search and choice shift 
behavior. In order to evaluate the resulting hypotheses, 
the general research design should first be explained— the 
randomized laboratory experiment.
Experimentation and the Process 
of Decision Making
The complexity of the framework specified in 
Chapter II necessitates a rather considerable division of
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labor in order to study the various elements of the 
decisional schema and ultimately to refine the framework 
into a fully operationalized model of decision making- No 
single research effort can integrate all elements of the 
framework into a single study. In order to advance explan­
ation and prediction of decisional analysis, research must 
proceed on several fronts, both at the laboratory and "real 
world" levels of analysis- The logic of experimentation 
provides a vehicle to begin such analysis- Although more 
general discussions of experimentation can be found else­
where (Myers, 1966; Campbell and Stanley, 1966; Plutchik, 
1968; Cook and Campbell, 1976; Festinger and Katz, 1953; 
Chapter 2), the following brief discussion emphasizes the 
needs of this particular investigation-
Traditional Objectives to 
Experimental Design
Although widely used in the natural sciences, the 
applicability of experimental design in the social sciences 
has been primarily limited to psychology and social psychol­
ogy- Since political science has only recently rediscovered 
the use of experimental methodology and design, the biases 
against it remain prevalent- First among the objections is 
the cirtificialitv of the experimental research situation, 
especially under laboratory conditions- Critics charge 
that since only certain measures are allowed to vary in an 
investigation, no statements of results can be justified-
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In decision-making analyses the forcing of certain situational 
constraints to be held constant may give an unreal picture of 
the decisional process.
As Kerlinger (1964: 380) notes, such criticism 
"... comes from individuals lacking an understanding of 
the purposes of laboratory experiments." Experimentation, 
especially in the laboratory environment, deliberately 
creates an artificial situation such that a relationship 
between two or more variables can be examined without out­
side forces potentially altering the hypothesized effect. 
Experimentalists do not deny that other variables in fact 
affect the relationship in the real world environment, but 
their desire is to measure the effects without those external 
variables interfering.
The problem emphasizes experimental design’s prime 
purpose— establishing causal relationships under "pure" 
conditions (Plutchik, 1968). The non-experimentalist's 
claim that this produces an artificial environment is cor­
rect. Yet, examination of effects in a real world mode 
suffers similar difficulties since all possible variables 
cannot be examined in the actual situation. By random 
assignment to conditions, the errors caused by "outside" 
or exogenous variables are more likely to be randomly 
distributed across treatment conditions than by non-random 
methods (Blalock, 1964; Campbell and Stanley, 1966; Cook 
and Campbell, 1976). Finally, the degree of artificiality
92
is determined by the experimenter; laboratory experiments 
can quite adequately simulate some situational environments 
(Verba, 1961).
The more general objection to experimentation is the 
lack of external validity or generalizability. The dominant 
disciplinary view in political science has obviously empha­
sized external validity at the expense of internal validity 
(Kirkpatrick et al-, 1976a). As a result, field study 
involving large scale random sampling has dominated research 
in political science. Yet, unless internal validity in 
research is established, one loses the ability to generalize 
to other settings or populations (Campbell and Stanley,
1966; 5).
In decision-making research, the limits of single 
inquiry must be underscored. Large random samples of actual 
decision-making elites (Barber, 1966) will not establish 
external validity. Generalization rests not only on the 
representativeness of the subject population, but also on 
the representativeness of test conditions and samples of 
time (Cook and Campbell, 1976: 226). Establishing external 
validity requires replication across time, cases, and situa­
tional environments.
Objections to experimentation are not without merit.
In studying political decision making, examination of labora­
tory groups often made up of college freshmen or volunteers 
certainly limits the ability to generalize from the laboratory
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to city councils or Congressional sub-committees. A special 
difficulty in experimentation is the problem of establishing 
a laboratory equivalent of accountability of the decision 
group— accountability to constituents in the case of elected 
councils, or to administrative superiors in the case of 
appointive groups. Does the rigor of experimentation in 
the laboratory, and the resulting greater confidence of the 
research findings at that level, justify its applicability 
to decisional analysis?
Experimentation and the 
Decision-Making Process
The premise of this investigation is that the dis­
comfort of scholars, especially political scientists, in 
using experimental laboratory groups is unwarranted at the 
current stage of development in decision-making theory.
As noted in Chapter I, decisional theory tends to be outcome- 
dependent; when processual notions in political decisional 
analysis have been addressed, the research relies heavily 
on anecdotal, ex post facto interpretations of the final 
outcome. By testing the applicability of specific theoreti­
cal frameworks on experimental small groups, the confidence 
with respect to such theory can be more adequately supported 
(Hempel, 1966). Once established at the experimental group 
level, less rigorous tests of similar frameworks can be 
applied on actual decision-making groups. Thus, the find­
ings at the laboratory level permit greater confidence in 
like results for natural groups.
94
Experimental designs do provide the researcher with 
greater confidence in the internal validity of the investi­
gation. By experimentally manipulating explanatory variables, 
and rzmdomly assigning subjects to treatments, the causal 
relationships of independent and dependent varisibles are less 
likely to be affected by exogeneous variables. Further, the 
threats to internal validity that debilitate confidence in 
non-experimental research are significantly reduced and 
often eliminated by using an experimental framework (Campbell 
and Stanley, 1966; Cook and Campbell, 1976).
Finally, the inferential leaps between theory and 
data are not as confining under the rigors of experimenta­
tion. For example, risk-taking theory has been specifically 
operationalized under several explanatory models; each has 
been extensively tested across time and settings. The result 
is a fairly explicit delineation of the models that explain 
the risk phenomenon.
Thus, experimental design seems the most logical 
first step in examining search and choice shift behavior in 
a political context. As elements of decisional theory are 
tested at the experimental level, the examination of natural 
groups becomes more applicable, although an intermediate 
step should be the study of actual policy decision-making 
groups under laboratory conditions (Kirkpatrick et al., 1976a)
The purpose of this discussion is not to claim that 
experimental design is a panacea for all political research;
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often experimentation is not feasible for building theory.
But in order to increase our knowledge of the process of 
decision making in groups, the approach does offer unique 
advantages. No claims are made about immediate practical 
utility to political decision-making groups; the amount of 
search by college freshmen on a policy item may not resemble 
that of a specialized Congressional sub-committee. Neverthe­
less, the process of interaction, leadership selection, 
search, and final choice shift should give strong clues as 
to corresponding processes in national settings. By build­
ing the theory/data linkage using experimental groups, the 
potential for escaping traditional anecdotal explanations 
of the collective decisional process may be realized.
Research Design 
In order to refine the framework specified in 
Chapter II, and to test the relationships specified by it, a 
laboratory investigation was conducted to examine small group 
decision making on political/policy items.
Method: Subjects and Procedure
Two hundred and fifty-three undergraduates enrolled 
in introductory American government courses at the University 
of Oklahoma participated in the initial session of the exper­
iment. Of this group, one hundred and fifty-five attended 
one assigned evening session over the ensuing three-week 
period. Students gave initial choices as to their desired
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time, and from this framework, students were randomly 
assigned to session times, as well as to control or treat­
ment groups. A total of twenty groups underwent experi­
mental treatment— sixteen five-person groups, two four-person 
groups, and two three-person groups. A total of sixty-one 
students were assigned control status over the three-week 
period.
Before attending the evening sessions, all subjects 
completed two questionnaires in their classes. The first 
was a series of questions and scales of measurement of per­
sonality and sociological characteristics of the students 
(see Appendix A). The second questionnaire was a set of 
five policy items. Each item has two alternatives; subjects 
were asked to pick which alternative they would recommend 
based on a Likert scale of strongly favor alternative A to 
strongly favor alternative B. In addition, subjects were 
asked to check their recommendation of what other students 
would likely recommend. All five decisional items had an 
introductory statement of the problem and two pieces of 
"background information" for each alternative (see Appendix 
B).
Once subjects arrived at their evening session, they 
entered a room assigned to either the control group or the 
experimental session. The control group was given the origi­
nal five-item policy schedule again and instructed to fill 
out the questionnaire after being informed that the first
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questionnaire was designed only to familiarize subjects 
with the decisional problems.
The experimental group was led into a room equipped 
for video taping. Subjects were allowed to see the equipment 
and become familiar with the setting before the session began. 
All of the groups quickly overcame any perceivable nervous­
ness about the equipment once the experiment began. Subjects 
were given questionnaires using the five policy items and 
asked to reach a group decision on each. Two separate treat­
ments were experimentally manipulated based on decision rule 
and information level (see Appendix C). The specific treat­
ment conditions were randomly assigned to all twenty groups. 
After reaching group decisions on all five items, subjects 
were asked individually to complete a final posttest ques­
tionnaire on the group experience, leaders in the group, and 
adequacy of the information. The subjects were then thanked 
and released.
Experimental Treatments
The study's design is a 2x2 factorial design (Myers, 
1966) with several additional covariates. Although many dif­
ferent combinations of explanatory variables could have been 
experimentally manipulated, two particularly salient vari­
ables were isolated: decision rule and information level.
Half of the groups were required to reach a majority deci­
sion, while the other condition required all members to come 
to a consensus decision on each policy item recommendation.
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The second treatment was the level of information provided 
to the group. Ten groups were given the same two pieces of 
information as they had in the pretest (low information), 
and ten groups were given five additional information ele­
ments for each alternative (high information). Thus, a 2x2 
design resulted, as noted in Figure 2. Using 20 groups, 
there were five groups in each treatment cell; once again, 








In addition, several covariates were included in 
the analysis of search and choice shift behavior. These 
covariates, although not experimentally manipulated, may 
provide evidence to further explain the decisional process. 
It should be noted that experimental treatments must be 
limited in any single analysis because of the practical lim­
its on the necessary cells. For example, if the design 
included another experimental treatment variable with two 
cells, the design would then be a 2x2x2 design. In order 
to place five groups per cell in the design, there would
have to be forty groups. As suggested elsewhere (Kirkpatrick 
et al., 1976a), by first establishing some effects based on 
covariate variation, additional research can then experi­
mentally manipulate the desired variables.
Dependent Variables— Search Process
As described in Chapter II, there are several meth­
ods for describing the search process, yet the principal 
division relies on volume and type of information search. 
Further, the amount of alternative search, or the search 
for different solutions, can be determined. Within the con­
text of this experiment, however, the emphasis remains on 
information search for given alternatives, and not for dis­
covering new alternatives. Each of the measures describing 
informational seeirch behavior is based on scoring the actual 
verbal interactions of the group sessions. The schemes for 
scoring are grounded in earlier methods described by Brown 
(1965) and Madron (1969), although the applied schema in 
this study is more elaborate.
Specifically, the interaction coding scheme required 
the coding of three specific interactions: the coding of
each conversational segment as to who spoke to whom; the 
Bales' interaction process categories (1950); and the infor­
mation coding scheme (see Appendix D).̂  The Bales' system
Three coders had primary assignments for each one 
of the category schemes as well as additionally coding one 
of the other schemes as a reliability check. After several
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will be described later as one of the explanatory 
variables.
The informational coding scheme is the most complex 
measure of verbal interaction. The elements coded are 
(1) whether the verbal statement had any specific informa­
tion about the problem; (2) if it was an information state­
ment, then which alternative did the statement favor (or was 
it neutral; and (3) which piece(s) of "given" information 
did the statement note (or was it "unique" information).
Given these categories, the specific dependent var­
iables for search behavior are defined below. The important 
distinction rests on the volume and type of information used 
in the group discussion. Each of the variables emphasize 
the three elements described above; all are the keys to 
explaining search behavior. First, how much information is 
provided by the group discussion? Specifically, does discus­
sion center primarily on resolving the differences between 
individual predispositions, or is there actual search whereby 
group members discuss information that may reduce uncertainty 
and lead to a group decision? The first variable examines the 
general level of information search both by examining the 
sheer volume of information statements as well as the per­
centage of information statements against statements not 
directly linked to specific information about the alterna­
tives. The latter can be as simple as a positive response
trial runs, the reliability scores generally were above .80 
for all items (see Madron, 1969}.
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to someone else's statement, or as complex as a question as 
to what other members' positions are on the issue.
Search Process VaricOales
 Information provided by others by the subject
(volume and typê
 Information favoring side A, B or neutral
(volume and type)
 Available versus unique information discussed
by the subject (volume and type)
The second and third sets of measures of search are 
more type-specific. When information is discussed, does it 
tend to reflect only one side of the problem, or do both 
sides receive equal discussion? Search processes which 
examine only a single alternative differ from those which 
note the other alternative as well. Third, how much infor­
mation does the group generate? This third variable exam­
ines two separate aspects of search— the amount of available 
information discussed by the group and the amount of unique 
information analyzed. The former only requires a group to 
process the available information; unique information is 
first generated by a decision maker and then processed by 
the group.
All three of these variables will be examined both 
from the amount of information relevant to the category in 
the discussions (volume), and the specific dependence on one 
category against another category (type). The latter will 
be examined as the percent usage of unique information.
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Thus, the more the subject depends on information that is 
unique, or external to the available information, the higher 
the subject's reliance on unique information. The alterna­
tive sides of the information and whether the verbal state­
ment has alternatives information present will also be anal­
yzed by the percent use within each category. Subjects who 
use information that favors a single alternative depends more 
on one-sided information. Other search behavior measures 
suggested in Chapter II cannot be addressed at this time, 
yet further analyses should consider such categorizations, 
especially those that examine alternative generation. Fin­
ally, search is measured primarily at the individual level 
and thus the measures reflect that emphasis. It should be 
remembered, however, that the final explanations of search 
are based on aggregating such measures across groups and 
treatment conditions. The result is the examination of 
individual search in a group environment. Nevertheless, 
search measures exist that analyze the collective entity.
For example, city councils often instruct their staffs to 
gather information on a problem pertinent to council needs; 
such external requests have been treated in other research 
studies with limited results at the experimental level 
(Davis, 1974).
Choice Shift Measurement
Unlike search procedures, the measurement of choice 
shift is easily defined. First, all subjects are pretested
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on the five policy items. Experimental treatments are then 
conducted using those five items under conditions defined 
in the treatment sections. Furthermore, control groups 
are given the same five items individually again. For 
experimental groups, the measurement of the five items is 
taken from the group decision and the dissents in the major­
ity decision rule condition. The shift that is measured is 
that from pretest to group decision; no posttest is con­
ducted. The emphasis is on the group because it is the 
decisions of small groups, not the individual's attitudes 
following those decisions, that should be of prime interest 
to decision-making scholars of small groups.
Nevertheless, there are essentially five dependent 
choice shift variables, one for each policy item. No summa- 
tive measure is derived as in the risky shift; instead, the 
five separate measures enable the researcher to compare the 
shift across several policy areas and do not assume some 
underlying continuum, although the general concept of extrem- 
ization will be discussed as a corollary to choice-shift 
mea sûrement.
Explanatory Variables and Hypotheses
The following discussion outlines the basic hypothe­
ses to be examined in this investigation. Each of the basic 
hypotheses to be examined in this investigation follows the 
framework as outlined in Chapter II through environmental, 
individual, and group constraints as explanatory variables
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for the amount and type of search; to the explanations of 
final group choice and the shifts from individual predis­
positions. Discussion of additional hypotheses relevant to 
the entire framework are addressed elsewhere (Kirkpatrick 
et al., 1975; Kirkpatrick et al., 1976a).
Search Process Hypotheses
Information constraint. Heavily discussed in the 
literature, the information constraint on search has been 
the prime treatment of both rational choice and cognitive 
process approaches to decision making. Because of its 
relative importance for explanations of search, two levels 
of information are analyzed as an experimental treatment in 
this investigation. Low information groups are given two 
pieces of background information for each of the two alter­
natives (four information items), while high information 
groups are given five separate information elements for 
both alternatives (ten information items), resulting in six 
additional elements of information for high information 
groups to utilize in making decisions.
How should this affect search? The rational and 
cognitive models both assert that information is sought to 
reduce uncertainty. The former hypothesizes that the more 
the information, the greater the search, and thus uncertain­
ty is reduced. Cognitive approaches theorize that too much 
information can overload decision makers, and thus increase 
uncertainty (March and Simon, 1958). To the extent that
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the treatment condition is sufficiently differentiated to 
activate such variation, the first set of hypotheses are 
constructed.
Hl-S: High information groups will engage in
greater information search (volume) than low 
information groups.
H2-S: High information groups will proportionately
discuss more alternatives information (type) 
than low information groups.
H3-S: High information groups will discuss more
equally the information about each alterna­
tive than will low information groups (type).
H4-S: Low information groups will be more dependent
on unique information while high information 
groups will rely more heavily on available 
(or supplied) information (type).
The above hypotheses, if confirmed, emphasize that 
greater information availability encourages greater search.
At what point does information overload occur? It is the 
hypothesis of this study that too much information can result 
in overload in three ways. The most obvious would be the 
reverse of Hl-S and H2-S; that is, if low information 
groups discuss more alternatives information than high 
information groups, overload may be indicated. Alterna­
tively, overload may not be evident in the amount of infor­
mation processed, but in the results. One measure is satis­
faction with the information provided, defined by individual 
posttest attitudes toward satisfaction with the available 
information.
H5-S: Low information groups will be more satisfied
with the available information than will high 
information groups.
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The final overload categorization is in the final decision 
of the group; this will be returned to in the choice shift 
hypothesis section.
Organizational constraints. Specifically treated 
in this investigation is the final decision rule of the 
group defined by imposed majority or consensus decisional 
requirements. The hypotheses center on the needs of con­
sensus groups to resolve their differences and come to a 
final decision, whereas majority groups require only three 
of five members to agree to a particular choice. Earlier 
decisional literature in social psychology found no signifi­
cant differences in the final choices of groups (Dion et al., 
1970), but what of the search for information?
H6-S: Groups required to gain a consensus decision
will engage in greater informational search 
(volume) than will majority decision rule 
groups.
Overall, consensus groups, in an attempt to resolve 
group differences, will discuss more alternatives informa­
tion than will majority groups. Emphasis is on sheer vol­
ume of search, not on percent use; that is, the amount of 
positive feedback, questions cd)out other group members’ 
positions, and other non-alternatives information will be 
proportionately similar under both decision rules.
H7-S; No significant differences should be present 
between decision rules in the proportion of 
alternatives information to the total group 
discussion.
Hypothesis 7-S posits a null relationship because consensus 
groups, although engaged in greater search, must also
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increase interpersonal negotiations, bargaining, and 
compromise independent of specific information categoriza­
tions (Dyson et al., 1972). Thus, consensus groups should 
discuss more information regardless of categorization.
The remaining measures of search behavior have not 
previously been examined as to their effects on decision 
rule; literature to aid in hypothesis-testing is scarce.
H8-S: Consensus groups will engage in more equitable
search among the competing alternatives than 
will majority groups.
Since consensus groups must resolve their differences, infor­
mation on the alternatives is more likely to be equally 
weighted in group discussion under unanimous decision rules. 
Further, dissenters in majority groups may recognize their 
lack of influence on any particular item, and remove them­
selves from the discussion; in a consensus group their views 
must be acknowledged before a decision can be made.
H9-S: Consensus groups will be more dependent on
unique information generated by group mem­
bers than will majority groups.
The above hypothesis suggests the need for consensus groups
to have information relevant to resolving the differences
within the group. As noted previously, consensus groups
will engage in greater information search, but H9-S posits
that consensus groups will search more widely for information
to resolve the problem than will majority groups.
Finally, given the relatively high search by consensus 
groups, satisfaction with available information should be 
reduced; thus, the following hypothesis is suggested.
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HIO-S: Majority decisional groups will be more
satisfied with the available information 
than will consensus decisional groups.
The remaining sets of explanatory variables will all 
be measured as covariates to search, yet the basic bivariate 
relationships are briefly outlined (for elaboration, see 
Plutchik, 1968; Meyers, 1966).
Situational constraints. Given the experimental 
focus of this study, no attempts are made to measure situa­
tional constraints such as crisis management or level of con­
troversy since simulations of such events remain question­
able (for an alternative explanation, see Anderson, 1976).
To the extent that the five items represent situational 
constraints, however, the analysis of their differences on 
search may give some suggestions for future research. For 
example, is the search strategy employed in a foreign policy 
situation (Item 2) different from search behavior in a more 
familiar university-based situation (Item 5)?
Individual constraints-motives. Two personality 
variables measured by the pretest are applicable to deci­
sional analysis. First, the Machiavellian scale posits that 
"high Machs" are individuals who enjoy dominating others 
and controlling group discussion (Christie and Geis, 1970). 
Thus, the following hypotheses are relevant to individual 
search processes (see Appendix A for the scale used in this 
study).
Hll-S; High Machiavellianism is positively associ­
ated with the number of statements in group
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discussion, but inversely related to the 
proportion of statements centering on 
alternatives information.
H12-S; High Machiavellianism is positively associ­
ated with discussion of single alternatives, 
but negatively related to the proportion of 
unique information used in group discussion.
A second personality scale useful in a group deci­
sional environment is the locus-of-control scale which sug­
gests that certain personality types feel they have control 
of their own lives (internals), while others (externals) are 
more inclined to believe that outside forces, such as luck, 
define the individual’s current and future success in life. 
Researchers hypothesize that the internal personality type is 
more willing to examine uncertainty and to resolve its 
dilemmas (Lefcourt, 1976). Thus, the internal-external 
personality continuum should show marked differences in 
individual search behavior (see Appendix A for the scale 
used in this investigation).
H13-S: Internals examine more alternatives informa­
tion (volume and percentage) than do external 
personalities.
H14-S: Internals depend less on information based on
single alternatives than externals.
H15-S: Internals will rely more heavily on unique
information than will externals.
Individual constraints-cognitive. Other studies have 
sufficiently dealt with the constraints imposed by cognitive 
variables. The most prolific literature is in the area of 
cognitive complexity where the general hypothesis notes that 
increased complexity increases information-processing (for
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review, see Schroder et al., 1967; Davis, 1974; Park and 
Sheth, 1976). This investigation examines one aspect of 
the complex phenomenon of information integration— the 
strength of attitudes. One of the concepts examined by 
integration theory suggests that a wealth of information is 
required to shift choices away from the predispositions of 
the group members (Anderson, 1977). Thus, one of the 
aspects of search behavior appears relevant.
H16-S; Pretest extremization is positively related 
to the dependence on a single alternative 
for information.
Thus, the more extreme the pretest means, the greater the
search concentrates on the preferred alternative, and the
less the impact of dissenting or opposing information.
Group constraints— cohesion and conformity. As 
described in Chapter II, cohesive groups have definite 
"groupthink" effects on informational search; dissenting 
information is not encouraged and often not even mentioned 
in a high conformity group condition. Although the experi­
mental groups in this investigation cannot adequately reflect 
conformity tendencies that may occur in natural group set­
tings, some effects should appear based on posttest cohesion 
scores. In this analysis, cohesion is primarily a measure 
of individual satisfaction with group members and decisions 
(see Appendix E).
H17-S; Cohesiveness in groups is negatively related 
to group alternatives search (volume and 
percentages).
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H18-S: High cohesive groups rely more on single
alternatives than do low cohesive groups.
H19-S: Cohesiveness is positively related to the
proportional use of unique information.
The latter hypothesis stresses the positive aspect of group 
cohesion— the ability to search outside the available infor­
mation categories.
Group constraints— leadership. Although leadership 
has been defined by many different measures (Stogdill, 1974), 
one operationalization is applied here— Bales leadership 
scores (Bales, 1950). The Bales' scheme posits that task 
leaders (individuals who provide answers in group discus­
sion) have greater influence on search than non-task leaders, 
primarily because they engage in greater alternatives search.
H20-S: Leadership scores are positively related to
individual alternatives search (volume).
Choice Shift Hypotheses
The above search behavior processes will be examined 
in Chapter IV; the choice shift hypotheses are examined in 
Chapter V. The general hypothesis posits that if groups are 
allowed to discuss the items, results will significantly 
differ from initial predispositions. As noted previously, 
since no underlying continuum between items is assumed, each 
problem will be examined separately.
Further, an additional underlying effect is noted in 
the choice shift literature— group extremization. The con­
cept relates to movement by the group away from neutrality 
toward greater extremes (Myers and Lamm, 1976).
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Informational constraints. Using the informational 
treatment condition, the level of shift is hypothesized to 
be conditioned by information overload. As noted earlier, 
too much information can result in greater confusion and 
heightened uncertainty for the groups. Thus, groups under 
the high information condition should reflect this lessened 
confidence by minimizing shift, or by shifting to a more 
neutral decision than low information groups.
Hl-CS: Low information groups will engage in greater
shifts after group discussion than high 
information groups.
H2-CS: High information groups' final decisions will
be more neutral than low information group 
decisions.
If the obverse condition occurs— greater shifts and greater 
extremization in the high information condition— the rational 
model implication that information resolves uncertainty will 
gain credence, at least to the extent that the measurement 
levels of the information treatment actually operationalize 
this difference.
Organizational constraints. The effects of group 
decisional rule are operationalized under the treatment 
condition that requires half of the groups to reach a con­
sensus or unanimous decision, while the other half of the 
groups are required to reach a majority decision.
H3-CS; Groups required to reach only a majority
decision will engage in greater shifts then 
consensus decisional groups.
H4-CS; Majority decisional groups will shift to
greater extremes away from neutrality than 
will consensus rule groups.
113
The underlying hypothesis suggests that consensus groups are 
more constrained by the needs of compromise and bargaining 
in resolving group differences, whereas majority groups 
require only three of five members to come to a final deci­
sion.
Individual constraints— motives. No specific models 
have been constructed by choice shift theorists that examine 
the effects of personality variables on decisional shifts.
It is suggested that given the tendency toward extremization 
by Machiavellian personalities, e.g., ideology, political 
attitudes, high Machs are more likely to have extreme initial 
predispositions on the various policy items. As noted in 
Chapter II, high Machs should be more able to move the 
group's decision to their position.
H5-CS: Machiavellianism is positively related with
pretest extremization, and negatively related 
to individual-group differences.
Group constraints— interactive model. Similar to 
the discussion of Machiavellian personality, the interactive 
model emphasizes group leadership, specifically leadership- 
confidence theory (Pruitt, 1971). The principal element of 
this hypothesis suggests that group leaders are more extreme. 
Using both sociometric and Bales' methods for measuring lead­
ership, the following correlational hypothesis is posited.
H6-CS: Leadership scores are positively correlated
with pretest extremization, and negatively 
related to individual-group differences.
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Group constraints -diffusion-of-responsibility model. 
Essentially, responsibility-diffusion is a test of the effects 
of group cohesion on the final choice shift.
H7-CS: Group cohesion is positively related to the
level of choice shift in the group decision.
H8-CS: Group cohesion is positively related to the
final extremization of the group decision.
Group constraints— familiarization model. This choice 
shift model posits that decisional shifts occur simply by 
decision makers familiarizing thaaselves with the problem 
and the available information, and not because of a group 
effect. The control group serves as a test of this hypothe­
sis by examining the five items again without group discus­
sion.
H9-CS: There will be no significant differences
between the choice shifts of experimental 
and control groups.
Group constraints— value and polarization models.
The strongest support for the choice shift rests in the value 
model (Myers and Lamm, 1976) which emphasizes that subjects 
view their initial predispositions as more congruent with 
their ultimate values than do others. When evidence sug­
gests to the decision maker that others may be as congruent 
— or more congruent— with those values, group shift will 
occur in the desired direction. This is operationalized by 
asking subjects to assign what other students (specifically, 
"200 other students like you") might pick on each of the 
decisional items (see Appendix B).
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HIO-CS: Subjects will see themselves as significantly
different from perceived others on the policy 
items, and the final group decisional shift 
will move in the valued direction.
The polarization hypothesis emphasizes a more gen­
eral shift that may be more applicable to political choice 
items. Polarization assumes nothing about other subjects, 
but only that shifts conform to the direction suggested by 
the mean initial response (Myers and Lamm, 1976; Kirkpatrick 
and Robertson, 1976).
Hll-CS; Group shifts will occur away from neutral­
ity, cind in the same direction as the mean 
of the group pretest responses.
Search and Choice Shift Linkage Hypotheses
Given the apparent disparate nature of the two deci­
sional processes of search and choice shift, and the current 
lack of theory, no hypotheses have been examined in the deci­
sion literature that link the two concepts (Kirkpatrick et 
al., 1976b). Thus the primary emphasis of this section must 
be on those linkages.
Does greater informational search imply increased 
group shifts? Rational choice modellers would agree with a 
positive relationship; cognitive theorists, especially those 
in the "Carnegie school" (Simon, 1957; March and Simon, 1958; 
Cyert and March, 1963), would theorize that information over­
load may force the decisional solution to be tempered, or 
in this study, to be less extreme on the policy items. The 
separate hypotheses for information search and choice shift
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by informational treatment levels suggest alternative 
hypotheses based on opposite movements in the process.
H1-S,CS: Group information level is positively
associated with search for information 
(volume), but negatively correlated with 
shift.
H2-S,CS; Group information level is positively 
associated with search for information 
(volume), but negatively correlated with 
group decisional extremization.
If confirmed, credence to the effects of information over­
load are obviously implied; if heightened availability of 
information results in greater search and increased shift, 
the rational element of decision processes gain credence.
The other treatment in this experiment emphasizes 
the effect of decision rule on search and choice shift.
The linkage hypotheses are noted below.
H3-S,CS: Consensus groups will engage in greater
informational search, but reduced levels 
of shift compared to majority decision 
groups.
H4-S,CS: Consensus groups will engage in greater
informational search, but shifts will be 
toward neutrality while majority groups 
will search less for information, yet 
shift away from neutrality toward the 
extremes.
Thus, majority decisional groups have less need to search 
for information in order to shift toward greater extremes, 
while consensus groups require increased amounts of informa­
tion in order to reach a decisional compromise.
Finally, if the above hypotheses are confirmed, the 
general relationship of informational search and final choice 
shifts will emphasize an inverse relationship.
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H5-S,CS: Informational search (volume) is negatively
correlated with the magnitude of the group
shift.
H6-S,CS: Informational search (volume) is negatively
correlated with the magnitude of the choice
shift and group extremization.
Thus, groups are not hypothesized to operate in a manner that 
confirms rationalistic assumptions about uncertainty reduc­
tion. Greater informational search is posited to imply in­
creasing levels of uncertainty, and thus reduced levels of 
group extremization. The next three chapters will provide 
tests of these relationships.
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF THE SEARCH PROCESS
This chapter's prime emphasis is on the explanation 
of variance in the amount and type of informational search 
in experimental small groups- Explanation is derived from 
independent variables that constrain the search for informa­
tion in a group context. Search is measured through group 
interaction; that is, information processed is verbalized 
at some point in the group discussion. The verbalization 
affords an opportunity to measure such processes, and hence 
the volume and type of search. This communication require­
ment might appear restrictive for individual decision mak­
ing, but in a collective environment, communication of indi­
vidual opinions, positions, and information is crucial for 
resolution of a decisional problem.
The analysis will examine the two experimental treat­
ments and their effects on the volume and type of informa­
tional search based on the hypothesized relationships de­
scribed in Chapter III. The first treatment, information 
level, posits that greater information availability increases 
information search, especially search for alternatives
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information. Thus, groups in the high information treatment 
are expected to engage in greater search based on alterna­
tives than low information groups. The decision rule re­
quired for a group solution is the second treatment in this 
experiment. The basic decision rule hypothesis suggests 
that subjects in a group required to reach a consensus deci­
sion rather than a majority decision will engage in greater 
informational search. Thus, subjects in a consensus deci­
sion rule cuid high information group will engage in a greater 
search for information while search by members of majority 
decision/low information treatment groups will examine less 
information.
After establishing the relationships based on the 
treatments, the analysis of search behavior will turn to the 
inclusion of the covariates utilized in this investigation. 
Each major aspect of the constraints on informational search 
will be reviewed both in the covariate's bivariate effect on 
search as well as the covariate's contribution to the multi­
variate explained variance filtered through the treatment 
variables.
Search Process— Experimental 
Treatments
Information Constraint
No theory of search should be hypothesized until the 
relationship of informational level to the overall search 
process is established. Using an experimental treatment that
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provides subjects with either "high" information (five 
pieces of information for each alternative) or "low" infor­
mation (two pieces of information for each alternative), the 
volume and type of informational search is examined.
The effect of available information on the search 
for information underlies a more basic theoretical problem 
discussed in earlier chapters— does search increase when more 
alternatives information is available, or does Simon's con­
cept of information overload become operational at this 
point? Thus, the central hypothesis questions whether infor­
mation enhances the group's discussion and search for infor­
mation relevant to the problem.
Table 4.1 illustrates the general hypothesis concern­
ing the amount of alternatives information (i.e., the volume 
of information dealing with the specific problem involved in 
the item) discussed by the group members by the two informa­
tion levels. The means (X's) of the two levels indicate that 
decision makers in the high information treatment category 
examine a greater volume of alternatives-based information 
(volume) than do members of low information groups. The 
analysis-of-variance table further notes that the differ­
ences between treatment means are statistically significant.^ 
Thus, Hl-S is confirmed at the bivariate level; the mean of 
alternatives information search for members of high
Although expressed in analysis of variance termi­
nology, the F test in a two-category situation actually is 




ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE VOLUME OF 





Low 48 7.94 7.24Information
High 46 16.94 14.75
Level
Total 94 





information groups is 16.94, while the mean of low information 
group members is only 7.94. Since members were randomly 
assigned to these two conditions, the indication is that an 
individual assigned to a high information condition will dis­
cuss approximately nine more pieces of information across the 
five items than if assigned to a low information condition.
Table 4.2 examines the relationship of volume of 
alternatives information by information level on each indi­
vidual item. The evidence indicates that as the discussion 
moves across the items the differences in the alternatives- 
based information search increases. Thus, as groups estab­
lish themselves over time, high information groups increase 
their alternatives information search while the low informa­
tion groups do not. (Note, however, that the items were not 
randomized, thus conclusions remain speculative.) All of 
the differences within the items are in the hypothesized 
direction— high information group members discuss more 
alternatives information than do low information group mem­
bers, although only three of five items show statistically 
significant differences.
The effect of alternatives information on the volume 
of search is also noted in Table 4.3. This element outlines 
the total amount of alternatives information that is unique—  
that is, the volume of information discussed that cannot be 
derived from the available information. Thus, generation of 
information, and not just processing of available information.
TABLE 4.2
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF VOLUME OF 
ALTERNATIVES INFORMATION SEARCH 
BY INFORMATION LEVEL AND ITEM
Volume of Alternatives Information 

















F(1.92)=3.90 F(l,92)=7.43 F(1.92)=7.73 F(l,92)=20.98F(l,92)=0.65
p<.001p<. 01 p<.01NS NS
to
w
*For all tables, an NS value indicates p>.05.
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TABLE 4.3
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE VOLUME 






Low 48 4.54 6.14
High 46 9.24 9.80
Total 94 6.84 8.43
F(l,92) = 7.827 (p<.01)
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is examined in this category. Table 4.3 indicates that 
high information group members bring to bear significantly 
more unique information than do members of low information 
groups. Thus, group members with a large quantity of infor­
mation available to them do not become complacent and fail 
to generate more information to solve the problem; in fact, 
increased availability of information encourages decision 
makers to generate information external to that provided.
Thus, the central premise that increased availability 
of information encourages alternatives-based search is con­
firmed for the volume of information. Yet, what effects 
occur for the types of information? Specifically, to what 
extent does the proportion of search differ when emphasizing 
alternatives information, differences between the alterna­
tives, and the dependence on available versus unique infor­
mation? Table 4.4 indicates that there is no statistically 
significant differences in the proportion of member's 
discussions based on alternatives information. Thus, al­
though more alternatives information is discussed by high 
information members (Table 4.1), the amount of time given 
over to discussion to the member's vote decisions, positive 
and negative reactions to other members' statements, and 
other non-alternative information is virtually equal in the 
two information conditions; both treatment types indicate 
that group members discuss alternatives information in approx­
imately thirty percent of their total discussion. Thus, 
hypothesis H2-S is rejected.
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TABLE 4.4
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE PROPORTION OF 





Low 48 31.92 15.54
High 46 34.39 12.31
Total 94 33.13 14.03




Table 4.5 and 4.6 indicate similar bivariate 
relationships between information types and the proportion 
of differences between alternatives and the proportion of 
unique information discussed, respectively. The dependent 
variable in Table 4.5 is the percentage of alternatives 
information discussed for one alternative against the other 
in absolute terms. This variable examines hypothesis H3-S 
as to whether high information group members will more 
equally discuss the two alternatives before them. The evi­
dence in Table 4.5 does not confirm this hypothesis across 
the five items. In fact, on Item 5, where the only statis­
tically significant relationship exists, subjects in the low 
information category are more equal in their discussion of 
the two alternatives than are high information subjects.
That is, members of low information groups depend less on 
single alternatives than members of high information groups.
Table 4.6 examines the effects of information level 
on the proportion of unique information discussed. Table 
4.3 has already indicated that high information group sub­
jects search for greater external alternatives information 
(volume); yet, given greater availability of information 
will they depend proportionately more on available informa­
tion? The evidence in Table 4.6 for hypothesis H4-S does 
not indicate such a relationship. In fact, even though the 
relationship is not statistically significant, the mean 
differences indicate that subjects in high information
TABLE 4.5
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OP DEPENDENCE ON ALTERNATIVES 
BY INFORMATION LEVEL AND ITEM
Item 1
Percent Alternatives Information 












N X S.D. X S.D. X S.D. X S.D. X S.D.
48 41.32 30.02 28.50 29.41 39.10 30.70 32.89 31.85 23.84 29.63
46 38.90 34.08 40.29 28.54 41.87 33.03 43.82 33.09 51.96 36.63
94 40.14 31.92 34.27 29.43 40.46 31.72 38.24 32.75 37.60 35.95
F(l,92)=0.13 F(l,92)=3.89 P(l,92)=0.18 F(l,92)=2.67 F(l,92)=16.81




ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE PROPORTION 





Low 48 18.00 16.50
Information
High 46 24.05 15.76
Level
Total 94 20.96 16.34
F(l,92) = 3.295 NS
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conditions depend slightly more on unique information than 
subjects in the low information treatment.
Organizational Constraints- 
Decision Rule
The other treatment operationalized in this experi­
ment is the rule utilized in reaching a final group decision. 
The general hypothesis posits that consensus groups, because 
of the greater demands on resolving group differences, will 
discuss more alternatives information than will majority 
groups. In Table 4.7, the evidence denotes that the hypothe­
sized relationship is statistically significant. Members of 
consensus groups examine approximately ten more pieces of 
alternatives information than do members of majority groups. 
Further, as illustrated in Table 4.8, all of the separate 
policy items result in significant differences as hypothe­
sized. Thus, the volume of alternatives information search 
is confirmed as stated in hypothesis H6-S.
Additional evidence for the volume of alternatives 
information search is explored in Table 4.9. The evidence 
discloses a marked difference in the amount of information 
generated by the subjects themselves. Decision makers in 
the consensual treatment engage in significantly higher 
amounts of unique information search than do their counter­
parts in the majority condition. Thus, the results from 
Tables 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 indicate that the volume of 
alternatives-based information search is as hypothesized
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TABLE 4.7
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE VOLUME 







Majority 48 7.75 6.73
Consensus 46 17.13 14.88
Total 94 12.34 12.34




ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF VOLUME OF 
ALTERNATIVES INFORMATION SEARCH 
BY DECISION RULE AND ITEM
Item 1
Volume of Alternatives Information 









N X S.D. X S.D. X S.D. X S.D. X S.D.
Majority 48 1.21 1.58 1.90 1.69 1.46 1.69 1.31 2.39 1.88 3.49
Consensus 46 3.00 3.08 3.30 3.78 3.26 3.73 2.94 2.62 4.63 5.92
Total 94 2.07 2.58 2.57 2.98 2.34 3.00 2.11 2.62 3.22 5.00
F(l,92)=12.76 F(l,92)=5.51 F(l,92)=9.93 F(l,92)=9.86 F(l,92)=7.64






ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE VOLUME 





Majority 48 4.25 5.70
Decision
Consensus 4 6 9.54 9.90
Rule
Total 94 6.84 8.43
F(1,92) = 10.173 p<.01
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in H6-S, consensus group members discuss more alternatives 
information than do majority group members.
Given the greater volume of search by consensus 
groups, will majority/consensus differences also be evident 
in the proportion of information types discussed? As 
described in Chapter III, the hypotheses are diverse. H7-S 
posits that no significant differences should occur between 
members of the two decision rule conditions on the propor­
tion of alternatives information utilized in group discus­
sion. Consensus groups,as confirmed in Tables 4.7, 4,8, 
and 4.9, do search for more alternatives information; yet, 
because of the needs for compromise, bargaining, negotia­
tion, and other non-alternatives information, discussion 
should be also greater for consensus groups in this cate­
gory. Table 4.10 denotes that the hypothesized null rela­
tionship is incorrect. Consensus groups utilize proportion­
ately more alternatives information than do majority groups. 
The member of a consensus decision group not only discusses 
more alternatives information, but he/she depends more on 
such information in participating in the group discussion.
Table 4.11 examines the discussion of the two alter­
natives in terms of how equitable subjects discuss each alter- 
tive. Hypothesis H8-S posits that consensus group members 
will discuss the competing alternatives more equitably than 
will majority group members. The evidence does not support 





ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE PROPORTION OF 





Majority 48 30.26 13.54
Consensus 46 36.12 14.05
Total 94 33.13 14.03
F(l,92) = 4.233 p<.05
TABLE 4.11
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF DEPENDENCE ON ALTERNATIVES 
BY DECISION AND ITEM
Item 1
Percent Alternatives Information 












N X S.D. X S.D. X S.D. X S.D. X S.D.
Majority 48 33.30 31.67 40.26 27.78 36.08 30.93 30.12 31.18 31.48 34.30
Consensus 46 47.27 30.93 28.01 30.10 45.03 32.23 46.71 32.52 44.00 36.89
Total 94 40.14 31.92 34.25 29.43 40.46 31.72 38.24 32.75 37.60 35.95
F(l,92)=4.68 F(l,92)=4.21 F(l,92)=1.89 F(l,92)=6.37 F(l,92)=2.91




of majority groups are less inclined to discuss a single 
alternative than are consensus treatment members. However, 
if subjects who discussed no alternatives information are 
excluded on each item, the differences between the two con­
ditions are minimized, and the only statistically signifi­
cant difference occurs on Item 2 (in the hypothesized direc­
tion) . The shift in results occurs primarily because of 
the increased likelihood of subjects in the majority rule 
condition to communicate no alternatives information (see 
Table 4.12). Nevertheless, there is no clear evidence in 
support of H8-S.
As noted previously, consensus groups engage in the 
greatest unique information search, yet will they become 
more dependent on external information? Given the equal 
weighting of the available information, H9-S posits that 
members of consensus groups will proportionately generate 
more external or unique information in an effort to resolve 
group differences. Table 4.13 indicates that group discus­
sion is more dependent on unique information in the consen­
sus treatment condition.
The above discussion illustrates the bivariate rela­
tionship between decision rule and various search measures. 
The results denote the statistically significant relation­
ship between decision rule and the volume of alternatives 
information search, as well as the effects of dependence on 
particular types of information search. Consensus group
TABLE 4.12
SUBJECTS COMMUNICATING NO ALTERNATIVES 
INFORMATION BY DECISION RULE
Item 1
No Alternatives Information 












Decision Majority 48 20 41.6 9 18.8 17 35.4 21 43.8 21 43.8




No information refers to the number of subjects who discussed no alternatives 
information on each item.
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TABLE 4.13
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE PROPORTION 







Majority 48 15.90 12.80
Consensus 46 26.25 18.02
Total 94 20.96 16.34
F(l,92) = 10.382 p<.01
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members are more vocal in their discussion of alternatives 
information and more reliant on such information than mem­
bers of majority rule groups. Thus, the decision rule 
adopted by a small group alters the search processes on any 
particular problem.
Summary of Bivariate Relationships—
Treatments on Search
As evidenced in the preceding discussion, both the 
level of information and decision rule affect the volume of 
information search, while the decision rule treatment also 
alters the dependence on both alternatives information and 
unique information search. Yet, is there an information 
overload factor occurring at the point? The research results 
indicate that high information groups search more than low 
information groups; no overload appears in the volume of 
search- Table 4.14 examines the satisfaction of group mem­
bers with the available information on a posttest scale.
The results note that the high information treatment subjects 
are more dissatisfied (the higher the mean the greater the 
dissatisfaction) with the available information. Thus, H5-S 
is confirmed; low information group members show greater 
satisfaction with the given information than high informa­
tion treatment members. As a measure of information over­
load, such findings illustrate that greater information 
availability (an obviously rational desire) reduces satis­
faction with the information. The final element of overload 
is examined in the choice shift chapter.
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TABLE 4.14
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE SATISFACTION 




Low 48 6.48 2.90
High 46 8.39 2.98
Total 94 7.42 3.07
F(l,92) = 9.965 p<.01
Information
Level
^The higher the score, the greater the dissatisfaction.
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Yet, if greater availability of information implies 
greater search, but less satisfaction, does not the greater 
need for information (consensus groups) also imply reduced 
satisfaction? Table 4.15 indicates that the relationship 
is in the hypothesized direction, but the means are not 
statistically different— HIO-S is not confirmed.
Multivariate Analysis— Treatments 
on Search Behavior
Since the two treatments, information level and deci­
sion rule, are operationalized in a 2x2 factoral design, the 
next step requires their joint analysis on the volume and 
type of search. Specifically, two-way analysis of variance 
is utilized in order to examine the independent effects of 
each treatment on the dependent variable of interest (main 
effects), as well as the potential interaction of treatment 
levels on search behavior (Blalock, 1972: 334-347).^
Table 4.16 illustrates the effects of the two treat­
ments on the total alternatives information across items.
The F-ratios denote that the main effects of the two treat­
ments explain the mean differences between the cell entries; 
no statistically significant interaction between the treat­
ments is present. The means in the summary table clearly 
illustrate how prominent the differences are between the
The specific program utilized for two-way analysis 
of variance in this investigation is the OSIRIS III program MANOVA. For documentation, see Volume I, System and Program 
Description of the OSIRIS III manual.
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TABLE 4.15
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE SATISFACTION 




Majority 48 6.85 2.90
Decision
Consensus 46 8. 00 3.18
Rule
Total 94 7.42 3.07
F(l,92) = 3.346 NS
^The higher the score, the greater the dissatisfaction.
TABLE 4.16
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF TOTAL ALTERNATIVES INFORMATION 
SEARCH BY INFORMATION LEVEL AND DECISION RULE
Decision Rule
Majority Consensus
Information Low 5.04® 11.08



















The figures in the summary table cells are the means (X) of alternatives 
information search volume by treatment condition.
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extreme cells— majority decision/low information and consensus 
decision/high information. Thus, the bivariate hypotheses 
confirmed earlier remain valid in the multivariate case.
Further, the evidence for the differences in volume 
of search are indicated in the examination of the treatment 
effects on total unique information search in Table 4.17.
Once again, the main effects confirmed at the bivariate 
level remain valid at the multivariate level with no signifi­
cant interaction between the treatments affecting the hypothe­
sized relationship. The summary table clearly illustrates 
this relationship since the differences are considerable 
between levels of treatment (low/high, majority/consensus), 
and the extreme cells (majority/low and consensus/high), but 
negligible between the interaction cells (consensus/low and 
majority/high).
The proportion of group discussion centering on 
alternatives information in the bivariate case was found to 
be statistically significant only for the decision rule, 
not the information level. This finding holds in the multi­
variate case in Table 4.18; further, no indication is present 
that the interaction of the two treatments enhances the dif­
ferences in the dependence on alternatives information. Con­
sensus groups spend more of their discussion time on alter­
natives information than do majority groups, regardless of 
the level of available information. Similarly, as noted in 
Table 4.19, the greater dependence by group members on unique
TABLE 4.17
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF TOTAL UNIQUE INFORMATION


























Decision Rule 658.19 10.86 p<. 01 1,90




ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE PROPORTION OF ALTERNATIVES
INFORMATION SEARCH BY INFORMATION
LEVEL AND DECISION RULE
Decision Rule
Majority Consensus
Information Low 28.76 35.36 (N=48)














Decision Rule 805.22 4.175 p<. 05 1,90
Interaction 15.28 0.079 NS 1,90
TABLE 4.19
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE PROPORTION OF UNIQUE
INFORMATION SEARCH BY INFORMATION
LEVEL AND DECISION RULE
Decision Rule
Majority Consensus
Information Low 13.46 22.93 (N=48)














Decision Rule 2518.22 10.541 p<. 01 1,90
Interaction 14.33 0.060 MS 1,90
4̂0»
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or externally generated information by group members is 
statistically significant for the decision rule treatment, 
but not for information level or the interaction of the two 
treatments.
In summary, the two treatment variables significantly 
alter the volume of search in experimental groups. The de­
pendence on alternatives information, as well as unique 
information, is statistically significant for the decision 
rule treatment— not for the information level condition. 
Finally, the statistical interaction of the treatment var­
iables provides no significant explanation of volume or the 
type of search engaged in by group members. The effects of 
the covariates remain to complete the explanation of search 
behavior, yet the strength of the relationship between the 
search variables by the treatment variables is established.
Search Process— Experimental 
Treatments and Covariates
Situational Constraints
No actual measures of the situational constraint are 
contained in this study. The only situational differences 
are between the items. As noted throughout the treatment 
effects, some differences do occur in search processes, 
especially in the volume of search. Reviewing Tables 4.2 
and 4.8, where the volume of alternatives information search 
is examined by item, it is apparent that the level of infor­
mation has the most significant effect on Item 5— the
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university budget. For the decision rule treatment, no single 
item is more noticeable in altering the volume of search.
Yet, the highest alternatives information discussion occurs 
on Item 5 (as illustrated in the X total cell), and Item 2.
The former concerned allocating money for athletics versus 
research, the latter emphasized a foreign policy issue.
Given that the subjects are students, these two items might 
logically be the end-points of a typical subject's knowledge. 
Thus, the extremes where students have considerable famil­
iarity (Item 5) and little familiarity (Item 2) seem to 
encourage the most discussion of alternatives information. 
However, such an hypothesis must be more rigorously tested.
Individual Constraints
Two principal personality variables are measured in 
this investigation in an attempt to find the kinds of indi­
vidual constraints that affect information search. The 
first, a Machiavellian scale, suggests that the Machiavellian 
personality will enjoy controlling others and will dominate 
the group discussion. Hypotheses Hll-S and H12-S suggest 
that the high "Mach" will discuss more information in the 
group. However, there is no evidence to indicate that 
Machiavellianism is related to either the volume or the type 
of information. Even simple correlation (Pearson's r) indi­
cates no link between the personality construct and the 
four major search variables— total alternatives information 
(r=0.047), total unique information (r=0.037), percent
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alternatives information (r=0.976), and percent unique 
information (r=0.024). When examined in a multivariate 
context with the treatments included, the Machiavellian 
scale does not affect the F-levels of the treatment main 
effects, nor the interaction effect. Obviously, the F-level 
for the covariate is also not statistically significant.
It might be noted that Machiavellianism is negative­
ly correlated with the satisfaction measure; that is, the 
stronger the Machiavellian personality, the lower the satis­
faction with group discussion and decisions (r=0.373)
(higher scores on the satisfaction scale refer to greater 
dissatisfaction). Thus, there is no evidence that high 
"Machs" assert themselves in group discussion. However, 
this lack of discussion may be indicative of why the Machia­
vellian is more likely to regard the group in a negative 
manner.
The second personality scale in this investigation, 
the locus-of-control scale, posits that subjects who feel 
they have control of their own lives (internals) will examine 
more alternatives information (H13-S), depend less on single 
alternatives (H14-S), and rely more heavily on unique infor­
mation (H15-S) than the personality type who believes that 
outside forces, such as luck, determine individual success.
As in the Machiavellian scale's case, no significant effects 
result in the multivariate analysis of the major search 
hypotheses, nor in the simple correlations. Thus, the two
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major personality constructs utilized in this study provide 
no clues as to the effects of individual motivation on the 
search process.
Group Constraints
The first group constraint, group cohesiveness, 
remains an elusive construct in an experimental, single­
meeting group session. The bonds of friendship and overall 
group linkages cannot be adequately established in a single 
meeting. However, based on a posttest scale, some prelim­
inary measure of cohesiveness can be examined. One qualify­
ing comment is necessary— cohesion is measured by the indi­
vidual's satisfaction with the group and its decision. Thus, 
the measure of cohesiveness simply reflects the group mem­
ber’s satisfaction with the group and its decisions, not a 
comprehensive index of group cohesion. This is a crucial 
point, since the prime concern in this chapter is the measure­
ment of search behavior. Although aggregated across treat­
ments, search behavior is examined as an essentially indi­
vidual phenomenon in a group context. Thus, H17-S, H18-S. 
and H19-S must be understood in this context. Specifically, 
the individual's attitude toward the group is linked only to 
the subject's volume of search for alternatives and unique 
information. As Table 4.20 and 4.21 illustrate, the stronger 
the individual's perceived satisfaction with the group, the 
lower the alternatives and unique search. The volume of 
alternatives information search, then, is confirmed for
TABLE 4.20
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OP TOTAL ALTERNATIVES 





















Majority Consensus Majority Consensus
1.87® 1.82 (N=48) 4.92^ 11.09


















The summary table figures indicate the satisfaction scale scores ranging from 1 
(high satisfaction) to 3 (low satisfaction).
T̂he summary table figures indicate the dependent variable search volume by treat­
ment conditions.
TABLE 4.21
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE TOTAL UNIQUE INFORMATION 


























Decision Rule 614.95 10.55 p<. 01 1,89
Interaction 0.15 0. 00 NS 1,89
Covariate
Gr Satisfaction Scale 318.88 5.47 p<.05 1,89
I-*in
The summary table for the group satisfaction scale by treatments is the same as 
that presented in Table 4.20. The summary table presented in this figure is that 
of the dependent variable— the total unique information.
155
H17-S— individuals search for more alternatives and unique 
information when dissatisfied with the group discussion and 
decisions. As indicated by Table 4.20, the significance of 
the treatment and main effects are not diminished by the 
satisfaction scale. The same statement holds true for the 
total unique information search in Table 4.21. However, 
neither the proportion of search based on single alterna­
tives (H18-S), nor the proportion of use of unique informa­
tion (H19-S), is altered by the individual's satisfaction 
with the group environment.
Finally, the covariate of leadership is examined. 
Measurement centers on the two prime Bales categorizations 
of leadership— task and social leadership— analyzed by the 
proportion of the subject's discussion on task matters (de­
fined by questions and answers) and that of social concerns 
(defined by positive and negative reactions). Yet, a funda­
mental difficulty remains— since both the dependent variables 
and the Bales leadership scores are defined by the subject's 
interactions, to what extent are they measures of the same 
result? Because of this difficulty, the Bales categoriza­
tion of leadership remains fairly inadequate for examining 
the volume of search. As Table 4.22 illustrates. Bales task 
leadership across the five items is strongly related to the 
total volume of alternatives information search, although 
both treatment conditions remain statistically significant 
in explaining the volume of search. The social leadership
TABLE 4.22
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF TOTAL ALTERNATIVES 
INFORMATION SEARCH BY TREATMENT AND 
BALES TASK LEADERSHIP SCORES
Decision Rule
Majority Consensus Majority Consensus
Information Low 49.48^ 57.46 (N=48) 5.04b 11.09
Level High 56.48 64.57 (N=46) 10.70 23.17
(N=48) (N=46)
Mean
Squares F-Level Significance d.f.
Main Effect
Information Level 686.30 8.99 p<.01 1,89
Main Effect
Decision Rule 685.39 8.97 p<. 01 1,89
Interaction 238.91 3.13 NS 1,89
Covariate
Bales Task 3228.05 42.27 p<.001 1,89
in
The figures in the summary table denote the percentage of the subject's discussion 
emphasizing the task leadership function.
The figures in the summary table denote dependent variable's means by treatment 
levels.
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function, however, did not affect the subject's volume of 
alternatives information search.
Conclusion
The findings in this chapter indicate that the volume 
and type of information search can be explained by two 
environmental variables— the level of available information 
and the rule for final group decisions. Both environmental 
variables are strongly related to the volume of alternatives 
and unique information search such that the highest amount 
of search occurs in the high information/consensus rule con­
dition. The proportion, or type, of information search is 
primarily explained by the decision rule; seldom does the 
level of available information affect the dependence on types 
of information.
Finally, the set of individual and group constraints 
generally are not found to be significantly related to infor­
mation search. The correlational evidence suggests that in 
future studies group effects such as leadership and group 
conformity might be explored as treatment effects on search 
behavior instead of their exploratory nature in this investi­
gation.
Yet, as the framework in Chapter II illustrates, 
the search for information is only the first step in the 
process of group decision mcdcing. For an adequate theory of 
collective decision making, the final choices of the group 
must be examined, especially in the framework of individual
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to group decisional shifts. It is this task that Chapter V 
addresses.
CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS OF GROUP DECISIONS AND 
TEE CHOICE SHIFT
To depend solely on individual information search 
behavior in explaining the group decisional process is in­
adequate, especially in analyzing the final choices in a 
collective environment. In this chapter, the analysis 
excunines the shifts in individual predispositions to final 
group decisions and the extremization of group decisions 
based on various hypotheses outlined in earlier chapters. 
Each proposition is analyzed according to the framework 
established in Chapter III.
Choice Shifts— Experimental Treatment
Informational Constraint
Given divergent levels of available information, do 
high information groups engage in greater shifts, and do 
group decisions approach the extremes of the Likert-scale 
alternatives? Based on a rationalistic model of group 
decision making, group shifts are posited to be larger in 
the high rather than the low information condition.
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Evidence favoring this proposition is highlighted by the 
results in Chapter IV illustrating greater alternatives 
and more unique information search in the high information 
than in the low information condition.
The hypothesized relationship in this investiga­
tion, however, posits that information overload will reduce 
high information group members' abilities to make decisions, 
and will result in greater shifts for subjects in the low 
rather than the high information treatment. Thus, a cogni­
tive processing model is indicated and the rational choice 
model is rejected. It is the hypothesis of this investiga­
tion that greater shifts (Hl-CS) and greater extremization 
{H2-CS) will occur for subjects in the minimal information 
condition because high information subjects will face 
heightened confusion and uncertainty in this stage of their 
decision-making process— the final choice. This is espec­
ially so when the final choice must be a collective deci­
sion.
One qualifying comment should be noted: given that
choice shift theory requires an indication of a pre- 
decisional preference among subjects, the differences among 
subjects should not be significantly diverse on the pretest. 
Random assignment to treatment conditions usually minimizes 
such differences, and as illustrated in Table 5.1, no sig­
nificant differences occur between treatment and control 
conditions on pretest mean choices across all five items.
TABLE 5.1
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF PRETEST MEANS
BY INFORMATION LEVEL AND ITEM
Pretest Means















Low 48 2.92 1.93 3.54 1.92 4.63 1.91 5.19 2.07 2.66 1.88
Information High 46 3.39 1.88 3.51 1.77 4.47 1.95 5.06 1.95 2.59 1.47
Level Control^ 58 2.90 1.33 3.99 1.76 4.97 1.58 5.21 1.77 3.05 1.96
Total 152 3.06 1.72 3.67 1.82 4.70 1.81 5.15 1.91 2.79 1.79
F(2,149)=l.'33 F(2,149)=0.76 F(2,149)=1.07 F(2,149)=0.09 F(2,149)=1.04
NS NS NS NS NS
o\
The control group is the group of subjects who were assigned only to read the items again, 
and not allowed to discuss the items with others.
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The results in Table 5.2 indicate that information 
treatment levels differ significantly from each other and 
from the levels of the control group condition on the first 
three policy items, but not in the final two. Further, 
the shifts from pretest to group decision between informa­
tion levels on Item 1 are obviously minimal, while the dif­
ferences on Items 2 and 3 on the treatment levels are in 
opposite directions— high information group members shifted 
more on Item 2, while low information subjects shifted more 
on Item 3. The size of shift on Item 2 is similar to that 
of Item 5 for the two information conditions; the reason 
for the difference in statistical significance rests primar­
ily on the slight shift by control groups on Item 2 whereas 
no shift occurred for subjects in the control condition on 
Item 5.
The evidence cannot support Hl-CS— there is no rela­
tionship between the level of available information and the 
shifts to a final group decision. Thus, neither the rational 
nor the cognitive models gain any particular support from the 
results in Table 5.2. The lack of relationship is more 
debilitating to the rational model since higher information 
levels may result in greater certainty, and thus greater 
shifts; the examination of information overload requires 
only that group shifts should be minimized for higher 
information levels. Nevertheless, the level of available 
information does not appear to have a significant effect on 
the subject's shift from pretest to group decisions.
TABLE 5.2
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF CHOICE SHIFT

















N X S.D. X S.D. X S.D. X S.D. X S.D.
48 0.85 2.53 -0.33 2.19 -0.71 2.06 -0.81 2.68 0.21 2.07
46 0.82 2.15 -0.51 2.12 -0.53 2.18 -0.84 2.29 -0.02 1.69
58 -0.22 1.96 0.40 1.72 0.24 1.29 0.00 1.82 0.00 1.35
152 0.43 2.25 -0.12 2.03 -0.30 1.89 -0.52 2.28 0.08 1.70
F(2,149)=4.17 F(2,149)=3.14 F(2,149)=4.01 F(2,149)=2.42 F(2,149)=0.28
p<.05 p<. 05 p<.05 NS NS
a\w
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Hypothesis H2-CS emphasizes a slightly different 
aspect of group choice— the extremization of final group 
decisions. In Table 5.3, the results are displayed. Only 
on Items 1 and 4 are statistically significant differences 
found between treatments and the control conditions. In 
both of those cases, however, low information decisions 
are more extreme than those in the high information condi­
tion (The range of scores is from 1 to 7, with neutral 
scored as 4). In each of the other three items the differ­
ences between conditions are in the hypothesized direction, 
although not statistically significant. Thus, only weak 
evidence can be cited for support of H2-CS— low information 
groups will engage in greater extremization than high infor­
mation groups.
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 signify the lack of evidence for 
the effects of information level on the final group decision. 
In spite of evidence in Chapter IV that high rather than low 
information groups engage in greater alternatives and unique 
information search, we find no support for the effects of 
information availability on final group decisions. Thus, 
given the positive relationship between information level 
and search behavior, the heightened dissatisfaction with 
available information by high information group members 
may be linked to the lack of shift (Table 4.14).
TABLE 5.3
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF GROUP DECISION 
BY INFORMATION LEVEL AND ITEM
Item 1
Group Decisions 















Low 48 2.04 1.83 3.88 1.14 5.33 1.28 6.00 1.79 2.46 1.29
Information High 46 2.57 1.63 4.02 1.53 5.00 1.32 5.90 1.28 2.61 1.27
Level Control 58 3.12 1.65 3.50 1.61 4.72 1.65 5.21 1.78 3.05 1.76
Total 152 2.61 1.75 3.78 1.47 5.00 1.45 5.67 1.67 2.73 1.49
F(2,149)=5.28 F(2,149)=1.84 F(2,149)=2.34 F(2,149)=3.77 F(2,149)=2.34




Originally treated in the risky shift literature as 
the statistical model, traditional efforts at measuring 
decision rule effects have yielded little explanation of 
decisional shifts (Kirkpatrick et al., 1976b). Yet, the 
type of decision rule utilized for collective processes may 
alter the final decision. The results in Chapter IV indi­
cate that consensus groups, by their needs for bargaining 
and compromise, require greater informational search. Yet, 
given those same needs, does the shift from pretest to 
group decision become minimized in a consensus decision 
environment? Are collective decisions more extreme under 
majority decision rules than under a consensus requirement? 
As shown in Table 5.4, differences between decision rule 
groups and the control condition are statistically signifi­
cant on all five items, although the difference between 
decision rule treatment levels is minimal on Item 3—  
Military/Domestic Spending. Further, on all but the third 
item, the shift differences are in the hypothesized direc­
tion— majority group subjects engage in greater shifts than 
do consensus decisional members. In fact, shifts from pre­
test positions for the consensus group condition are less 
than the shifts for control group members on Items 1 and 2. 
Thus, in spite of the greater alternatives and unique infor­
mation search by consensus group members, the shift of 
individual positions is greater for subjects under majority
TABLE 5.4
ANALYSIS OP VARIANCE OF CHOICE SHIFTS
BY DECISION RULE AND ITEM
Rule Control
Item 1 Item 2
Choice Shifts
















48 1.62 1.96 -0.65 2.29 -0.54 2.05 -1.17 2.12 0.62 1.75
46 0.08 2.42 -0.20 1.99 -0.69 2.19 -0.49 2.76 -0.41 1.88
58 -0.22 1.96 0.40 1.72 0.24 1.29 0.00 1.82 0.00 1.35
152 0.44 2.25 -0.12 2.03 -0.30 1.89 -0.52 2.28 0.06 1.70
F(2,149)=10.82F(2,149)=3.66 M2,149)=3.98 F(2,149)=3.56 F(2,149)=4.65
p<.001 p<.05 p<.05 p<.05 p<.05
a\
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than consensus decision rules— H3-CS is confirmed in the 
bivariate case.
The evidence for the group extremization hypothesis 
(as indicated in Table 5-5) is less strong than for the 
shift hypothesis. Treatment and control conditions are 
significantly different in three of the five items. Only 
on It^s 2 and 3 are the conditions not statistically dis­
tinct— and only on Item 2 is the hypothesized direction of 
the relationship not indicated. Thus, despite lower infor­
mation search, majority groups decisions are more extreme 
than consensus group decisions.
Summary of Bivariate Relationships—
Treatments on Choice Shifts
From the bivariate relationships between treatments 
levels on choice shifts and group extremization displayed 
in Tables 5.2 through 5.5, the evidence indicates that in­
formation level has little or no effect on either the 
individual/group shift, or the extremization of the final 
group decision. Yet, the evidence from the analysis does 
illustrate that the decision rule utilized by the group 
alters shifts, and to a lesser extent, also alters group 
extremization. In both treatment conditions, the magnitude 
of the extremization is negatively related to the findings 
on information search examined in Chapter IV such that 
groups that shift toward greater extremes generally 
search less.
TABLE 5.5
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF GROUP DECISION
BY DECISION RULE AND ITEM
Item 1
Group Decision 










N X S.D. X S.D. X S.D. X S.D. X S.D.
Majority 48 1.52 0.83 4.17 1.42 5.31 1.01 6.40 0.94 2.06 0.93
Decision Consensus 46 3.08 2.05 3.74 1.25 5.02 1.53 5.51 1.87 3.00 1.40
Rule Control 58 3.12 1.65 3.50 1.61 4.72 1.65 5.21 1.78 3.05 1.76
Total 152 2.61 1.75 3.78 1.47 5.00 1.46 5.67 1.67 2.73 1.49
F(2rl49)=16.18 F(2,149)==2.82 P(2,149)=2.189 F(2,149)=7.61 F(2,149)=7.5
p<.001 NS NS p<.001 p<.001
< nVO
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In Chapter IV, the evidence illustrates that in 
spite of heightened information search in the high informa­
tion treatment, satisfaction with available information is 
lower for members of high than low information groups.
Does the same result occur for satisfaction with group 
decisions? As illustrated in Table 5.6, the evidence indi­
cates that members of high information groups are less 
satisfied with the final outcomes of group decisions than 
are low information group members. Yet, as noted in 
Table 5.7, there are no statistical differences between 
majority and consensus group members on satisfaction with 
the group decision.
Thus, significant differences are observed on shift 
and group extremization for the decision rule treatment, 
but majority and consensus groups do not differ on satis­
faction with group decisions. High information group mem­
bers do not differ significantly from low information 
treatment members on shifts or group extremization; yet the 
former are more dissatisfied with group decisions. As 
indicated in Chapter III, this result provides further 
evidence that information overload has occurred for high 
information group members— they search for more informa­
tion, and yet are more dissatisfied with the increased 
information; their decisions cure no different from low infor­
mation group subjects, yet they are still more dissatisfied 
with the final results.
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TABLE 5.6






Low 47 19.49 6.34
High 46 25.48 7.89
Total 93 22.45 7.72
F(l,91) = 16.334 p<.001
^he higher the satisfaction score, the greater dissatis­
faction with group decisions.
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TABLE 5.7
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF GROUP DECISION 





Low 47 21.47 7.54
High 46 23.46 7.85
Total 93 22.45 7.72
F(l,91) = 1.553 NS
^The higher the satisfaction score, the greater the
dissatisfaction with group decisions.
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Multivariate Analysis— Treatments 
on Search Behavior
Do the effects of the treatments operate independently 
(main effects), or do they interact in explaining choice 
shifts and group extremization? The multivariate anlaysis 
of search behavior found that the interaction of informa­
tion level and decision rule was insignificant. Yet, both 
treatment or main effects were found to be statistically 
significant explanatory variables on information search—  
primarily in terms of the volume of information.
Tables 5.8-5.12 illustrate the treatment effects on 
choice shift behavior by item. The only two items that 
indicate effects are Item 1 (Environment) and tern 5 (Uni­
versity Funding). In both cases, the decision rule is the 
only significant independent variable. As hypothesized, 
on both items majority group members shift more away from 
individual pretest positions rhan do consensus group mem­
bers. As indicated in the bivariate case, the level of 
available information has no statistically significant 
effect on choice shifts. Further, no statistical signifi­
cant interaction occurs across the policy items, although 
such an effect is indicated on Item 2 (Foreign Policy).
The summary tables denote that the greatest shifts 
should be toward the majority rule/low information treat­
ment condition. In fact, on Items 1, 3, and 5 the strong­
est shifts are in the majority rule/low information cell, 
while the remaining items show greatest shifts in the
TABLE 5.8
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF CHOICE SHIFTS















Squares F-Ratio Significance d.f.
Main EffectsInformation Level 0.02 0.00 NS 1,90
Main Effects 
Decision Rule 56.55 11.39 p<.05 1,90
Interaction 2.08 0.42 NS 1,90
TABLE 5.9
ANALYSIS OP VARIANCE OF CHOICE SHIFTS BY















Squares F-Ratio Significance d.f.
Main Effects
Information Level 0.97 0.21 NS 1,90
Main Effects 
Decision Rule 4.73 1.05 NS 1,90
Interaction 15.72 3.48 NS 1,90
cn
TABLE 5.10















Squares F-Ratio Siqnificance d.f.
Mean Effects
Information Level 0.84 0.18 NS 1,90
Mean Effects 
Decision Rule 0.56 0.12 NS 1,90
Interaction 0.82 0.18 NS 1,90
TABLE 5.11
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF CHOICE SHIFTS BY















Squares F-Ratio Siqnificance d.f.
Mean Effects
Information Level 0.08 0.01 NS 1,90
Mean Effects 
Decision Rule 11.11 1.79 NS 1,90
Interaction 0.05 0.01 NS 1,90
TABLE 5.12
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF CHOICE SHIFTS BY


































majority rule/high information condition. The most unusual 
movement is on Item 5 (University Spending) where majority 
and consensus group members shift in opposite directions; 
that is, majority group shifts are toward increased research 
support, while consensus groups shift toward increased 
athletic support. Nevertheless, the results on choice 
shifts indicate that the decision rule utilized in reaching 
final decisions has some effect on the shifting of prefer­
ences, but neither the level of availabile information nor 
the interaction of the treatments alter the final decisional 
shifts.
Is the same true for the extremization of the final 
group decision? Are group decisions primarily affected by 
decision rules rather than information levels? The evi­
dence in Tables 5.13 through 5.17 indicates that on Items 1, 
4, and 5 the rule required for group decision is the only 
treatment effect on group extremization. No significant 
differences are found on Item 2 (Table 5.14); in fact, in 
each of the four conditions, the group decisions are very 
close to neutral.
The most unusual extremization occurs on Item 3 
(Table 5.15), where the interaction of the treatment vari­
ables provides the prime explanation of group extremization. 
Once again, the most extreme decisional means are in the 
majority rule/low information condition, but the next most 
extreme cell occurs in the consensus rule/high information 
condition.
TABLE 5.13
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF GROUP DECISIONS BY















Squares F-Ratio Significance d.f.
Main Effects
Information Level 4.91 2.07 NS 1,90
Main Effects 
Decision Rule 59.07 25.00 p<.001 1,90
Interaction 9.00 3.81 NS 1,90
00o
The figures are the group decision means ranging from 1-7.
TABLE 5.14
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF GROUP DECISIONS BY















Squares F-Ratio Siqnificance d.f.
Main Effects
Information Level 0.68 0.38 NS 1,90
Main Effects 
Decision Rule 4.52 2.49 NS 1,90
Interaction 0.77 0.42 NS 1,90
TABLE 5.15
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OP GROUP DECISIONS BY 















Squares F-Ratio Significance d.f.
Main Effects
Information Level 2.46 1.56 NS 1,90
Main Effects 
Decision Rule 2.07 1.31 NS 1,90
Interaction 11,57 7.31 p<.05 1,90
00to
TABLE 5.16
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF GROUP DECISIONS BY















Squares F-Ratio Significance d.f.
Main Effect
Information Level 0.08 0.03 NS 1,90
Main Effect 
Decision Rule 19.02 8.57 pc. 01 1,90
Interaction 3.24 1.46 NS 1,90
COw
TABLE 5.17
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OP GROUP DECISIONS BY















Squares P-Ratio Significance d.f.
Main Effect
information Level 0.27 0.19 NS 1,90
Main Effect 
Decision Rule 21.31 14.73 p<.001 1,90
Interaction 0.01 0.01 NS 1,90
00
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Thus, group decisions tend to be bound by compromise 
and bargaining for collective decisions by consensus groups 
Majority groups are more apt to move decisions toward 
stronger recommendations on the various items. As in the 
case of the choice shift hypothesis, group extremization is 
not affected by the level of available information.





The Machiavellian personality scale is hypothesized 
to be an additional explanatory variable on the choice shift 
process. Specifically, hypothesis H5-CS posits that Machia­
vellianism is positively related to both the subject's pre­
test extremization and the individual-group shifts.
The evidence in support of the hypothesis is rather 
weak. From the simple correlations (Pearson's r), the only 
correlations of Machiavellianism with pretest extremization 
equal to or above 0.10 are on Items 2 and 4 (r2=0.10; 
r^=0.13), while the only noticeable correlation of Machia­
vellianism with individual/group shift is on Item 2 (-0.13). 
Given the lack of explanation for shift by the treatment 
variables, the only statistically significant effect of 
Machiavellianism is on the second item. As illustrated in 
Table 5.18, the only significant effect of this covariate
TABLE 5.18
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OP CHOICE SHIFTS BY TREATMENTS
AND MACHIAVELLIAN SCALE— ITEM 2 (FOREIGN POLICY)
Decision Rule



















92.00* 97.17 (N=48) -.16b -.52


















The figures are the X's of the Machiavellian scores by treatment conditions. The 
range of values are from 40 to 160— with the higher figure denoting the high 
"Mach" personality.
The figures are the X's of the choice shifts by treatment conditions.
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is the rather small shift on the foreign policy item. As 
noted from the correlations above, the results suggest that 
as the Machiavellian score increases, the extremization on 
the pretest score of the foreign policy item increases pri­
marily toward support of Nation B— the dictatorship ally.
As indicated in the analysis of variance, the minor shift 
that occurs is linked to the Machiavellian scale. However, 
given the lack of effects on the remaining four items, 
hypothesis H5-CS cannot be supported.
Group Constraints—
Interactive Model
Emphasizing the effects of group leadership, the 
interactive model examined in this investigation assumes 
that group leaders are more extreme on pretest positions, 
and as a result have a stronger effect on the group shift 
(H6-CS). . Similar to the Machiavellian linkage to choice 
shifts, leadership-confidence theory, as defined in this 
study, posits pretest extremization and leadership scores 
(as measured by Bales task leadership) should be positively 
correlated. Only on Items 4 and 5 did the Bales leadership 
score positively correlate at 0.10 or above (r̂ =0.13; 
rg=0.14) with extremization. On one item (Item 2) the 
relationship was negative (r2=-0.14). Thus, the evidence 
linking leadership and extremization is suspect.
Nevertheless, the subject's leadership score does 
have a significant effect on Item 4. As Table 5.19
TABLE 5.19
ANALYSIS OP VARIANCE OF CHOICE SHIFTS BY TREATMENTS
AND BALES TASK LEADERSHIP— ITEM 4 (MASS TRANSIT)
Decision Rule
Majority Consensus Majority Consensus
Information Low 49.48® 57.48 (N=48) -1.16^ -.43
Level High 56.48 64.57 (N=46) -1.17 -.91
(N=48) (N=46)
Mean
Squares F-Ratio Significance d.f.
Main Effect
Information Level 5.27 1.14 NS 1,89
Main Effect 
Decision Rule 3.49 0.09 NS 1,89
Interaction 1.29 0.23 NS 1,89
Covariate
Bales Task Scale 27.32 4.07 p<. 05 1,89
CO
00
The figures are the X's of the Bales task leadership scores by treatment condi­
tion. High scores represent higher leadership.
The figures are the X's of the choice shifts by treatment condition.
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illustrates, the Bales task score has the only statistically 
significant effect on the choice shift. As noted earlier 
in Table 5.16, the decision rule main effect was the prime 
explanation of the choice shift; the Bales score on Item 4 
suggests, however, that most of the differences observed 
between decision rules can be primarily explained by the 
leadership variable. As illustrated in the simple correla­
tion, the higher the Bales task score the greater the shift 
toward recommending the highway over the mass transit sys­
tem (r̂ =0.23).
Group Constraints— Diffusion 
of Responsibility Model
Does greater individual support of the group's deci­
sions affect the level of choice shift and the final extrem- 
ization of group decisions? According to the responsibility- 
-diffusion hypothesis, the higher the perceived similarity 
and cohesion of the group by its members, the greater the 
choice shift (H7-CS) and the greater the final decisional 
extremization {H8-CS). As defined in this investigation, 
cohesion is primarily a measure of individual satisfaction 
with group decisions. For a true cohesion measure to be 
operationalized, groups must be examined over time rather 
than in a single ad hoc meeting.
The effects of satisfaction on choice shift are 
apparent on Items 1 and 2, On Item 1, the effects of deci­
sion rule on the dependent variable remain strong, but the
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satisfaction measure indicates an additional significant 
effect on the magnitude of the choice shift (Table 5.20). 
Given the simple correlation of satisfaction and shift on 
Item 1 (r̂ =.16), the direction of shift suggests that the 
greater the movement toward support of the dam (a positive 
shift), the greater the dissatisfaction with general group 
outcomes. In addition, as indicated in the first summary 
table of means in Table 5.20, dissatisfaction is correlated 
with the level of information— although that has no signifi­
cant effect on the magnitude of shift.
On Item 2, the effects of decisional satisfaction 
and the interaction of the treatment variables affect the 
magnitude of shift. Statistical interaction is indicated 
because of the magnitude of the shift for subjects in the 
majority rule/high information condition (see Table 5.21—  
the summary of dependent variable X's). The satisfaction 
measure indicates that the greater the shift toward Nation 
B (the dictatorship ally), the greater the dissatisfaction 
with the group (r2=-.13).
Although only significant on these two items, the 
effects on the direction of shift are curious. Hypothesis 
H7-CS indicates that greater satisfaction increases the 
magnitude of choice shift. Yet, on Item 1 the greater the 
subject's satisfaction with overall group decision malting, 
the more the individual shifts away from the predominant 
shift indicated in the summary table. That is, the greater
TABLE 5.20
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF GROUP DECISIONS BY TREATMENTS
AND SATISFACTION SCORE— ITEM 1 (ENVIRONMENT)
Decision Rule
Majority Consensus Majority Consensus
Information Low 1.83* 1.83 (N=46) 1.78* -.09































®The figures are the X's of the satisfaction scores, scales from 1 to 3 where the 
latter indicates dissatisfaction with group decisions.
^The figures are the X's of the dependent variable by treatment condition.
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the positive shift indicated in Table 5.20, the more 
dissatisfied subjects are with final group decisions. The 
same effect occurs on Item 2 (Table 5.21)— dissatisfaction 
with group decisions are higher for shifts in the direction 
of Nation B, which is the direction that most shifts indi­
cate (It must be emphasized that this satisfaction mea­
sure examines posttest satisfaction on all decisions of the 
group).
Since there are no effects on shifts on the final 
three items, it is apparent that the dissatisfaction with 
early items extinguishes on later shift items. Neverthe­
less, the indication from the first two items emphasizes that 
subjects who are the most dissatisfied with group decisions 
across the five items are those who shifted away from the 
predominant shift on Items 1 and 2. According to H7-CS, 
satisfaction should be positively correlated with group 
shift— but subjects satisfied with the general set of deci­
sions actually shift in the opposite direction of the gen­
eral shift on the first two items. Hypothesis H7-CS cannot 
be confirmed.
The effects of satisfaction with decisional results 
is even more marked on the extremization of the final group 
decision. On Items 2, 4, and 5 decision satisfaction sig­
nificantly alters the extremization of the final decision. 
However, the direction of the simple correlations indicate 
conflicting directions (r2=.19; r^=.17); that is, greater
TABLE 5.21
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OP CHOICE SHIFTS BY TREATMENTS
AND DECISION SATISFACTIONS— ITEM 2 (FOREIGN POLICY)
Decision Rule
Majority Consensus
Information Low -.17® -.52 (N=46)































The summary table X's are on the dependent variable— the covariate X's are 
identical to those in Table 5.20.
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satisfaction with group decisions is indicated when those 
decisions favor Nation A (Item 2), highway recommendations 
(Item 4), and research choices (Item 5). As noted in 
Tables 5.22-5.24, the individual choices by groups are gen­
erally neutral (Item 2), recommending the mass transit sys­
tem (Item 4), and favoring research spending (Item 5). On 
the latter two items, extremization is not in the indicated 
direction in the first case (Item 4), but it is indicated 
in the final item (Item 5).
Although the effects of group decisional satisfac­
tion are appanrent in this investigation on both choice 
shifts and group decisional extremization, the direction 
of the effects is conflicting. The evidence suggests that 
the subject's attitude toward group decisions is often in 
opposition to preferred choices. Thus, although satisfac­
tion is correlated with choice shifts and group extremiza­
tion, the direction of the covariate's effects are in a 
negative direction to the group shift.
Group Constraints—
Familiarization Model
The general hypothesis of this model posits that 
individuals do not need group discussion in order to sig­
nificantly shift their choices on the various items. Thus, 
no differences should be apparent between subjects in the 
experimental groups and those in control conditions. The 
latter groups, simply by examining the information again
TABLE 5.22
ANALYSIS OP VARIANCE OF GROUP DECISIONS BY TREATMENT







Majority Consensus Majority Consensus
1.88® 1.83 (N=47) 4.04b 3.74 (N=47)
































The figures are the X's of the satisfaction scale by treatment condition.
T̂he figures are the X's of the individual decisions by groups and treatment 
conditions.
TABLE 5.23
ANALYSIS OP VARIANCE OF GROUP DECISIONS BY















Squares F-Ratio Siqnificance d.f.
Main Effect
Information Level .29 .16 NS 1,88
Main Effect 
Decision Rule 12.96 7.29 p<.01 1,88
Interaction 4.67 2.63 NS 1,88
Covariate




ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF GROUP DECISIONS BY 
















Squares F-Ratio Siqnificance d.f.
Main Effect
Information Level .37 .28 NS 1,88
Main Effect 
Decision Rule 16.45 12.57 p<.001 1,88
Interaction .50 .38 NS 1,88
Covariate
Gr. Dec. Satisfaction 10.20 7.79 p<. 01 1,88
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(familiarization),should shift significantly on all items.
As Table 5.25 indicates, shifts are generally significantly 
different in experimental and control conditions. Except 
for slight shifts on Item 2, members of the control group 
generally do not change their pretest positions when the 
questionnaire is administered a second time. Thus, group 
discussion is required for choice shifts; individual famil­
iarization does not alter pretest positions.
Group Constraints— Value 
and Polarization Models
The value hypothesis rests on the initial assumption 
that individuals will see themselves as different from other 
subjects like them on the various policy items. Once that 
difference is established, group members will then shift to 
greater extremes in that valued direction (HIO-CS). Polari­
zation requires only that the group decision be more toward 
the extremes of the alternative already indicated by pre­
test means (Hll-CS). For example, if the pretest means sug­
gest that the groups tend to support building the dam, the 
final decision should be an even stronger recommendation of 
that alternative.
For three of the five items, statistically signifi­
cant differences are apparent for the disparity between pre­
test self and perceived others (Table 5.26). Subjects saw 
themselves as more favorable toward building the dam (Item 1), 
constructing the mass transit system (Item 4), and supporting
TABLE 5.25
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF CHOICE SHIFTS BY
EXPERIMENTAL AND CONTROL GROUPS BY ITEM











Experimental Groups 94 0.83 2.33 -0.42 2.14 -0.62 2.11 -0.83 2.48 0.09 1.88
Control Groups 58 -0.22 1.96 0.40 1.72 0.24 1.29 0.00 1.82 0.00 1.35
Total 152 0.44 2.25 -0.12 2.03 -0.30 1.89 -0.52 2.28 0.06 1.70
F( 1,150) =8.38 F( 1,150) =7.85 F(1,150)=7.85 P( 1,150) =4.87 F(1,150) = 0.11










Item 1 (N=94) 
(Environment) -.56 2.06 151 -3.29 p<. 05
Item 2 (N=93)
(Foreign Policy) -.13 1.89 151 -.87 MS
Item 3 (N=93)
(Mil/Domes. Spend.) -.06 2.40 151 — .30 NS
Item 4 (N=94) 
(Mass Transit) .32 1.92 151 2.00 p<. 05
Item 5 (N=94)




research funding (Item 5) than other typical university 
students. No significant differences were apparent on 
Items 2 and 3.
As a result, when examined as a covariate, the 
self-other differences significantly affect choice shifts 
on Items 1, 4, and 5 (along with the decision rule on 
Items 1 and 4— see Tables 5.27-5.29). For the hypothesis 
to be confirmed, however, the direction of shift must be 
in the opposite direction from the self-other differences. 
That is, shifts must be toward greater support of the dam 
(Item 1), increased support for the mass transit system 
(Item 4), and higher support of research funding for uni­
versities (Item 5). Thus, shifts should be positive on 
Item 1 and 5 and negative on Item 4. As can be seen in the 
sumnary tables of means for each item, the direction is con­
firmed on Items 1 and 4 and mixed on Item 5, since majority- 
rule groups shift in the valued direction, but consensus 
groups shift toward the non-valued alternative.
In examining group polarization, group decisions 
are required to be less neutral than the pretest means, yet 
favoring the same alternative. To confirm hypothesis H11-C& 
group shifts are required to be shifts away from neutrality 
and in the same direction as the pretest means. As indicated in 
Table 5.30, except for Item 2 and the consensus groups in 
Item 5, the groups move toward greater extremization in the 
same direction as denoted by pretest means (polarization).
TABLE 5.27
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF CHOICE SHIFTS BY TREATMENTS
AND SELF-OTHER DIFFERENCES— ITEM 1 (ENVIRONMENT)
Decision Rule
Majority Consensus Majority Consensus
Information Low -.29* -.68 (N=46) 1.75b .18
Level High -.39 -.08 (N=46) 1.48 .23
(N=46) (N=46)
Mean
Squares F-Ratio Significance d.f.
Main Effect
Information Level 1 39 .41 NS 1,88
Main Effect 
Decision Rule 46 64 13.68 p<.001 1,88
Interaction 01 •00 NS 1,88
Covariate
Self-Other Differences 113.14 33.17 p<.001 1,88
N)Oh)
The figures are the X's of the self-other differences for the item. Possible 
ranges are from -6.
The figures are the X's of the dependent variable by treatment condition.
mum
TABLE 5.28
ANALYSIS OP VARIANCE OF CHOICE SHIFTS BY TREATMENTS 








.75® -.48 (N=46) -.96b -.43































The figures are the X*s of the self-other differences.
The figures are the X's of the dependent variables by treatment condition.
TABLE 5.29
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF CHOICE SHIFTS BY TREATMENTS AND
SELF-OTHER DIFFERENCES— ITEM 5 (UNIVERSITY FUNDING)
Decision Rule













































The figures are the X's of the self-other differences by treatment condition.
The figures are the X's of the dependent variable by treatment condition.
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TABLE 5.30 






Item 1 Maj/Low 3.37 1.62 1.75 Pol
Maj/High 3.80 2.32 1.48 Pol
Cons/Low 1.61 1.43 .18 Pol
Cons/High 3.81 3.58 .23 Pol
Item 2 Maj/Low 3.92 4.04 -.12 Non-Pol
Maj/High 3.18 4.35 -1.17 Non-Pol
Cons/Low 3.22 3.74 -.52 Non-Pol
Cons/High 3.81 3.73 .08 Non-Pol
Item 3 Maj/Low 5.00 5.79 -.79 Pol
Maj/High 4.43 4.78 -.35 Pol
Cons/Low 4.13 4.83 -.70 Pol
Cons/High 4.50 5.19 — . 69 Pol
Item 4 Maj/Low 5.62 6.58 -.96 Pol
Maj/High 5.00 6.17 -1.17 Pol
Cons/Low 4.91 5.35 -.44 Pol
Cons/High 5.11 5.65 -.54 Pol
Item 5 Maj/Low 2.79 1.96 .83 Pol
Maj/High 2.52 2,13 .39 Pol
Cons/Low 2.53 2.96 -.43 Non-Pol
Cons/High 2.66 3.04 -.38 Non-Pol
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In conclusion, the effects of the value and 
polarization explanations significantly alter choice shifts 
and the final group extremization respectively. The strong­
est results are on Items 1, 4, and 5, with only slight 
effects on the remaining two items.
Conclusion
The final choice in a group decision-making setting 
cannot be explained by any single explanatory model. Sev­
eral research hypotheses have been offered as possible 
explanations of the shift of individual pretest positions 
into a final group solution. Two variables, the decision 
rule and the value model, offer the strongest explanations 
for the choice shift phenomenon. The decision rule effect 
posits that groups required to arrive at a majority deci­
sion are less constrained than consensus rule groups, and 
thus shift more away from their initial predispositions. 
Further, the shift is generally toward greater extremiza­
tion for the choice initially preferred by the group (as 
established by pretest means).
The value shift posits that subjects see themselves 
as different frcan others and that this difference denotes 
the direction of shift. Thus, subjects who see others as 
more favorable toward increasing athletic funding (Item 5) 
will shift toward increased funding for research needs.
Such differences are apparent on Items 1, 4, and 5.
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The remaining variables in this investigation 
provide little conclusive evidence on the choice shift 
effect. Both the interactive-leadership hypothesis and 
the diffusion-of-responsibility model provide conflicting 
evidence for explanations of the choice shift. In fact, 
the responsibility-diffusion model appears to have some 
negative effect— greater satisfaction implies individual 
shifts in directions opposite to the group shift. Finally, 
the level of available information has no effect on the 
shifting of choices in a group context, in spite of the 
positive relationship to the level of information search.
It is this linkage of search behavior and choice shifts 
that the final chapter will now address.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION— LINKAGE OF SEARCH 
AND CHOICE SHIFT
In this final chapter, three sections are delineated. 
First, findings on search and choice shift are reviewed. 
Second, the linkages of the two concepts are analyzed, 
specifically the effects of the volume of search on the 
magnitude of the choice shift. Finally, the findings are 
directed toward their possible implications for the natural 
group setting. In this final section, future research pos­
sibilities are illustrated with an eye on developments in 
theory and research both in the laboratory and the field 
setting.
Review of Findings— Search 
and Choice Shift
Informational Level Treatment
Of the measures of information search behavior, only 
the volume of information is affected by the information 
level treatment. As hypothesized, individuals in high in­
formation, rather than low information, groups engage in 
greater alternatives and unique information search. Thus,
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increased availability of supplied information encourages 
groups to discuss the information in detail- Groups with 
greater availedsility of information, however, do appear to 
have increased difficulties in the group decision-making 
process. Specifically, high information group members are 
less satisfied with the supplied information than members 
of low information groups. Thus, in spite of the greater 
availability and discussion of such information, members 
are more dissatisfied with information in the high informa­
tion condition. One possible implication is that high infor­
mation groups overload; that is, members cannot cope with 
the increased information burden; thus they become more 
dissatisfied with the available information.
Furthermore, greater search by high information 
groups is not reflected in choice shifts or group extremi­
zation. The information treatment has no effect on the 
shifting of choices; in fact, in the few cases that indi­
cate some effect of information level on choice shift, the 
direction implies that high information group members shift 
less than low information members. In summary, members of 
high information groups engage in greater alternatives and 
unique information search than low information subjects; 
they are less satisfied with the information; show no dif­
ferences in their choice shifts or group extremization; 
cuid, finally, are less satisfied with the final decisions 
of the group process.
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Decision Rule Treatment
The required rule for making final group decisions 
significantly affects the volume and type of information 
search. Consensus group members engage in greater alterna­
tives and unique information search and show a greater 
dependence on both information types in their search pro­
cess. The prime explanation for this phenomenon is that 
consensus groups need to resolve interpersonal differences. 
To do so, no argument can be ignored, for a single member 
can inhibit a final grouo decision. Majority groups are 
not so constrained; requiring only a simple majority for 
a final decision on each item, subjects spend much less 
time discussing the information or bargaining for a final 
decision than do consensus group members.
Unlike the information level dichotomy, no differ­
ences are indicated between majority and consensus group 
members on their satisfaction with the available informa­
tion. Since both consensus and high information group 
subjects discuss greater amounts of alternatives and unique 
information, and only the latter is frustrated with the 
final decisions of the group, the implication is that the 
increased information availability in the high information 




Generally, the covariates examined in this 
investigation explain little about either information search 
or choice shift. The two personality dimensions examined 
in this analysis, the Machiavellian and locus-of-control 
measures, provide little evidence of any significant effect 
on alternatives search. The lack of relationship between 
those personality characteristics and the magnitude of choice 
shift has also been noted. The implication is that indi­
vidual personality differences, although clearly important 
in political attitude studies, apparently do not alter the 
behavior of subjects involved in a group decision-making 
situation. Of course, this hypothesis requires testing 
using personality variables other than the two utilized in 
this study.
As for group constraints on decision making, several 
covariates appear most relevant. First, leadership behavior 
affects the volume of information search. Specifically, 
task leaders, as established by Bales task leadership scores, 
êure subjects who discuss more alternatives information than 
non-task leaders. Yet, task leadership is also hypothesized 
to be related to pretest extremization and finally to group 
shift. Little evidence can be found to substantiate either 
claim; in fact, leadership is not related to either pretest 
extremization or final shift. Thus, leadership appears to 
primarily affect the securch for information, and not choice 
shift.
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Another covariate relevant to group decision making 
is the individual’s satisfaction with group members and deci­
sions— regarded in this investigation as a surrogate for group 
cohesion. Although having no direct effect on either search 
or choice shift, the measure indicates that greater infor­
mation search may be linked with increased dissatisfaction. 
Although the magnitude of the shift is not generally related 
to the individual's satisfaction with group processes, the 
direction of shift implies that greater agreement with the 
predominant shift of the group on an item is correlated 
with greater dissatisfaction with group processes. Thus, 
the responsibility-diffusion hypothesis may be correct in 
claiming that satisfaction is related to choice shifts— but 
not in a negative direction.
Finally, two other hypotheses have been examined 
for their effects on the choice shift process. The first, 
the familiarization hypothesis, posits that group discussion 
is not necessary to engage choice shift— individual famil­
iarization is a sufficient condition. This hypothesis has 
no support; neither in this study, nor by other investiga­
tions of the choice shift (for review, see Dion et al.,
1970; Pruitt, 1971). The second hypothesis, the value 
model, does receive support from the analysis. The model 
posits that if subjects see themselves differently from 
others on the policy items, they will shift to greater 
extremes following group discussion in the opposite direction
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of the perceived others. The model emphasizes that the shift 
is in the valued direction since subjects see themselves as 
more attuned to those values than perceived others. For most 
of the items, these self-other differences exert a signifi­
cant effect on choice shifts. Furthermore, its corollary 
hypothesis, the polarization model, positing that shifts by 
group members will be toward extreme responses, is also 
supported, except for the foreign policy issue (Item 2).
Thus, the set of covariate measures' impact on 
search behavior and choice shift have met with limited suc­
cess. What do the hypotheses indicate about individuals in 
group decision-making environments? In terms of the volume 
of alternatives and unique information search, subjects who 
can be identified as task leaders, and who are not generally 
satisfied with the group and its decisions, are those most 
likely to search for information. Also, if subjects are in 
a group setting where members have already been supplied a 
considerable volume of information, and are required to 
reach a consensus decision on the problem, the search for 
information will increase.
As for the shifting of choices, those members who 
shift the most tend to be dissatisfied with the decision­
making process, and especially tend to shift in directions 
that most uphold their valued choices. Additionally, sub­
jects who shift are more likely to be in a decision envi­
ronment requiring a simple majority decision. Finally,
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the choices of group members tend to be more extreme than 
pretest positions indicating that group discussion enhances 
shifts.
Linkage of Search and Choice Shift
If the final decisions of group members tend to 
shift away from neutrality and toward greater extremization, 
can this shift be explained by increased information search? 
Alternatively, does greater information search inhibit the 
shifting of choice to the extent that greater shifts are 
negatively correlated with the volume of information search? 
Some evidence has already been presented. In the two-way 
analysis of variance of the effects of the two treatments 
(information level and decision rule) on the volume of 
alternatives information search, the main effects of each 
treatment variable on the dependent variable are signifi­
cant in the hypothesized direction (Table 4.16). However, 
of the two treatments, only decision rule alters the shift­
ing of choices. The critical element is that choice shifts 
are greater for majority, not consensus, group members, al­
though the latter engages in greater alternatives search.
The final connection remains— the linkage of the 
volume of alternatives information search to the shifting 
of choices, with the treatment effects included. Thus, the 
volume of alternatives information is examined as a covar­
iate on the magnitude of choice shift by item. The evidence
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in Tables 6.1-6.5 indicates that the volume of alternatives 
information has no independent effect on the magnitude of 
the choice shift. Although not presented in tabular form, 
none of the remaining search variables— total unique infor­
mation, proportion alternatives information, and proportion 
unique information— affect the magnitude of choice shifts 
on the items.
Search Behavior and Choice Shifts 
in Natural Group Settings
Given that scholars accept the validity of experi­
mental group investigations, how can the results of this 
study affect theory and research in a natural group envi­
ronment? The following section identifies research areas 
that can benefit from experimental results. One corollary 
should be noted; for small group laboratory studies to have 
a legitimate claim on political decision-making theory, the 
research findings must be replicated across numerous set­
tings.
Search Behavior and the 
Natural Group Environment
Studies employing search measures for examining 
small group decision making are quite scarce, especially in 
political settings (Barber, 1966; Skjei, 1973). Too often, 
political science investigations have ignored such proces- 
sual considerations in order to concentrate on the final 
choice. Yet, given that decision makers must have information
TABLE 6.1
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF CHOICE SHIFTS BY TREATMENTS
AND VOLUME OF ALTERNATIVES INFORMATION SEARCH—
ITEM 1 (ENVIRONMENT)
Decision Rule



















1.38® 2.47 (N=47) 1.75b -. 09
















The figures are the X's of the volume of alternatives information search on the
item by treatment levels.
The figures are the X's of the dependent variable by treatment levels.
TABLE 6.2
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OP CHOICE SHIFTS BY TREATMENTS 
AND VOLUME OF ALTERNATIVES INFORMATION SEARCH—  
ITEM 2 (FOREIGN POLICY)
Decision Rule
Majority Consensus Majority Consensus
Information Low 1.68® 2.35 (N=48) -.16^ -.52
Level High 2.13 4.26 (N=46) -1.17 .09
(N=48) (N=46)
Mean
Squares F-Ratio Significance d
Main Effect
Information Level .05 .01 NS 1
Main Effect 
Decision Rule 8.93 1.98 NS 1
Interaction 19.49 4.31 p . 05 1
Covariate
Vol. of Alt. Info. 15.93 3.52 NS 1
,89
,89
®The figures are the X's of volume of alternatives information search on the item 
by treatment conditions.
toH
The figures are the X's of the dependent variable by treatment conditions.
TABLE 6.3
ANALYSIS OP VARIANCE OF CHOICE SHIFT BY TREATMENTS
AND VOLUME OF ALTERNATIVES INFORMATION SEARCH—
ITEM 3 (MIL/DOMES. SPENDING)
Decision Rule
Majority Consensus Majority Consensus
Information Low 1.00* 2.13 (N=48) -.72^ -.70
Level High 1.46 4.39 (N=46) -.35 -.87
(N=48) (N=46)
Mean
Squares F-Ratio Siqnificance d
Main Effect
Information Level .01 .00 NS ],89
Main Effect
Decision Rule 2.16 .50 NS 1,89
Interaction 2.16 .46 NS 1,89
Covariate
Vol. of Alt. Info. 1.73 .37 NS 1,89
M
00
The figures are the X's of the volume of alternatives information search on the 
item by treatment conditions.
The figures are the X's of the dependent variable by treatment conditions.
TABLE 6.4
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OP CHOICE SHIFTS BY TREATMENTS
AND VOLUME OF ALTERNATIVES INFORMATION SEARCH—
ITEM 4 (MASS TRANSIT)
Decision Rule
Majority Consensus Majority Consensus
Information Low .48* 2.39 (N=48) -1.16^ -.43
































The figures are the X's of the volume of alternatives information search on the
item by treatment conditions.
The figures are the X's of the dependent variable by treatment conditions.
TABLE 6.5
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF CHOICE SHIFTS BY TREATMENTS
AND VOLUME OF ALTERNATIVES INFORMATION SEARCH—








Vol. of Alt. Info.
Majority Consensus Majority Consensus
Information Low .58® 1.74 (N=47) .83̂ -.43


























®The figures are the X's of the volume of alternatives information search on the 
item by treatment conditions.
^The figures are the X's of the dependent variable by treatment conditions.
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in order to make decisions, and in a collective environment 
must find some way to process the incoming information, the 
relevance of search behavior cannot be ignored.
The prime contribution of the search literature to 
a theory of political decision making is the more complete 
explanation of the process which groups utilize in arriving 
at final choices. To ignore this processual component 
forces the decision-making scholar to make simplifying 
assumptions about search behavior. As noted in Chapter I, 
these assumptions generally require theorists to accept 
that decision makers utilize some rational calculus where 
all alternatives are weighed and individual and group pref­
erences are quantitatively measured. Alternatively, search 
is linked to a cybernetic process where only "critical" var­
iables are examined as to their impact on the decision pro­
cess. In both cases, the theorist assumes that the search 
process "fits" the model. This investigation, in part,has 
been an attempt to illustrate that this process need not 
be assumed, but can be empirically examined.
Furthermore, given the increased accessibility of 
political and government units to examination, political 
science scholars can no longer claim that the small group 
decision-making unit is not available for investigation.
In fact, many political committees are routinely video­
taped and their discussions recorded. Such data allow the 
decision analyst to examine the processual features of the
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small group environment either by interaction coding or 
content analytic techniques (Madron, 1969). Admittedly, 
such analysis does not allow the theorist to control the 
treatment variables as in this investigation. However, with 
further experimental testing of ad hoc groups, the evidence 
from non-experimental settings can be built on developments 
in the laboratory.
From this investigation, small group scholars may 
find evidence that by increasing the information available 
to decision makers more information will be discussed by 
group members. Yet, unless simplification rules can be 
utilized that combine seemingly diverse information, groups 
may become more dissatisfied with the available information 
and may even become more frustrated with the group itself—  
increasing the possibilities that the group may not be able 
to effectively continue. Additionally, small group 
scholars may examine the effects of decision rule on deci­
sion making. In some Congressional sub-committees, dis­
sension is discouraged. If the group insists on agreement, 
then the search for information should increase. On the 
other hand, if group members clearly split on most major 
issues, the need for increased search for resolving indi­
vidual differences is reduced.
There have been no attempts to make normative judg­
ments on the search process in this study. Nevertheless, 
the effects of heightened search in ad hoc groups have
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indicated that such behavior increases the likelihood that 
group members will be more dissatisfied with group pro­
cesses and decisions. Since political groups are faced 
with increasingly complex issues and information about 
those issues, the ability of decision-making collectives 
to deal with such information must be examined. If groups 
become more dissatisfied with the information and with each 
other under heightened information conditions, then the 
implication may be that new methods need to be adopted for 
examining the "information revolution" in policy decision 
making.
Choice Shifts and the 
Natural Group Environment
Choice shift and group extremization theory may 
enable researchers to escape the traditional confines of ex 
post facto research on choices and outcomes. As in the case 
of information search analysis, examination of choice shifts 
more adequately treats processual notions of decision mak­
ing. By following group members' positions over time, and 
not just on a single issue, the shifting of choices can be 
inspected. For example, the recent discussion that Congress­
men become more ideologically conservative in their voting 
over a several year period can be loosely linked to a 
choice shift framework (Clem, 1977).
Given the amount of decision making in small groups, 
continuing dependence on outcome explanations of the group
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decision ignores the ongoing process of decision making. 
Although the choice shift framework is an attempt to explain 
the final outcome of group decisions, the principal models 
are linked to group processes, specifically those involving 
group interaction and discussion.
The findings in this investigation emphasize several 
components of choice shift which may have immediate effect 
on studies of group decisions. One treatment variable, 
decision rule, indicates that greater shifts will occur when 
only a majority decision is required. The implication for 
political groups is clear; the requirement for a group con­
sensus will result in smaller shifts away from individual 
predispositions than would occur under a majority decision 
rule. The results of this investigation also imply that 
the premises of value theory are correct. Thus, when deci­
sion makers view themselves as different from other typical 
decision makers on an issue, the result is a greater choice 
shift.
Possibly more important to political decision-making 
theory is the lack of relationship between the volume of 
alternatives search and the shifting of choices. No clear 
evidence cam be presented for increased volume of informa­
tion search or increased availability of information having 
any effect on group shifts. In fact, the evidence indicates 
that when groups are required to reach a consensus decision, 
rather than majority solution, the shifts will be less— in
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spite of the fact that consensus groups search for more 
information. Given the increasing information availability 
in society, can the consequences of greater information be 
decisions that reflect the predispositions of individuals 
before group processes?
The current evidence indicates that shifts still 
occur, but without the influence of information availability 
or search. Instead, the processes of group interaction en­
able decision makers to move away from initial positions 
such that the decisions of groups move toward stronger recom­
mendations of choices which were initially favored by the 
individuals before the group meeting.
Conclusion
Group decision making is becoming more prevalent for 
resolving the complex political and policy problems in our 
society. Additionally, the increasing complexity of policy 
issues requires different individuals with often divergent 
skills and interests to meet and attempt to resolve the 
issues placed before them. If the results of this study 
are correct, and groups do make decisions on the basis of 
factors other than the information that they gather in the 
group setting, then the future usage of small groups for 
resolving political and policy issues needs to be examined.
Yet, the evidence in this study does not indicate 
that individual-level search smd decision making resolves 
the issue. More complex cuialyses of individual versus group
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decision making have suggested that the former may also 
result in decisions that simply reflect individual predis­
positions (for review, see Dion et al., 1970). Thus, no 
answers are suggested in this investigation. Future re­
search must come to grips with the realization that the cur­
rent explanatory factors for examining group decision making 
cannot adequately tap all of the aspects of the decision pro­
cess. Thus, research must find new measures that empiri­
cally isolate the elements of decisional analysis. This 
investigation has attempted to delineate areas, both in 
theory and research, that may enable greater understanding 
of the process of decision making— a process which may be 




1. Please fill in your social security number in the space provided below.
2. What is your class standing? Circle the appropriate response.
Freshman Sophomore Junior Senior Graduate
3. What is your sex? Circle the appropriate response.
Male Female
The next section of the questionnaire centers on your attitudes toward 
various social and political events around you. Below is a sample ques­
tion for illustration.
Sample Question:
Politicians are basically honest people.
Strongly Moderately Somewhat Somewhat Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Disagree
If you agree strongly, circle #1 
If you moderately agree, circle #2
If you have mixed feelings, but tend to agree, circle #3 
If you are not in agreement or disagreement, circle #4 
If you have mixed feelings, but tend to disagree, circle #5 
If you moderately disagree, circle #6 
If you disagree strongly, circle #7
Each line represents your attitude or opinion on each of the questions. 
Please read each carefully and give your judgment by circling the number 
of the response that most closely reflects your feelings or opinion. Take
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your time and answer each question. Circle only one response for each 
question.
4. Large universities overemphasize organized athletics.
Strongly Strongly
Agree Neutral Disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. New technological developments are needed to save America's Icurge 
cities.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. The federal government has spent too much money on military weaponry 
and not enough for its people.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. This country should not support military dictatorships around the 
world.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. We need to protect our environment even if it means some people will 
lose their jobs.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. One of the reasons our environment is in danger is because Americans 
are too selfish.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. The prime purpose of the government in Washington is to defend the 
people against outside aggression, not to try to solve all of the 
problems of society.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. Foreign aid has been used too often to aid nations which are 
unfriendly to our country.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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12. Americans buy whatever is new just because it is different.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13. Professors vho do a lot of research are not very good teachers.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is 
useful to do so.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
15. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear. 
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
16. One should tedce action only when sure it is morally right.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
17. Most people are basically good and kind.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
18. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it 
will come out when they are given a chcmce.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
19. Honesty is the best policy in all cases.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
20. There is no excuse for lying to someone else.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
21. Generally speaking, people won't work hard unless they're forced to 
do so.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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22. All in all, it is better to be humble «md honest than to be important 
amd dishonest.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
23. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the
real reasons for wanting it rather than giving reasons which carry 
more weight.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
24. Host people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
25. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
26. The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is 
that the criminals are stupid enough to get caught.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
27. Host people are brave.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
28. It is wise to flatter important people.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
29. It is possible to be good in all respects.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
30. Bamum was wrong when he said that there's a sucker b om every minute. 
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7.
31. It is hard to get ahead without cutting comers to get there.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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32. People suffering from incurable diseases should have the choice of 
being put painlessly to death.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
33. Host people forget more easily the death of a parent than the loss 
of their property.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
34. If X have an important project for class, I would rather work on it 
with a few others as a group project than work on it on my own.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
35. Without the right breaks one Ccinnot be an effective leader.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
36. I enjoy planning things .ind deciding what each person in a group 
should do.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
37. I must admit that I try to see what others think before I take a 
stand.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
38. Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability; luck has 
little or nothing to do with it.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
39. People seem to naturally turn to me when decisions have to be made. 
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
40. As far as world affairs eure concerned, most of us are the victims of 
forces we can neither understand nor control.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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41. Generally, I find that solving problems in a group takes twice as 
long as it would take to solve them myself.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
42. When I work on a committee, X like to take charge of things.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
43. There really is no such thing as luck.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
44. I feel nervous when I try to do something in a group.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
45. Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that 
happen to me.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
46. Most groups that I have been in are not effective in making decisions. 
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
47. I would rather not have much responsibility for getting people intro­
duced.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
48. It is is^ssible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an 
in^rtëtnt role in my life.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
49. When in a group of people, I have trouble thinking of the right 
things to say.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
50. Most people don't realize the extent to which their lives are con­
trolled by accidental happenings.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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51. I find that I leam more when I study for an exam with other students, 
rather than by myself.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
52. In school, I generally find it easy to talk in front of a class.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
53. By taking an active part in political amd social affairs, the people 
can better control world events.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
54. In a group, I am often the person who gets the group started by 
mcücing sure everybody gets introduced.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
55. Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky enough to 
be in the right place first.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
56. I must admit that I feel that I have accomplished more when I finish 
a task by myself rather than completing it with a group.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
57. In a group of strangers, I am often afraid of saying or doing some­
thing that I might regret afterwards.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
58. Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken advantage 
of their opportunities.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The Machiavellian Scale— Questions 14-33.
The Locus-of-Control Scale— Questions 35, 38, 40, 43, 45, 48, 50, 53, 
55, and 58.
APPENDIX B
PRETEST— FIVE POLICY ITEMS
INSTRUCTIONS
Social Security No.
This section of the questionnaire contains five items that require 
some important decisions. We would like you to read each item carefully 
and examine all of the information given to help you make an advisory 
recommendation. Then check the blank at the end of the item that most 
clearly approximates your decision. The possible recommendations range 
from strongly favoring one alternative to strongly favoring the other.
If you feel that you cannot make a rec<xnmendation either way, mark 
neutral.
Next to your decision on each item we ask you to check the blank 
that most closely approximates how you think 200 other University of 
Oklahoma students like you might respond. Obviously, we are asking you 
to estimate their response.
Please answer all five decision items. There cire no right or wrong 
answers. An example of the answers you must check appears below:
Check What Other Students Might 
Your Recommendations; Recommend;
 (1) Strongly favor alternative X  (1) Strongly favor alternative x
(2) Moderately fayor alternative (2) Moderately favor alternative
X X
(3) Slightly fayor alternative X  (3) slightly fayor altematiye X
(4) Neutral; favor neither alter- (4) Neutral; favor neither alter­
native X or Y_______________________native X or Y
(5) Slightly favor aatemative Y  (5) Slightly favor alternative Y
(6) Moderately favor alternative (6) Moderately favor alternative
Y Y




An important decision-maker in state Alpha needs to decide whether or 
not to build a dam on a local river. Serious spring flood problems 
caused considerable damage to farms, yet environmentalists object to the 





For the Icist 10 years several 
floods to farms have cost approxi­
mately $50 million; a dam would 
control such floods.
Loss of food crops affects rising 
prices on food items in neighbor­
ing communities.
Against the Dam
1. The dam will require several 
years to conglete and will cost 
at least $100 million to the 
state (even though federal 
funding will help).
2. EnvironmentcULists claim an 
historic, wild and scenic river 
will be destroyed— and recrea­
tional facilities that have 
functioned along the river 
will be lost.
CHECK YOUR RECOMMENDATION
(1) Strongly favor building the 
dam
CHECK WHAT OTHER STUDENTS MIGHT 
RECOMMEND


















Nation A amd Nation B are at the edge of war over a lightly populated 
mountcûn area along their common border. Both nations turn to your 
nation in the situation and a national, decision-maker whom you are advis­
ing must take a position on the issue. Your nation is very influential 
with both nations and neither will meet with the other.
BACKGROOND INFORMATION
For Nation A
1. Nation A is a democracy while 
Nation B is a military dictator­
ship.
2. Nation A has developed the 
natural resources in the dis­
puted eurea in the last 10 years 
and Nation B has never mentioned 
its claim until the area has 
been developed.
CHECK YODR RECOMMENDATION







(7) Strongly favor Nation B
For Nation B
1. Nation B is a strong supporter 
of your nation, Wiile Nation A 
is building close ties with 
your strongest enemies.
2. The mountain area has belonged 
to Nation B until only 30 years 
ago when Nation A claimed it 
during a world war.
CHECK MHAT OTHER STDDENTS MIGHT 
RECOMMEND







_(7) Strongly favor Nation B
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Problem #3
Your nation is at a crossroads. The nation is no longer as wealthy as 
10 years earlier, thus the usual high monetary commitment to both domes­
tic and military programs will change. Your advise to a national 




1. Because your nation is a world 
power further cutbacks in mili­
tary weaponry will reduce the 
nation's ability to defend it­
self.
2. A reduction in military spend­
ing will result in a loss of 
jobs to many people currently 
working in militeury-related 
jobs.
For Domestic Spending
1. Internal needs for housing, 
medical care and aid to the 
elderly are growing and all 
have been limited in the 
amount of funds previously 
available.
2. Those in favor of domestic 
spending argue that the mili­
tary, through cost overruns 
and waste, are misusing their 
funds.
CHECK YOUR RECOMMENDATION
(1) Strongly recommend emphasis 
on military spending
CHECK WHAT OTHER STDDENTS MIGHT 
RECOMMEND


















Your city has a limited amount of funds available for building new 
tretnsportation facilities. The city's population is climbing dramatically 
The alternatives are to build a new highway in and out of the city or 
a new mass transit system consisting of increased bus service cuid a new 
subway system. The mayor needs your advice on these alternatives.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
For the Highway
1. The new highway is over a 
million dollars cheaper -̂.ha-n the 
mass transit system.
2. Mass transit systems in other 
large cities have met with 
mixed success; many are not 
being used by the population.
For Mass Transit
1. The mass transit supporters 
point out that if the popula­
tion continues to grow, the 
highway will be out of date 
in 10 years vdiile the mass 
trcuisit system will be useful 
for at least 50 years.
2. Mass transit advocates have 
polled the city residents and 
find a large percentage claim?- 
ing they would ride the new 
transit system.
CHECK YOUR RECCBIHENDATION
(1) Strongly recommend building 
the highway
CHECK WHAT OTHER STUDENTS MIGHT 
RECOMMEND







_(7) Strongly recommend building 






(7) Strongly recommend building 
the mass tremsit system
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Problem #5
Your college regents need advice on priorities. Money for education is 
currently extremely tight in your university. Your institution is a 
private school with only a small amount of governmental funding. Because 
of the tight money situation, either money for research must be cut 
back, or athletic funding will need to be reduced.
BACKGROOND INFORMATION
For anphasis on Research Funding For Emphasis on Athletic Funding
1. In past years, organized athletics 
has a mixed record of success. 
Football and various minor spring 
sports have failed monetarily. 
Basketball has been successful 
but cemnot make up for the 
deficits in other athletic 
programs.
2. Because of the high academic 
quality of your school, a reduc­
tion in research funding may cause 
several prominent scholars to 
leave the school and thus lower 
the prestige of the school.
CHECK YOUR RECOMMENDATION
1. The alumni chapter is pushing 
for continued support of ath­
letics, and their contributors 
make up some 25% of the univer­
sity budget each ysax.
2. The community where the school 
is located points out that 
research from the university 
has done very little to aid the 
community, ii&ereas athletics 
brings community ties closer 
to the school.







(7) Strongly recommend en^hasis 
on athletic funding
CHECK NHAT OTHER STUDENTS MIGHT 
RECCaOEND















The questioimad.re before you is similar to the one you completed 
recently in class. You were asked to answer it in order to familiarize 
yourself with the various situations and to reach some tentative deci­
sions about each. At this time, read each one of the situations caure- 
fully emd mark your decision in the appropriate space.
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Problem #1
An importcuit decision-maker in state Alpha needs to decide whether or 
not to build a dam on a local river. Serious spring flood problems 
caused considerable damage to farms, yet environmentalists object to 
the dam because of damage to a scenic river.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
For the Dam
1. For the last 10 years several 
floods to fcunns have cost 
approximately $50 million;
a dam would control such floods.
2. Loss of food crops affects ris­
ing prices on food items in 
neighboring communities.
Against the Dam
1. The dam will require several 
years to complete and will cost 
at least $100 million to the 
state (even though federal 
funding will help).
2. Environmentalists claim an 
historic, wild and scenic river 
will be destroyed— and recre­
ational facilities that have 
functioned along the river will 
be lost.
CHECK YOUR RECOMMENDATION




_____(5) Strongly oppose building the dam
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Problem #2
Nation A and Nation B (both friendly to your nation] are at the edge of 
war over a lighly populated mountain area along their common border.
Both nations turn to your nation in the situation and a national decision­
maker whom you are advising must take a position on the issue. Your 




1. Nation A is a democracy while 
Nation B is a military dic­
tatorship.
2. Nation A has developed the 
natural resources in the dis­
puted area in the last 10 years 
and Nation B has never men­
tioned its claim until the 
area has been developed.
For Nation B
1. Nation B is a strong supporter 
of your nation, while Nation A 
is building close ties with 
your strongest enemies.
2. The mountain area has belonged 
to Nation B until only 30 years 
ago when Nation A claimed it 
during a world war.
CHECK YOUR RECOMMENDATION






 (7) Strongly favor Nation B
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Problem #3
Your nation is at a crossroads. The nation is no longer as wealthy as 
10 yeëurs earlier, thus the usual high monetary commitment to both comes- 
tic and military programs will change. Your advice to a national 




1. Because your nation is a world 
power, further cutbacks in 
military weaponry will reduce 
the nation's ability to defend 
itself.
2. A reduction in military spend­
ing will result in a loss of 
jobs to many people currently 
working in military-related 
jobs.
For Dqnestic Spending
1. Intemcil needs for housing, 
medical care and aid to the 
elderly are growing and all 
have been limited in the 
amount of funds previously 
available.
2. Those in favor of domestic 
spending argue that the mili­
tary, through cost-overruns 
and waste, are misusing their 
funds.
CHECK YOUR RECOMMENDATION






 (7) Strongly recommend et^hasis on dcmiestic spending
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Problem #4
Your city has a limited amount of funds for building new transportation 
facilities. The city's population is climbing dramatically. The 
alternatives are to build a new highway going in auid out of the city or 
a new mass transit system consisting of increased bus service and a new 
subway system. The mayor needs your advice on these alternatives.
BACKGSOOND INFORMATION
For the Highway
1. The new highway is over a 
million dollars cheaper than 
the mass transit system.
2. Mass transit systems in other 
large cities have met with 
mixed success; many are not 
being used by the population.
For Mass Transit
1. The mass transit supporters 
point out that if the popula­
tion continues to grow, the 
highway will be out of date 
in 10 years, while the mass 
transit system will be useful 
for at least 50 yeeurs.
2. Mass transit advocates have 
polled the city residents 
and find a large percentage 
claiming they would ride the 
new transit system.
CHECK YOOR RECOMMENDATION





 (6) Strongly recommend building the mass transit system
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Problem #5
Your college regents need advice on priorities. Money for education is 
currently extremely tight in your university. Your institution is a 
private school with only a small amount of governmental funding. Because 
of the tight money situation, either money for research must be cut back, 
or athletic funding will need to be reduced.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
For Emphasis on Athletic Funding
1. The alumni chapter is pushing 
for continued support of ath­
letics, and their contributors 
make up some 25% of the univer­
sity budget each year.
2. The community where the school 
is located points out that 
research from the university 
has done very little to aid the 
community, whereas athletics 
brings community ties close to 
the school.
For Emphasis on Research Funding
1. In past years, organized ath­
letics has a mixed record of 
success. Football and various 
minor spring sports have failed 
monetarily. Basketball has 
been successful but cannot 
mcike up for the deficits in 
other athletic programs.
2. Because of the high academic 
quality of your school, a reduc­
tion in research funds may cause 
several prominent scholars to 
leave the school and thus lower 
the prestige of the school.
CHECK YOUR RECOMMENDATION






_(7) Strongly recommend emphasis on athletic funding
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MAJORITY DECISION/LOW INFORMATION GROUPS
Social Security No.
INSTRUCTIONS
The questionnaire before you is similar to the one you completed 
recently in class. You were asked to answer it individually first in 
order to familiarize yourself with the various situations cmd to reach 
some tentative decisions about each. We would now like you to discuss 
each situation with other members of the group and, in turn, arrive at 
a majority recommendation. That is, at least three of you must agree 
to a particular choice. After reaching a majority decision, you are 
to mark this choice on your questionnaire. If you disagree with the 
majority, your personal recommendation should be indicated by placing 




An important decision-maker in state Alpha needs to decide whether or 
not to build a dam on a local river. Serious ^ring flood problems 
caused considerable damage to farms, yet environmentalists object to 
the dam because of damage to a scenic river.
BACKGROUND INFORMATIŒ)
For the Dam
1. For the last 10 years several 
floods to farms have cost 
approximately $50 million;
a dam would control such 
floods.
2. Loss of food crops affects riS' 
ing prices on food items in 
neighboring communities.
Against the Dam
1. The dam will require several 
years to complete and will 
cost at least $100 million to 
the state (even though fed­
eral funding will help].
2. Environmentalists claim an 
historic, wild cuid scenic 
river will be destroyed— and 
recreational facilities that 
have functioned along the 
river will be lost.
CHECK THE RECOMMENDATION FOR 
YOUR GROUP







_(7) Strongly oppose building 
the dam
IF YOU DISSENT OR DISAGREE WITH 
THE MAJORITY RECŒlMENDATim, CHECK 
YOUR PERSONAL CHOICE











Nation A and Nation B (both friendly to your nation) are at the edge of 
war over a lightly populated mountain area along their common border. 
Both nations turn to your nation in the situation and a nationctl 
decision-maker vdiom you are advising must take a position on the issue. 




1. Nation A is a democracy while 
Nation B is a military dic­
tatorship.
2. Nation A has developed the 
natural resources in the dis­
puted area in the last 10 years 
emd Nation B has never men­
tioned its claim until the area 
has been developed.
For Nation B
1. Nation B is a strong supporter 
of your nation, while Nation A 
is building close ties with 
your strongest enemies.
2. The mountain area has belonged 
to Nation B until only 30 years 
ago when Nation A claimed it 
during a world war.
CHECK THE BECOmiENDATICN OF YOUR 
GRODF







_(7) Strongly favor Nation B
IF YOU DISSENT OR DISAGREE WITH THE 
MAJORITY RECOMMENDATION, CHECK YOUR 
PERSONAL CHOICE







_(7) Strongly favor Nation B
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Problem #3
Your nation is at a crossroads. The nation is no longer as wealthy as 
10 years earlier, thus the usoetl high monetary commitment to both domes­
tic and military programs will change. Your advice to a national 




1. Because your nation is a world 
power, further cutbacks in mili- 
taury weaponry will reduce the 
nation's ability to defend it­
self.
2. A reduction in military spend­
ing will result in a loss of 
jobs to many people currently 
working in military-related 
jobs.
For Domestic Spending
1. Internal needs for housing, 
medical care and aid to the 
elderly are growing and all 
have been limited in the 
amount of funds previously 
available.
2. Those in favor of domestic 
spending argue that the 
military, through cost- 
overruns and waste, are mis­
using their funds.
CHECK THE RECOMMENDATION OF YOOR 
GROUP
_(1) Strongly recommend empha­






_(7) Strongly recommend empha­
sis on domestic spending
IF YOD DISSENT OR DISAGREE WITH 
THE MAJORITY RECOMMENDATION, CHECK 
YOOR PERSCatAL CHOICE
(1) Strongly recommend empha­






(7) Strongly reconmend enpha- 
sis on domestic spending
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Problem #4
Your city has a limited amount of funds available for building new 
transportation facilities. The city's population is climbing dramati­
cally. The alternatives axe to build a new highway going in and out of 
the city or a new mass transit system consisting of increased bus serv­




1. The new highway is over a 
million dollars cheaper than 
the mass transit system.
2. Mass transit systems in other 
large cities have met with 
mixed success; many are not 
being used by the population.
For Mass Trainsit
1. The mass transit supporters 
point out that if the popula­
tion continues to grow, the 
highway will be out of date 
in 10 years while the mass 
transit system will be use­
ful for at least 50 years.
2. Mass tTcuisit advocates have 
polled the city residents 
and find a large percentage 
claiming they would ride the 
new transit system.
CHECK THE RECOMMENDATION FOR YOOR 
GROUP







_(7> Strongly recommend build­
ing the mass transit sys­
tem
IF YOD DISSENT OR DISAGREE WITH 
THE MAJORITY RECOMMENDATION, CHECK 
YOUR PERSONAL CHOICE







_(7) Strongly recommend build­




Your college regents need advice on priorities. Money for education 
is currently extremely tight in your university. Your institution is 
a private school with only a small amount of governmental funding. 
Because of the tight money situation, either money for research must be 
cut back, or athletic funding will need to be reduced.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
For Emphasis on Research Funding
1. In past years, organized ath­
letics has a mixed record of 
success. Football and various 
minor spring sports have failed 
monetarily. Basketball has 
been successful but cannot make 
up for the deficits in other 
athletic programs.
2. Because of the high academic 
quality of your school, a reduc­
tion in research funds may cause 
several prominent scholars to 
leave the school and thus lower 
the prestige of the school.
For Emphasis on Athletic Funding
1. The alumni chapter is pushing 
for continued support of ath­
letics, and their contributors 
make up some 25% of the univer­
sity budger each year.
2. The community where the school 
is located points out that 
research from the university 
has done very little to aid the 
community, whereas athletics 
brings community ties closer
to the school.
CHECK THE RECOMMENDATION FOR YOUR 
GROUP
_(1) Strongly recommend enpha- 






_(7) Strongly recommend empha- 
sis on athletic funding
IF YOU DISSENT OR DISAGREE WITH THE 
MAJORITY RECOMMENDATION, CHECK YOUR 
PERSONAL PREFERENCE
(1) Strongly recommend empha­






(7) Strongly recommend empha­
sis on athletic funding
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MAJORITY DECISION/HIGH INFORMATION GROUPS
Social Security No.
INSTRUCTIONS
The questionnaire before you is similar to the one you completed 
recently in class. You were asked to answer it individually first in 
order to familicurize yourself with the various situations and to reach 
some tentative decisions about each. In addition, more background in­
formation has been provided to aid in your decision. We would now like 
you to discuss each situation with other members of the group and n 
turn, arrive at a majority recommenation. That is, at least three of 
you must agree to a particular choice. After reaching a majority 
decision, you are to meurk this choice on your questionnaire. If you 
disagree with the majority, your personal recommendation should be 
indicated by placing an additional check in the appropriate blank on 
the second set of answers.
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Problem #1
An important, decision-maker in state Alpha needs to decide whether or 
not to build a dam on a local river. Serious spring flood problems 
caused considerable damage to farms, yet environmentalists object to the 
dam because of damage to a scenic river.
BACKGRODND INFORMATION
For the Dam
1. For the last 10 years several 
floods to farms have cost 
approximately $50 million; a 
dam would control such floods.
2. Loss of food crops affects ris­
ing prices on food items in 
neighboring communities.
3. Pro-dam groups suggest that new 
recreational facilities will 
result from the lake created 
by the dam.
4. Farmers in the area claim that 
if severe floods continue most 
of the farmers will eventually 
go bankrupt.
5. Pro-dam groups note that dams 
built in neighboring states 
have not adversely affected 
the wildlife in those areas.
Against the Dam
1. The dam will require several 
years to complete and will cost 
at least $100 million to the 
state (even though federal 
funding will help).
2. Environmentalists claim an 
historic, wild and scenic 
river will be destroyed— and 
recreational facilities that 
have functioned cilong the river 
will be lost.
3. Anti-dam groups claim that the 
surrounding wilderness area 
will be destroyed by over­
commercialization of the area.
4. Environmentalists claim that 
too little is known about the 
possible effects on the animal 
wildlife if the dam is built.
5. Environmentalists emphasize 
that several varieties of fish 
in the river may be destroyed 
if the dam is built.
CHECK THE RECOMMENDATION FOR YOUR 
GRODP
IF YOU DISSENT OR DISAGREE WITH THE 
MAJORITY RECOMMENDATION, CHECK YOUR 
PERSONAL CHOICE







(7) Strongly oppose building 
the dam







(7) Strongly oppose building
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Problem #2
Nation A and Nation B (both friendly to your nation) arc at the edge of 
war over a lightly populated mountain area along their common border. 
Both nations turn to your nation in the situation and a national 
decision-metker whom you are advising must take a position on the issue. 




1. Nation A is a democracy while 
Nation B is a military dictator­
ship.
2. Nation A has developed the 
natural resources in the dis­
puted area in the last 10 years 
and Nation B has never mentioned 
its claim until the area has 
been developed.
3. Nation A's developing economy 
is deeply tied to keeping their 
new resources— while Nation B 
is a relatively rich nation.
4. Nation A's development has pro­
vided jobs for most of the 
people in the area.
5. Some claim that if Nation A 
loses the mountain area, a 
revolution will occur in the 
country and the democratic 
regime will collapse.
CHECK THE RECOMMENDATION OF
YOUR GRODP







 (7) Strongly favor Nation B
For Nation B
1. Nation B is a strong supporter 
of your nation, while Nation A 
is building close ties with your 
strongest enemies.
2. The mountain area has belonged 
to Nation B until only 30 years 
ago when Nation A claimed it 
during a world war.
3. Although sparsely populated, 
about 60% of the people in the 
mountain area want to be joined 
to Nation B.
4. Nation B claims that Nation A 
is exploiting the mountain area 
by taking all of the natural 
resources out of the area for 
its own use.
5. The close relationship of your 
nation to Nation B will be 
severely damaged if Nation B 
loses its claim to the land.
IF YOD DISSENT OR DISAGREE WITH THE
MAJORITY RECOMMENDATION, CHECK YODR
PERSONAL CHOICE







 (7) Strongly favor Nation B
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Problem #3
Your nation is at a crossroads. The nation is no longer as wealthy as 
10 years earlier, thus the usual high monetary commitment to both 
domestic and military programs will change. Your advice to a national 




1. Because your nation is a world 
power, further cutbacks in mili­
tary weaponry will reduce the 
nation's ability to defend it­
self.
2. A reduction in military spending 
will result in a loss of jobs to 
many people currently working in 
military-related jobs.
3. Other advisors argue that reduc­
ing our commitments around the 
world is just isolationism and 
will only cause the nation to 
decline as a world power.
4. Some claim that the money spent 
on domestic programs hêis been 
wasted, and that no new commit­
ments should be made in such 
programs until they work.
5. Others en^hasize that the gov­
ernment should not be involved 
in housing, welfare, and other 
such programs, but that it only 
should protect the population 
from foreign invasion.
CHECK THE RECOMMENDATION OF 
YOOR GRODP
 (1) Strongly recommend empha­






 (7) Strongly recommend emoha-
For Domestic Spending
1. Internal needs for housing, 
medicctl care and aid to the 
elderly are growing and all have 
been limited in the amount of 
funds previously available.
2. Those in favor of domestic 
spending argue that the mili­
tary, through cost-overruns and 
waste, are misusing their funds.
3. Some argue that we have become 
too reliant on solving world 
problems with military actions 
and now we must turn back to our 
own internal problems.
4. Some claim that we carry too much 
of the weight for supplying the 
world military weapons, and that 
our allies should contribute more 
of their manpower and money for 
military uses.
5. Because there are increasing num­
bers of elderly in the population, 
more money is necessary to pro­
vide for their needs.
IF YOU DISSENT OR DISAGREE WITH THE
MAJORITY RECOMMENDATION, CHECK YOUR
PERSONAL CHOICE
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Problem #4
Your city has a limited amount of funds available for building new 
transportation facilities. The city's population is climbing dramati­
cally. The alternatives are to build a new highway going in and out of 
the city or a new mass transit system consisting of increased bus serv­
ice and a new subway service. The mayor needs your advice on these 
alternatives.
BACKGRODND INFORMATION






1.The new highway is over a 
million dollars cheaper than the 
mass transit system.
Mass transit systems in other 
large cities have met with mixed 
success; many are not being used 
by the population. 2.
Highway advocates point out that 
people in your city always 
drive cars and that mass tran­
sit will be ignored. 3.
Highway supporters point out 
that highways are the most 
favored means of travel and that 
mass transit is still in an 
experimental stage. 4.
Even though a mass transit sys­
tem is useful longer than a high­
way, replacing highways are much 
cheaper than replacing transit 
systems.
CHECK THE RECCMMENDATION FOR 
YODR GRODP
 (1) Strongly recommend build­
ing the highway
The mass transit supporters point 
out that if the population con­
tinues to grow, the highway will 
be out of date in 10 years while 
the mass transit system will be 
useful for at least 50 years.
Mass transit advocates have polled 
the city residents and find a 
large percentage claiming they 
would ride the new transit system.
Because of increasing costs of 
fuel and the growth of the city 
further away from the central city 
automobiles may become too expen­
sive to operate.
Building more highways just en­
courages more urban sprawl.
5. As highways êu:e built, people lose 
their homes, or their property 
values decline while mass transit 
causes a minimum of population 
disruption.
IF YOD DISSENT OR DISAGREE WITH THE 















(7) Strongly recommend build­
ing the transit system





Your college regents need advice on priorities. Money for education is 
currently extremely tight in your university. Your institution is a 
private school with only a small amount of governmental funding. Because 
of the tight money situation, either money for research must be cut back, 
or athletic funding will need to be reduced.
BACKGRODND INFORMATION
For Emphasis on Resectrch Funding
1. In past years, organized ath­
letics has a mixed record of 
success. Football and various 
minor sports have failed mone­
tarily. Basketball has been 
successful but cannot make up 
for the deficits in other ath­
letic programs.
2. Because of the high academic 
quality of your school, a re­
duction in research funds may 
cause several prominent 
scholars to leave the school 
and thus lower the prestige of 
the school.
3. The school's faculty suggests 
that research has often con­
tributed to the advancement of 
science throughout the world.
4. A large petition drive is cur­
rently being boosted by some of 
the students in support of the 
research funding.
5. The standards of education and 
the prestige that a degree 
from this school exacts may 
decline if the university cuts 
back on research funding.








Strongly recommend en^h- 
sis on research funding
Neutral
For Emphasis on Athletic Funding
1. The alumni chapter is pushing 
for continued support of ath­
letics, and their contributions 
make up seme 25% of the univer­
sity budget each year.
2. The community vdiere the school 
is located points out that re­
search from the university has 
done very little to aid the com­
munity, Tpdiereas athletics brings 
community ties closer to the 
school.
3. Athletic programs make univer­
sities more visible in the pop­
ulation; a cut in athletic fund­
ing thus may cause a decline in 
student enrollment, and thus force 
a cutback in all university fund­
ing.
4. Athletics gives a university some­
thing to build a cohesive school 
around and such "school spirit" is 
crucial for the maintenance of a 
university.
5. Beyond a prestige factor, research 
does not help the school, but suc­
cessful athletic programs usually 
increase enrollment and thus in­
crease funds for the university.
IF YOU DISSENT OR DISAGREE WITH THE












CONSENSUS GHODPS/LOW INFORMATION GROUPS*
Social Security No.
INSTRUCTIFS
The questionnaire before you is similar to the one you consisted 
recently in class. You were asked to answer it individually first in 
order to familiarize yourself with the various situations and to reach 
some tentative decisions about each. We would now like you to discuss 
each situation with other members of the group and arrive at a 
unanimous recommendation about each item. After reaching a unanimous 
decision, mark the group's choice on your questionnaire.
*The information presented for each item is the same as in the 
majority/low information condition.
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CONSENSUS DECISION/HIGH INFORMATION GROUPS*
Social Security No.
INSTRUCTIONS
The questionnaire before you is similar to the one you completed 
recently in class. You were asked to answer it individually first in 
order to familiarize yourself with the various situations and to reach 
sane tentative decisions about each. In addition, more background 
information has been provided to aid in your decision. We would now 
like you to discuss each situation with other members of the group and 
arrive at a unanimous recommendation about each item. After reaching 
a unanimous decision, mark the group's choice on your questionnaire.




CODER 1— INTERACTION AND BALES CATEGORIES
Coder 1 Group No._____  Group Type_____  Problem No.__
Bales
From To Positive Negative











CODER 2— INFORMATION CODING
























CODER 3— BALES AND INFORMATION CODING
Coder 3 Group #_____  Group Type_____  Problem



























The following cure a list of questions on your experience in the group 
session. Please answer all of the questions. Each item is based on the 
continuum as shown below.
Strongly Moderately Somewhat Somewhat Moderately Strongly
Agree Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree Disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
After reading the question, please circle the response that is most 
like your preferred response.
1. I am satisfied with the decisions of my group.
Strongly Strongly
Agree Neutral Disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. The information we had was helpful in making our decisions.
SA N SD
3. We had adequate information with vdiich to make our decisions.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. The members of my group worked well together.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. I was interested in the policy issues.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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6. There was a great deal of conflict in my group.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. The group as a whole was interested in the policy issues.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. There was general consensus in my group in terms of the final 
decision on the policy issues.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9- In nry group, a single person tended to push ideas on the rest of 
the group.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. In my group, a small group of people tended to push ideas on the 
rest of the ccsnmittee.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. In general, I disagreed with the final decisions of my group.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12. In general, the differences among the people in my group on the 
policy issues were minor.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13. My group was tense when we began the meeting.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14. By the end of the meeting, my group was relaxed.
SA N SA
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
15. I would like to work on similar problems with this group again.
SA N SD
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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16. I enjoyed the group session.
SA N
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Now we would like to ask you some questions on the other members of your 
group. For each question, all of the member are listed. Circle the 
letter for the member, other than yourself, vbo best fits the question.
17. First, identify yourself by letter.
A B C D E
18. When given a specific policy problem similar to those just completed, 
with whom would you most like to work?
19. When given a specific policy problem similar to those just completed, 
with whom would you least like to work?
20. When seeking advice on specific policy problems, who could advise 
you most competently?
21. Among member of the group, who would you most enjoy having as a 
personal friend?
A B C D E
22. Who contributed most to the decisions which were made by your group? 
A B C D E
23. If your group would meet again, who should be the chairperson of 
the group?
24. If you could remove one person from a future group meeting, who 
would you remove?
A B O D E
25. What do you think this exercise was about?
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